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A puzzling age gap in vote choice appeared between young and older Americans 
between the 2004 and the 2012 presidential elections in the United States. This dissertation 
seeks to explain the emergence and persistence of this gap, and more generally to 
understand when the usual processes of political socialization might be disrupted. I posit 
that in today’s polarized political environment, young people are more susceptible to the 
short-term forces affecting campaigns and elections—namely national context, 
performance issues, and candidates—due to their malleable partisan preferences. Older 
Americans, with more crystallized partisan attachments and better-defined political 
predispositions, are not as easily swayed by national conditions and the short-term forces 
impacting politics. While young people usually do not pay much attention to nor engage 
much with politics, the prevailing national conditions and turbulence of the political 
environment from 2004 to 2012 made politics salient to young people, leading to a 
performance issue-driven shift in attitudes and opinions about candidate and party 
competency on handling major problems facing the country. In the future, I expect we 
might see another age gap in vote choice when party competency is questioned on the large 
salient issues of an election, particularly on issues of foreign policy, and the national 
context strongly favors one party over the other. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, a general consensus among political 
behavior scholars regarding young Americans emerged— young people were generally 
uninvolved and uninterested in politics (e.g. Wattenberg 2011, Zukin et al. 2006). Since 
the turn of the twenty-first century, though, we have seen an increase in turnout and 
participation among the youngest segment of the electorate. This, in and of itself, is an 
intriguing development. However, the more puzzling and interesting development that is 
largely overlooked is the party gap that has developed between the Millennial1 generation 
and the rest of the U.S. electorate since 2000. The 2000 election itself seems to have been 
a critical turning point, as it was the last election in which the young and older electorate 
resembled each other in terms of vote choice. From 2004 to 2012, a much higher percentage 
of 18-29-year-olds preferred Democratic candidates at election time compared to 
Americans over the age of 30. This tendency is particularly notable at the presidential level. 
Indeed, despite the increased focus on youth turnout in recent elections, the most striking 
fact is not their level of participation (though this has gone up proportionally, they still vote 
at lower levels than every other age group), but their remarkably pro-Democratic behavior. 
The empirical data on this fact are striking. According to the American National 
Election Studies (ANES), a 15-point disparity in Democratic presidential candidate 
preference2 emerged in 2004 between 18-29-year-olds and voters over 30. This gap shrank  
  
                                                 
1 The boundaries for what defines a “Millennial” vary from scholar to scholar. For the present study, any 
person born in 1979 or after is considered a member of the Millennial generation or cohort, as 2000 would 
be the first election that the oldest of these individuals would be eligible to vote. The defining characteristic 
of Millennials is coming of age with proficiency in the use of the Internet for information-gathering, which 
is virtually costless and widely available. Millennials are distinct in that they grew up in a period of true 
digital communities (Zukin et al. 2006, 16). A distinct end-boundary as to who is considered a Millennial 
has yet to be determined. 
2 These figures include both voters and nonvoters. 
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Figure 1.1: Democratic Presidential Candidate Preference by Age Group, Voters and 
Nonvoters (in percentages) 
 
Source: ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File 1980-20163 
to a nine-point difference in 2008 as the rest of the electorate preferred the Democratic 
candidate in higher proportions as well, and then expanded back to a 12-point difference 
in 2012 (Figure 1.1). These figures have been corroborated by several exit polls and 
surveys, most notably the Pew Research Center’s studies on the Millennial generation. The 
emergence and persistence of this gap is puzzling due to the fact that the preferences of 
young people had been fairly equal to those of older Americans for the previous two 
decades. In fact, the lack of interest and engagement of young people strongly suggests that 
                                                 
3 I only extend this graph back to 1980 to be consistent because this candidate preference variable includes 
both voters and nonvoters, and is calculated using two post-election variables. The first variable asks voters 
who they voted for in the election. The second question asks non-voters which candidate they preferred, 
even if they did not vote. The second candidate preference variable was first asked in the 1980 ANES, so 
extending the analysis back further would necessitate combining the post-election vote variable with a pre-
election candidate preference variable. This could be problematic since late-deciders (individuals who 
choose their preferred candidate within 2 weeks of an election) tend to be younger and less politically 
sophisticated than the rest of the electorate, and their choices look random in the American context 














their attitudes and preferences should not be terribly distinct. Just as puzzling is the fact 
that this gap disappeared in the 2016 election. Thus, recent changes represent not only an 
interesting empirical development in the behavior and opinions of young people, but also 
a new theoretical challenge to explain. 
Plenty of anecdotal evidence has been offed by the media as to why young people 
preferred Democrats at the ballot box from 2004 to 2012, and while marketing and 
journalistic stories about Millennials abound, few comprehensive systematic studies have 
been performed that link the seminal studies of youth opinion and behavior (e.g. Jennings 
and Niemi 1968; Beck 1975) to the recent behavioral phenomenon. My dissertation aims 
to fill this void, for both practical and political purposes. Practically speaking, the pro-
Democratic behavior of the young was a boon for the Democrats during this period; in fact, 
it may have been decisive in the 2012 presidential election. Because of the Electoral 
College, the youth vote carries more weight in some states than in others, and young people 
appear to have tipped the scales in favor of Obama in many of the consequential 
battleground states in 2012. Obama won Ohio by 2.98% (50.67-47.69), Virginia by 3.87% 
(51.15-47.28), and Florida by a mere 0.9% (50.0-49.1) (Husted 2012; Virginia SBOE 2012; 
Florida DOS 2012). In Ohio, where young people made up 17% of the electorate, 62% 
voted for Obama while 35% voted for Romney. This provided Obama with a net advantage 
of about 4.6 points statewide.  Similarly, the young in Florida and Virginia netted 5.4 and 
4.8 points for Obama, respectively. If Millennials had split their votes 50/50, Obama’s 
advantage would have been reduced by 2.04% (48.73 to 49.73) in Ohio, 2.53% in Virginia 
(47.98-50.41), and 2.56% in Florida (47.44-51.66). In other words, Obama would have lost 
these critical battleground states.  
From a more theoretical perspective, young people were a growing and increasingly 
distinct political force from 2004 to 2012, which defies traditional political socialization 
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patterns and challenges our understanding of how motivation and engagement influence 
political behavior. 18-29-year-olds comprised 17 percent of the electorate in 2004, 18 
percent of the electorate in 2008, and 19 percent of the electorate in 2012, while voters 65 
or older comprised only 16% of the electorate in each of these elections (Fox News 2012). 
Exit polls also indicate that 60% of 18-29-year-olds who turned out in 2012 voted for 
Barack Obama while only 44% of voters over the age of 65 did so. In 2000, on the other 
hand, exit poll data indicate the opposite—only about 48% of 18-29-year-olds who turned 
out voted for the Democratic candidate, while 51% of individuals over the age of 65 did so 
(CNN 2004). This suggests that the cohort of voters recently entering the electorate were 
much more Democratic in their preferences (almost 2 to 1) than the generation of voters 
they are replacing, hinting at a possible change in the distribution of preferences in the 
electorate. If the rate of candidate preference among the young in 2000 had been the same 
as it was in 2004, when the popular vote differed by only about half a million people and 
Bush won the Electoral College by five votes, Al Gore likely would have won the election 
comfortably. 
As several journalists and pundits have observed, if Millennials continue to vote 
Democratic in years to come, the Democrats will almost certainly command a sizable 
national majority (e.g. Judis 2007, Dionne Jr. 2010).  Moreover, the behavioral tendencies 
of young people with the Democrats is particularly worrisome for Republican elites. While 
young people today are not all liberal, party identifiers and partisan leaners are generally 
directionally stable. Relatively few people change from one party to the other, and any shift 
in partisanship is usually a shift in the intensity of partisan identification, not in direction 
(Keith et al. 1993, 87-88). In fact, leaners have a greater tendency to vote for the candidate 
of the party they feel closer to, and are generally more loyal to that party than weak 
partisans in presidential elections. And where individuals end up on the political spectrum 
 5 
largely depends on where they start; the political events of a voter’s teenage and early adult 
years are enormously important in the formation of long-term partisan preferences (Bartels 
and Jackson 2014; Ghitza and Gelman 2014). Because of this, we might expect a majority 
of Millennials today to retain their Democratic loyalty as they age.  
Despite numerous news reports about the voting preferences of young people in 
recent elections, with the exception of a handful of Pew Research Center reports, few 
systematic analyses to uncover the causes for the recent age gap in vote choice have been 
performed.  This dissertation looks to rectify this deficit. While this dissertation primarily 
investigates the causes for the differences in candidate preference between 18-29-year-olds 
and Americans over the age of 30 from 2004 to 2012, it also provides evidence on many 
of the conventional wisdoms and anecdotes about the changing behavior of the young. 
Plenty has been written about the transference of partisanship from parents to their 
children, about the malleability of political attitudes at the time one comes of political age, 
and about the potential divergence of attitudes between the young and older age cohorts 
during turbulent political times (Beck 1975; Jennings and Niemi 1968, 1975, 1991; Nie et 
al. 1979). Very little has been done to connect these seminal studies with the age gap we 
saw from 2004 to 2012, and we need a better understanding of the conditions under which 
the “normal” pattern of partisan behavior does not hold.  
Political environments differ for each cohort of young voters as they come of 
political age and experience politics firsthand. Young people today are probably less 
subject than previous generations to coherent socializing forces due to the dissipation of 
familial engagement with politics (Lawless and Fox 2015), the decline of social capital and 
community involvement (Putnam 2001), and the decay of the New Deal Party system 
(Bibby and Schaffner 2008). This leads to weaker party ties that make young people today 
even more susceptible to short-term forces in an election, and are thus more likely than 
 6 
ever to blow with the prevailing wind. While the empirical analyses in this study primarily 
offer comparisons between young and older voters between the 2004 and 2012 elections, 
there are inferences we can draw that can provide greater insight into the social and 
psychological processes that produce patterns of generational opinion divergence. 
In this dissertation, I examine some of the extant theories of voting behavior to 
explain the age gap in vote choice we observed between 2004 and 2012 to determine if and 
when another age gap in vote choice may appear. As such, I seek to uncover the causes of 
this 9-15% gap in presidential candidate preference favoring the Democrats among the 
young from 2004 to 2012. More specifically, the research questions I strive to answer are: 
1) What are the underlying causes for the emergence of this shift in candidate preference 
among America’s youth? 2) What do the causes imply regarding the over-time durability 
of the shift in attitudes among Millennials? And 3) Under what conditions might we see 
another age gap in vote choice emerge?  
This age gap in vote choice presents a challenge to existing theories of voting 
behavior. While contemporary electoral behavior studies focus little attention on the 
political environment when explaining vote choice, my theory seeks to unite individual-
level attitudinal factors with national contextual factors to explain the age gap that arose 
after the turn of the new millennium. People of different age groups are likely to perceive 
and react to the same political experiences in different ways because of the particular stage 
of personal and social development they have reached when the events occur (Delli Carpini 
1986, 8). As such, I posit that young people are more susceptible to the short-term forces 
affecting campaigns and elections—namely national context, issues, and candidates—due 
to their malleable partisan preferences, especially in today’s polarized political 
environment. This susceptibility led them to be more reactive to performance issues by the 
incumbent that personally affected them from 2004-2012, including the downturn in the 
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economy and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in which they witnessed their peers fighting 
and dying. Older Americans, with more crystallized partisan attachments and better-
defined political predispositions, are not as easily swayed by national conditions and the 
short-term forces impacting politics.  
In fact, one might consider older Americans to be the driving force behind the age 
gap we observed in recent presidential elections, as they are less reactive to contextual 
developments because of polarization and the ease with which informed people with 
stronger party ties are able to find echo chambers that reinforce their pre-existing views 
(Stroud 2008; Sunstein 2009). Older individuals are now more affectively polarized than 
ever before (e.g. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Hetherington and Rudolph 2016), likely 
due to the ideological sorting that marked the end of the New Deal Party system in the 
1970s (Sundquist 2011). But because young people hold weaker, more malleable partisan 
ties (Franklin 1984; Franklin and Jackson 1983), they tend to be more reactive to the current 
political environment and less rooted by their political predispositions. Thus, the prevailing 
national conditions and turbulence of the political environment from 2004 to 2012 made 
politics salient to young people, leading to a performance issue-driven shift in attitudes and 
opinions about candidate and party competency on handling major problems facing the 
country. In the future, I expect we might see another age gap in vote choice when party 
competency is questioned on the large salient issues of an election, particularly on issues 
of foreign policy, and the national context strongly favors one party over the other. 
I must be upfront about the limitations of this dissertation. Because the age gap in 
vote choice was only realized in retrospect, the availability of good data investigating the 
attitudes and behavior of young people is lacking. Panel data would be ideal to examine 
individual-level opinion change during this period; however, a panel dataset with sufficient 
numbers of young people does not exist for this period. On top of that, young people are 
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notoriously difficult to contact in large national surveys. Because of this, I rely heavily on 
aggregate-level analysis using American National Election Studies (ANES) data to 
examine aggregate shifts in opinion and behavior rather than individual-level shifts since 
the ANES provides the best over-time consistency in the types of questions asked, though 
the number of cases for analysis (N for young people) in certain years is somewhat low.   
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Because this is a puzzle that is extremely difficult to untangle after the fact, I must 
piece together a story with many moving pieces. To capture the complexity of the effects 
of the turbulent national context and short-term campaign factors on youth vote choice, 
this dissertation is a multi-step enterprise. In Chapter 2, I first discuss the existing literature 
on the attitude development of young people and what we know about the Millennial 
generation in particular. Then I provide an overview of the vote choice literature and 
discuss how extant theories—including the social-psychological model, rational 
choice/proximity models, and issue ownership models of vote choice— open the door for 
a variety of possible causes for the age gap in vote choice. I use this literature to build a 
case for my theory and discuss the hypotheses I intend to test.  
In Chapter 3 I use closed-ended measures in the ANES surveys to investigate the 
attitudes of young people towards the parties and their candidates in presidential elections 
from 1992 through 2016. Given journalistic claims that young people just “like the 
Democrats better” (e.g. Rundio 2008), I use first examine whether young people identified 
with the Democratic Party in larger proportions from 2004 to 2012 than in earlier election 
years, and whether they identified with the Democrats at higher rates than older adults. I 
next determine whether the attitudes of 18-29-year-olds towards the parties and their 
candidates are in fact distinct from older Americans using party and candidate thermometer 
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ratings. More specifically, I explore whether young people are more affectively polarized 
today than older Americans. I then examine candidate and incumbent thermometer scores 
to inform the analyses of subsequent chapters. 
In Chapter 4, I use closed-ended 7- point issue scales in the ANES to examine one 
of the short-term factors affecting vote choice—prospective issue preferences and issue 
proximity to the candidates. Given the contradictory evidence as to whether the masses 
have polarized on substantive matters of public policy, I explore whether, in the aggregate, 
young people have become more liberal on policy issues and whether they can better see a 
difference between the candidates during the period from 2004-2012 on substantive 
policies than in immediately-prior election years. I then create proximity models based on 
the spatial theory of voting to determine whether young people perceive the Democratic 
candidates’ positions to be closer to their own, and whether they are using these issue 
proximities when making their candidate choice decisions. I create similar proximity 
models for older Americans as well to detect possible differences in the use of prospective 
issue proximities between older and younger Americans. To avoid complications from 
projection, I create a second set of models using more objective measures of candidate 
placement on these issue scales by using the sample means for the candidates’ positions.  
Chapter 5 is the true pièce de résistance of this dissertation. I employ an original 
use of open-ended ANES data based on my own re-examination and coding of party and 
candidate “likes” and “dislikes” measures to determine the impact of candidates, national 
context, and issues—including retrospective assessments of party performance on those 
issues— on the candidate choice of young people during times of political turbulence. I 
use these open-ended responses to ANES likes and dislikes questions about the candidates 
and parties from 1972 to 2012 since the 1972 election was the first election in which 18-
20-year-olds could vote after the voting age dropped with the ratification of the 26th 
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amendment. These open-ended responses give an investigator an unfettered look at the 
considerations individuals use when evaluating political objects like the parties and 
candidates, and are particularly appropriate for examining the way in which citizens think 
about an election. I create similar measures for older Americans as well to examine the 
effect of the same factors on their candidate choice preferences. 
I first measure partisan valences on a number of party, candidate, and issue domains 
to determine whether perceived national conditions favored the Democrats from 2004 to 
2012. I then create a series of probit models using individual-level valences on these 
candidate, party, and issue domains to determine whether candidate and issue factors have 
an effect on candidate preference for young people. I run the same models on older people 
during this period to determine if party factors more frequently come into play among the 
over-30 crowd, as my theory predicts. Finally, I test the generalizability of my theory using 
the 1972 and 1976 election data as this period of politics was similarly turbulent to the 
period from 2004 to 2012. I examine whether the salient issues of that period had an effect 
of greater magnitude on the candidate preference of young people relative to party factors.  
This dissertation concludes in Chapter 6. It summarizes the findings of each chapter 
and discusses the generalizations that can be taken from the research I have performed. It 
also suggests the practical implications of my findings and as well as avenues for future 
research.  
In sum, my dissertation develops a theory suggesting that the issue context changed 
after the 2000 election as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan made politics relevant to the 
lives of young people in 2004 and 2008, increasing political awareness and interest among 
this age group. The heightened salience of performance issues continued into the 2012 
election with the economic recession and the persistent unemployment affecting the young. 
During this period, Republicans suffered from negative retrospective performance 
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evaluations on these issues, and held incongruent prospective issue positions on the moral 
and social issues young people care about. While older Americans held crystallized 
partisan predispositions that somewhat insulated them from these national conditions and 
short-term forces, the opinions and behaviors of young people were more heavily swayed 
by the winds of change. This confluence of processes and conditions altogether created a 
generational divergence in political opinions and behavior between Millennials and older 
Americans. But when these national problems were resolved, and national conditions no 
longer heavily favored the Democrats, we witnessed a return to the equilibrium where the 
general lack of interest and involvement of the young was reflected in their voting 
behavior—which once again mirrored that of older Americans in 2016. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I discuss the theoretical and empirical foundations that underpin this 
dissertation. I start with a discussion of what we know about the attitudes, opinions, and 
behaviors of young people. Then I review the foundational theories of vote choice that 
generally inform our understanding of youth voting. In describing my theory for the age 
gap in vote choice from 2004 to 2012, I combine elements of generational theory, social-
psychological theory, rational choice and retrospective voting, and issue ownership 
theories of attitude development and vote choice. My approach highlights the impact of 
national conditions and context on the vote, which is an element not often included in most 
theories of vote choice.  
WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT YOUNG PEOPLE  
When it comes to political participation, young people are generally less interested, 
less engaged, less involved, and less rooted in their communities than older adults4 
(Lawless and Fox 2015; Wattenberg 2011). The political apathy that characterizes young 
adults suggests that we should not expect their attitudes and behaviors to be terribly distinct 
from older Americans. In fact, we should expect them to slightly exaggerate the preferences 
of the older electorate as they tend to only receive the “loudest shouts” from the political 
world (e.g. Zaller 1992). Yet this was not the case between 2004 and 2012, when 18-29-
year-olds preferred Democratic candidates at much higher rates than older Americans at 
the ballot box. 
The members of youngest cohort of voters today have an unusual combination of 
views. In general, they are more socially liberal but more fiscally conservative compared 
                                                 
4 Dalton (2008) is one of few scholars who argues that while young people are less interested in traditional 
forms of political participation, they are more likely to participate through less-traditional means such as 
petition-signing and consumer boycotting. 
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to previous generations at the same age, and are much more likely to label themselves as 
“liberal” (e.g. Keeter, Horowitz, and Tyson 2008; Kirby and Kawashima-Ginsburg 2009). 
Members of the Millennial5 generation appear supportive of decreased government 
involvement in the home and schools, yet are favorable towards government regulation and 
governmental policies that attempt to close the gap between the rich and the poor (Zukin 
et al. 2006). On the topic of national security, while young people are often the most 
enthusiastic supporters of military engagement (Wattenberg 2011, 137), they are also some 
of the first to change their views on the necessity of war (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode 
2012). In addition, higher education levels, higher proportions of minorities, and lower 
levels of religiosity among the young make it less likely for Millennials to hold 
conservative positions on the moral issues that have been the focus of the Republican Party 
for the last few cycles. In fact, some have speculated that this may be driving young people 
away from the GOP and its candidates (Campbell 2002; Zukin et al. 2006, 169). 
The bulk of research on political attitudes and preferences of the young come from 
studies conducted in the 1960s and 1970s on political socialization and the transmission of 
political beliefs, including party identification, from parents to their children.6 Political 
views are influenced most by events that occur during the adolescent years, so in more 
quiescent times we should expect the distribution of party identification and political 
beliefs of the young and older generations to be relatively similar (e.g. Beck 1975; Dawson, 
Prewitt, and Dawson 1977; Jennings and Niemi 1968; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979). This 
had been the case for decades prior to the turn of the 21st century, and was reflected in 
                                                 
5 Millennials made up the bulk of 18-29 year old voters from 2004 to 2012. 
6 Political socialization is a developmental process through which a citizen matures politically, acquiring a 
complex of information, feelings, and beliefs about the political world (Dawson et al. 1977, 38) 
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similar rates of vote choice between young people and older Americans. So why might the 
attitudes of a whole cohort of young voters differ from older generations? 
One dominant life-cycle theory is that age breeds conservatism, and that the liberal 
attitudes young people hold become more conservative as an individual experiences new 
politically-relevant events such as purchasing a home or having children (Dawson, Prewitt, 
and Dawson 1977). But if this were the case, life cycle patterns should be consistently 
found in different eras and therefore be a constant feature of elections (Delli Carpini 1986; 
Wattenberg 2011, 2). Yet we do not see this in reality, and this theory is not supported by 
much empirical evidence (Converse 1976). In fact, the only life-cycle effect for which 
strong evidence is found is that party identification tends to strengthen as a function of the 
length of time an individual holds a generalized preference for a particular party and has 
repeatedly voted for it (Converse 1976; Franklin 1984). 
A more promising theory to explain cohort differences in attitudes is generational 
theory. This theory proposes that people of the same age share important political learning 
experiences through exposure during their formative years to critical events – such as 
depressions, wars, or mass movements— that shape their partisan attachments (Beck 
1984). Sometimes period effects are of such magnitude that they produce generational 
effects among young cohorts of voters just coming of political age, changing the basic party 
predispositions of these cohorts as they develop views of the political world that differ 
from previous age cohorts (Beck 1975; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Miller 
1992).  
Younger people, therefore, have less stable political attitudes than older adults and 
are more prone to be influenced by the social and political forces at work in the national 
context (Jennings and Niemi 1968, 1978). While scandals, diplomatic crises, and severe 
economic downturns rarely have a lasting effect on the more crystallized partisan 
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attachments of the older electorate, these large salient events can alter the partisan balance 
in the electorate by shaping the newly forming, still-malleable partisan attachments and 
attitudes of young adults (Bartels and Jackman 2014). Thus, the national political context 
matters when studying public opinion and vote choice of the young. The contested election 
results of 2000, 9/11 attacks, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the subsequent 
economic recession of 2008 would certainly qualify the 2000s as politically turbulent times 
that could explain both the increased attention to politics and the distinct attitudes and 
behavior of the youngest cohort of voters from 2004 to 2012. These attitudes can also help 
to explain the behavioral differences we saw at the ballot box between young and older 
voters. 
THEORIES OF VOTE CHOICE 
Generally, scholars in American politics consider there to be three primary models 
of voting that provide the foundation for many of the extant theories of voting behavior 
used today: the sociological (Columbia), rational choice (Rochester), and social-
psychological (Michigan) models. My focus here is on the interplay between party 
identification as a key attitude conditioning voting behavior and the role of issues, 
candidates, and context when party identification is less developed. As such, my theoretical 
approach borrows from the latter two schools.  
Most theories of vote choice and opinion dynamics draw on or are a response to the 
foundational work of scholars at the University of Michigan. Since the publication of The 
American Voter in 1960, the social-psychological theory of vote choice persists as a key 
attitudinal framework for understanding vote choice, emphasizing the role of enduring 
partisan commitments in shaping attitudes towards political objects (Campbell et al. 1960). 
From this perspective, party identification is a deeply-held psychological attachment that 
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is largely stable over time, and acts as a filter through which citizens view and interpret 
new political information. Party identification therefore shapes policy preferences and 
other political attitudes, but is largely unchanged by them. Decades of research since have 
found that the impact of partisanship on voting behavior is substantial, and party loyalties 
are generally the best predictor of vote choice (e.g. Bartels 2000; Hillygus and Shields 
2008; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Therefore, we should expect party identification to heavily 
influence the vote choice of individuals who identify with one of the parties, particularly 
among strong identifiers. But among voters with weaker party ties, like young adults, party 
identification should exert a smaller influence on vote choice.  
The rational choice framework, on the other hand, is a popular paradigm that allows 
for the incorporation of issue preferences and performance assessments as factors affecting 
the vote. In rational choice models, voters are assumed to have “selfish” preferences, and 
a rational voter will decide whether to turn out to vote and which candidate to vote for 
based on the voter’s judgment of the expected personal or sociotropic benefits derived from 
one candidate winning over another (Aldrich 1993; Edlin, Gelman, and Kaplan 2007; 
Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). While The American Voter downplayed issue preferences as a 
major independent factor in vote choice, V.O. Key Jr. (1966) noted that “voters are not 
fools”, arguing that voters base their decisions on the issue positions of the candidates and 
on their expectations of candidate performance in office, particularly on the important 
issues of the day.  
Spatial voting theories like the proximity voting model, which fall under the 
rational choice framework, posit that parties and their candidates use issue positions to 
appeal to voters. The proximity model in particular proposes that a voter’s policy 
preferences can be summarized as a single point on a liberal-conservative ideological 
spectrum, and the policy positions of the political candidates are also summarized to points 
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in that same space (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984; Jessee 2009). Key to this theory 
is the assumption that a voter will cast her ballot for the candidate whose position is closest 
to her own. Thus, issue preferences of voters can and do have independent effects on the 
vote choice of individuals, and perhaps have a stronger effect on those with weaker partisan 
attachments. 
In fact, while partisanship is a long-term factor affecting candidate choice, issue 
preferences and performance assessments (along with candidate qualities) are among the 
shorter-term factors that can affect both vote choice and partisanship as well. While the 
initial partisan beliefs of young people stem from socialization influences, revisionist 
models of party identification demonstrate that party identification is endogenous and may 
change in response to issue preferences, candidate evaluations, retrospective evaluations 
of party performance, and even vote choice (Achen 1992, 2002; Brody and Rothenberg 
1988; Carsey and Layman 2006; Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jackson 1975; 
Luskin, McIver, and Carmines 1989; Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979).  
An “impressionable years” hypothesis suggests that core predispositions like 
partisanship are malleable in young adulthood, and tend not to crystallize until the mid-to-
late twenties (Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jennings and Markus 1984; Jennings and Niemi 
1981). From this perspective, even if partisanship is largely stable, there is room for 
response to issues and other contextual factors, particularly in young adulthood (Beck and 
Jennings 1991; Markus 1979; Niemi and Jennings 1991). Some evidence has been found 
to show that predispositions like partisanship do not crystallize incrementally; rather, they 
crystallize in spurts in response to information-rich exogenous political events that are 
usually focused only on a narrow range of specific attitude objects (Sears and Valentino 
1997). While these attitude objects are often political parties or candidates, the large 
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contentious issues on the national agenda during times of unrest, and perceived 
performance failures on those issues, can certainly be a catalyst for socialization. 
For young people, then, partisanship is reinforced or weakened by their experiences 
with politics. While they are socialized into their initial political beliefs like party 
identification, I posit that the standard socialization processes were not as acute after the 
turn of the twenty-first century as they were prior due to the turbulent nature of the political 
context at the time young Millennials came of political age (i.e. became old enough to 
vote). This is coupled with evidence that family socialization processes are weakening as 
younger Baby Boomers and members of Generation X are less likely to discuss politics at 
home with their children (Lawless and Fox 2015). While party identification is nonetheless 
important and predictive for the vote choice of young people, I believe it is not as 
determinative to the vote when compared to its effects on older Americans, especially 
during periods where the national context demands attention such as the period during 
which we see the age gap in vote choice.  
As such, my theory is that young people are particularly susceptible to the short-
term factors influencing the vote—context, candidates, and issues—given their relatively 
malleable attachments to the parties. In periods of relative quiescence, these factors may 
not lead to attitudinal or behavioral differences between 18-29-year-olds and older 
Americans because young people simply would not be paying much attention to politics in 
the first place. But in times of political turbulence, they should be less anchored by party 
identification than older adults and more susceptible to national circumstances and context, 
particularly on the salient issues that personally affect them. In the context of the elections 
from 2004 to 2012, two unpopular wars, a terrible economy, and high levels of 
unemployment among young people produced a toxic stew for Republicans. The higher 
rates of Democratic preference among young people, relative to older adults, were not so 
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much due to an attraction to the Democratic Party and its candidates; rather, 18-29-year-
olds were more likely to attribute blame to Republicans for their performance in office and 
were therefore repelled by the Republican brand. Their weaker partisan ties resulted in a 
more forceful pro-Democratic shift in aggregate opinion and behavior due to the national 
context compared to older adults, who had deeper-rooted partisan predispositions and more 
experience with politics to resist the winds of change. As such, Chapters 3 through 5 of 
this dissertation measure young people’s reactions to both the short- and long-term forces 
affecting vote choice relative to the older electorate to test this theory. 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION 
The first two hypotheses I test in Chapter 3 are actually alternative hypotheses to 
my theory. The most conventional theory for the age gap in vote choice is that young people 
simply like Democratic Party and its candidate better, are identifying at higher rates with 
the party than older adults, and are voting based on their partisanship. Thus, my first two 
hypotheses in Chapter 3 are (H1) that a larger proportion of 18-29-year-olds identified with 
the Democratic Party between 2004 and 2012 than older adults and (H2) young Democratic 
identifiers and leaners, in the aggregate, hold warmer affective feelings towards their party 
than older adults. This second hypothesis stems from a recent line of research that has 
uncovered the rise of affective polarization among everyday Americans in recent years 
(e.g. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Levendusky 2013). From a group identity 
perspective, affective polarization occurs when individuals view opposing partisans (as 
members of the outgroup) with increasingly greater dislike, and co-partisans (as the 
ingroup) positively.7 More specifically, it is the tendency of Republican identifiers to view 
                                                 
7 The “outgroup” is the group to which a person does not belong, while the “ingroup” is the group to which 
a person does belong. 
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Democrats negatively and other Republicans positively while Democratic identifiers 
indicate unfavorable feelings towards Republicans and positive feelings towards other 
Democrats (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Therefore, it is 
possible that young people are simply identifying more as Democrats and like the 
Democratic Party and its candidates to a greater extent than older adults. 
The phenomenon of affective polarization is based on social identity theory, which 
posits that members of an in-group will associate negative or undesirable traits to members 
of the outgroup (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1979). It is true that party identifiers have 
been progressively antagonistic towards political elites of the outparty in recent years, 
which is reflected in increasingly biased evaluations of national conditions depending on 
which party controls the White House (Bartels 2002; Jacobson 2009; Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2016). But this out-partisan dislike has extended to even rank-and-file members 
of the opposing party today (Iyengar and Westwood 2014). 
Affect towards the parties may also be produced or changed through retrospective 
evaluations of party performance in office and assessments of current national conditions, 
particularly for individuals who are less familiar with politics (Fiorina 1981; Hetherington 
and Rudolph 2016). The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the economic collapse in 2008 
were critical national events that were difficult for even the most politically disinterested 
individuals to ignore, and could certainly have led to negative assessments of the 
performance of the George W. Bush administration and the Republican Party. These events 
may therefore not only impact party identification among young Americans, but influence 
feelings towards the parties as well. 
Given the less crystallized partisanship of young people (Franklin and Jackson 
1983), I suspect that H1 and H2 are incorrect and that affective polarization is less 
pronounced among the younger electorate compared to older partisans. This is consistent 
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with my theory that young people are less anchored to the political parties which could 
lead to aggregate differences in voting behavior from older individuals if young people are 
affected to a greater degree by political context. Therefore, if H1 and H2 do not hold, it is 
likely that young voters are generally are more disaffected by the Republican Party than 
older individuals are. Even if positive affect towards the Democratic Party has not grown 
over time in recent elections, positive sentiment towards the Republican Party may be 
weaker still. As such, my third hypothesis (H3) is that young Republican identifiers and 
leaners are less affectively attached to the Republican Party and like the Republican Party 
to a lesser extent than older Americans. On a similar note, my fourth hypothesis stems more 
generally from my theory that young people are less attached to the parties, and that (H4) 
older partisans of both parties are more affectively polarized than younger Americans. 
It is prudent to also examine attitudes about the presidential candidates themselves 
since affective considerations of the presidential candidates at the top of the tickets, as 
symbols of the party, may differ between young and older Americans. It is also useful to 
get a sense as to whether young people just liked the Democratic candidates as individuals 
better than the Republican candidates since studies show that candidate traits have an 
independent effect on vote choice as well (e.g. Kinder 1986; Miller, Wattenberg, and 
Malanchuk 1986). Therefore, my fifth hypothesis (H5) is that young partisan identifiers 
and leaners of both parties just liked the Democratic candidates better than older Americans 
from 2004 to 2012 as reflected by candidate thermometer scores. More likely, however, is 
the alternative that (H6) young partisans and leaners of both parties just disliked Republican 
candidates more than older adults during this period due to the toxicity of the party’s brand. 
Finally, because of their relative inexperience with politics, it is easier for young 
people to retrospectively attribute blame for problems they directly experience rather than 
cast prospective assessments of future candidate performance (Fiorina 1981). As such, my 
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seventh hypothesis (H7) is that any difference in affect between young and older 
Americans will be reflected in assessments of the incumbent president. In particular, I 
expect that assessments of George W. Bush will be much lower among young Americans 
in 2004 and 2008 than among older adults as they evaluate his conduct and blame him for 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic recession.  The results from hypotheses 
5 through 7 in this chapter will help inform my analyses in Chapter 5, which includes 
candidate trait assessments and retrospective assessments of candidate and party 
performance in office as factors affecting vote choice. 
ISSUE VOTING AND SPATIAL THEORY 
As discussed above, there is a general consensus among scholars that the masses 
have become affectively polarized in recent decades (e.g. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; 
Levendusky 2013). There is also little doubt that party elites have become increasingly 
polarized over policy preferences in the last fifty years (e.g. Abramowitz 2010; Fiorina, 
Abrams, and Pope 2005; Layman 1999; Theriault 2008). But there is considerable debate 
as to whether the masses have polarized on substantive policy matters as well. Some 
scholars argue that most citizens are still moderate, but because their choices at the ballot 
box have become more disparate and extreme, it appears as if they have polarized on issues 
(Levendusky 2009). Other researchers contend that rank and file partisans have in fact 
become polarized ideologically (Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; 
Bafumi and Shapiro 2009; Mason 2015). 
The sources of issue attitudes are diverse and may include ideology, core political 
values, material self-interest, group identity and attachment, or political events and 
experiences (Hillygus and Shields 2008, 27). When individuals feel strongly about issues 
on which they differ with their party, the internal conflict that is produced may be powerful 
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enough to cause party loyalties to change (Campbell et al. 1960; Carsey and Layman 2006), 
particularly on polarizing issues of the day (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). This process 
of adjustment is more pronounced among younger voters than among older voters 
(Franklin and Jackson 1983; Jackson 1975). Policy attitudes also have an independent 
impact on vote choice depending on the personal importance of the issue to a voter, and 
whether a citizen can see a difference in the candidates’ stands on that issue (Brody and 
Page 1972).  
To reiterate, I posit that young people are especially susceptible to the short-term 
factors influencing the vote, including issue context and issue preferences, particularly in 
times of political turmoil. Given the mixed evidence found by scholars on substantive 
polarization, I investigate four hypotheses in Chapter 4. Because of their greater propensity 
to identify as “liberal” than previous generations at the same age (Keeter, Horowitz, and 
Tyson 2008; Kirby and Kawashima-Ginsburg 2009), it is possible that the age gap in vote 
choice observed from 2004 to 2012 is, in part, due to a leftward shift in ideological issue 
positions among young people and that these issue preferences are closer to those of the 
Democratic Party and its candidates. As such, my first hypothesis (H1) is that, in the 
aggregate, young people hold more liberal positions on social issues, foreign policy issues, 
and economic issues than older people, and that over time these issue preferences have 
moved further to the left.  
Of course, it might be the case that young people have always been liberal and that 
the strong preference for Democratic candidates among 18-29-year-olds in recent elections 
is due to the growing ideological polarization of candidates. Because young people usually 
do not usually pay much attention to politics, under normal political conditions they may 
not be able to differentiate between the stands of the political candidates—a necessary 
condition to vote based on issue preferences (Brody and Page 1972). But because of the 
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turbulent political climate from 2004 to 2012, it is plausible that young people were more 
aware of differences between the candidates’ stands on the important issues of the day. 
Thus, my second hypothesis (H2), which is not necessarily exclusive to H1, is that the 
perceived policy positions of candidates have grown more distinct in recent years among 
18-29-year-olds, especially from 2004 to 2012. If this hypothesis rings true, we should see 
the candidates’ perceived positions on these issues become more extreme in recent 
presidential elections. 
Regardless of whether either or both of the first two hypotheses hold, my third 
hypothesis (H3) is that young people are proximally closer to Democratic candidates in 
terms of issue preferences in recent elections (foreign policy and economic issues 
especially), and that they are using those issue proximities when making their vote choice. 
Finally, given their lack of political engagement during times of relative political 
quiescence, my fourth hypothesis (H4) is that young people used issue preferences—
particularly on foreign policy and economic issues— to a greater extent during the period 
from 2004 to 2012 than in earlier election years because politics and issues were not as 
salient in prior years. In other words, issue proximities are expected to have a statistically 
significant effect on the candidate preference of young people to a greater degree in the 
period from 2004 to 2012 relative to earlier elections. This can manifest in two ways. Either 
more issue areas should have a significant impact on candidate choice during the period of 
the observed age gap, or a few specific issue areas should have a more substantive impact 
on candidate preference, holding all other variables at their means. 
RETROSPECTIVE VOTING AND ISSUE OWNERSHIP 
Still under the umbrella of the rational choice framework, but from a somewhat 
different perspective than spatial theory, the issue ownership theory incorporates the 
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importance of electoral context to voting and candidate choice by bringing into the equation 
the degree of political turmoil and the extent to which parties offer distinct policy choices 
on important national problems. According to the issue ownership theory of voting, 
campaigns strategically emphasize issues on which their parties are perceived to hold an 
advantage to prime their salience when citizens make their vote decision (Kaufmann 2004; 
Petrocik 1996). This theory states that issues are ultimately decisive to election outcomes 
because salient issues tend to work to the advantage of one party over the other. Unlike 
spatial theory and the proximity models explored in Chapter 4, what is key to the issue 
ownership theory is not the candidates’ specific stands on policies, but what problems they 
promise to resolve.  
What the public perceives as national problems that need solving depends both on 
existing national conditions and whether campaigns prime the issues they “own”. 
Ownership of an issue area depends on what the social bases of the parties (i.e. the groups 
making up the parties’ coalitions) want from their party and a party’s historical record of 
performance in handling those problems (Kaufmann 2004; Petrocik 1996). These 
reputations are regularly tested and reinforced by the choices made by political 
officeholders. While issue emphases in campaigns are specific to candidates, Republicans 
generally “own” issue areas like moral values, law and order, and tax and spend issues 
while Democrats “own” social welfare programs and issues of racial discrimination 
(Petrocik 1996). The economy, foreign relations, and government functioning are issue 
areas where ownership is almost entirely performance-based, and incumbent failures in 
these areas can provide a short term “lease” to the other party. Thus, performance-issue 
reputations can be gained and lost in short periods of time (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hasen 
2003). 
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Retrospective evaluations of party performance in office can also impact candidate 
choice, particularly on issues an individual considers important (Fiorina 1981, 200; 
Fournier et al. 2003). Directly experienced or perceived events and conditions contribute 
to performance evaluations, and both in turn contribute to future expectations about party 
performance (Fiorina 1981, 197). A country in bad times can expect performance issue 
concerns to benefit the challenger since the incumbent party can be retrospectively blamed 
for national problems in times of crises including wars, failed policies, economic 
downturns, or corruption. Even if more voters are concerned with problems owned by the 
incumbent’s party, the incumbent can still lose if bad times elicit substantial attention to 
performance problems (Petrocik 1996). Therefore, an issue ownership interpretation of an 
election has three expectations: 1) each party has distinct issue handling reputations, and 
their ability to handle national problems depends on the performance record of the 
incumbent, 2) candidates focus the election on issues advantageous to themselves, and 3) 
voters will choose their preferred candidate based on the issues made salient by those 
campaigns. 
Thus, the issue ownership theory really rests on the idea of issue salience, in line 
with a prominent body of research which suggests elite discourse determines the most 
salient considerations in people’s minds when evaluating political objects (Converse 1964; 
Zaller 1992). The reception and acceptance of elite discourse is contingent upon political 
awareness and interest since exposure to elite discourse occurs most frequently through 
exposure to political news and information. While the most politically aware are exposed 
to more elite messages, they are also better able to resist messages that run counter to their 
prior political beliefs. People low in awareness, including the young, rarely receive these 
messages and generally remain unaware of politics. But when events and issues within the 
political system permeate into their immediate experiences, like wars and economic 
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recession, even young people may become more interested and politically involved. At that 
point, more of these persuasive communications reach them, and young people are less 
able to resist persuasive messages that are inconsistent with their relatively weak 
predispositions. In fact, major foreign policy and domestic crises that are framed as 
compelling human dramas can gain the attention of even the most politically inattentive 
segments of the population when soft news media—including satirical comedy shows, 
daytime or late-night talk shows, and entertainment news programs—lead entertainment-
seeking viewers to become incidentally informed about national events and political 
candidates (Baum 2002; Baumgartner and Morris 2006). 
As such, evaluating George W. Bush’s conduct in office may help explain the shift 
away from the Republican Party by the young from 2004 through 2012. Retrospective 
evaluations of Republican performance on salient national problems are expected to be 
large factors in candidate preference of the young from 2004 to 2012 as they consider 
extant circumstances and party performance on these issues. The wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan increased the salience of foreign policy issues, as most Americans knew 
someone directly impacted by troop deployments during these engagements. Similarly, 
young people were affected by the 2008 economic recession to a greater degree than older 
adults, and faced higher levels of unemployment for a longer period of time (Maloney 
2010). Republican failures on these performance issues provided Democrats with “lease” 
on these issue areas, creating a political environment that favored the Democrats. These 
short-term forces, I argue, affected the candidate preference of young Americans to a large 
extent. While these short-term factors likely played a role in the candidate preference 
equations of older adults, their attitudes were likely anchored by their more crystallized 
partisanship. Thus, we should see party factors playing a bigger role in the candidate choice 
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decisions among older Americans as well, moderating the effects of the short-term forces 
to an extent. 
Furthermore, moral issues8 rose in prominence among Republicans in 2004—an 
issue area owned by the Republicans that is also at odds with a cohort of young voters who 
are less religious and more educated than previous generations. George W. Bush’s 2004 
campaign highlighted the conservative values and issue preferences of Born-again and 
evangelical Protestant activists, leading to more ideologically extreme issue preferences on 
social issues within the Republican Party (Jacobson 2009). Indeed, moral issues are an area 
unexplored by the issue proximities in Chapter 4, and prospective performance on moral 
issues may have exacerbated the age gap in electoral choice.  
Chapter 5 is my capstone chapter, incorporating all the elements of my theory into 
one set of analyses to test. Again, I argue that short term factors such as candidate 
evaluations, prospective issue performance on the salient issues of a campaign, and 
retrospective evaluations of Republican performance on issues are expected to be large 
factors in the vote choices of the young from 2004 to 2012, as the major issues facing the 
nation permeated into the lives of young people to the point where it was difficult for even 
the normally disengaged youth to ignore. While older Americans are likely to be impacted 
by these factors as well, their more crystallized partisan attachments should take 
precedence and temper the effects of these short-term factors.  
Because there is plenty of evidence to suggest candidates and their campaigns 
emphasize the issues their party “owns” or “leases” (e.g. Kaufmann 2004; Petrocik 1996; 
Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2003; Pope and Woon 2009), I assume this to be true for the 
elections from 2004 to 2012. Instead of measuring party reputations using media content 
                                                 
8These are issues generally associated with the activism of the Religious Right such as abortion, stem cell 
research, and gay rights/marriage. 
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analysis like in many issue ownership studies, I analyze alternative measures of the parties’ 
issue-handling reputations in Chapter 5 using open-ended party and candidate likes-
dislikes responses in the American National Election Studies. Not only do these open-
ended party and candidate likes-dislikes questions allow me to measure the salient 
considerations individuals use when evaluating the parties and candidates, they also allow 
me to measure public attitudes about prospective issue performance and retrospective 
assessments of party performance in office. I use these data to test five hypotheses. My 
first hypothesis (H1) is that perceived Republican failures on performance issues—
especially in the areas of economic and foreign policy—should provide Democrats with a 
temporary lease on these issue areas from 2004 through 2012 among both older and 
younger adults.  
More directly related to my theory, my second hypothesis (H2) is that short-term 
forces, including candidate assessments and both prospective and retrospective issue 
assessments, should have a strong impact on the candidate choice of 18-29-year-olds from 
2004 to 2012 relative to their effects in previous election years due to turbulent national 
conditions and the critical nature of the problems on the political agenda during this period. 
In the period directly prior to 2004, it is feasible that political events were not salient 
enough for young people to use prospective issue performance assessments or retrospective 
performance assessments to distinguish between the candidates, and that party factors 
would come into play more in times of relative political quiescence. 
Also, more directly related to my theory, my third hypothesis (H3) is that party-
related factors should factor into candidate choice more frequently among older adults 
relative to younger voters in all years under study due to their more crystallized party 
attachments. This should be especially true in recent elections given higher levels of 
affective polarization among older Americans (Chapter 3). This should also be particularly 
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true during the turbulent period from 2004 to 2012 as period effects should weaken the 
basic party attachments of young people (e.g. Beck 1975). Finally, as an interesting 
companion era to the 2004-2012 period also rife with political turbulence, my fourth 
hypothesis (H4) is that performance issues and candidate assessments also factor into 
candidate choice of young people in 1972 and 1976 to a greater degree than in the 
subsequent period of political quiescence.  
The seminal studies of political socialization and attitudinal development suggest 
the attitudes and opinions of young people should, for the most part, look similar to those 
of older adults. But attitudes and opinions are at their most malleable when individuals just 
come of political age, and period effects may have a particularly strong impact on the 
young, creating generational differences in opinion. While most theories of voting behavior 
do not include extant national circumstances to explain vote choice, these contextual 
factors may be particularly influential on the political behavior of young people. Thus, my 
theory combines elements from many theories of attitude development and vote choice, 
and to my knowledge is the first attempt at bringing these theories together to explain the 
age gap in vote choice we observed between 2004 and 2012. As such, the overall structure 
in this dissertation is to first explore the attitudes and emotions of young people relative to 
older Americans in Chapter 3. The primary aim is to explore differences in affect towards 
the parties, though it also investigates differences in attitudes towards the presidential 
candidates and the incumbent president. Chapter 4 examines prospective issue preferences 
and proximities to the candidates, and tests their effects on candidate choice. Chapter 5 
analyzes context in a comprehensive manner, examining the salience of party factors, 
candidate factors, and especially prospective and retrospective assessments of candidate 
and party performance on national problems.  
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Chapter 3: Partisanship and Affective Polarization 
Young voters became a distinct political force in American elections from 2004 to 
2012. Given their pro-Democratic behavior in elections during this period, it is valuable to 
study the perceptions of young Americans and their opinions of the parties and political 
candidates independently of the attitudes of older Americans. Might the young voters of 
the Millennial9 generation bring a distinctly pro-Democratic, and thus polarizing, set of 
attitudes and perceptions to the table? 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the social-psychological theory focuses on partisanship 
as the primary driver of political attitudes and their resulting behaviors (Campbell et al. 
1960). From this perspective, party identification is a psychological attachment to one of 
the parties that shapes policy preferences and other political attitudes but is largely 
unchanged by them; therefore, the partisan lens through which an individual observes 
politics affects how he or she evaluates political candidates and issue preferences. A related 
theory of party identification suggests party ID is a social identity or group attachment, so 
rather than acting as a perceptual screen, party identifiers take on the positions advocated 
by their group (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Hyman 1959; Stanley and Niemi 
2006). From either of these perspectives, party identification is exogenous and shapes our 
issue preferences and political beliefs but is largely unchanged by them. While a number 
of revisionist models question the unchanging nature of party identification and argue it is 
endogenous with issue positions (e.g. Achen 1992, 2002; Carsey and Layman 2006; Fiorina 
                                                 
9 Given that the 18-29 year old age brackets in 2008 and 2012 consisted entirely of members of the 
Millennial generation, and comprised a majority of 18-29-year-olds in 2004, I sometimes use the terms 
“Millennial” and “young” interchangeably when discussing young Americans in recent elections. The 
boundaries for what defines a “Millennial” vary from scholar to scholar, and a distinct end-boundary as to 
who is considered a Millennial has yet to be determined. However, it is likely that the youngest segment of 
the electorate in 2016 (18-22 year olds) are members of the post-Millennial generation. 
  
 32 
1981), party identification is nonetheless the single best predictor of vote choice in a 
campaign (e.g. Bartels 2000; Hillygus and Shields 2008; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). 
Therefore, it is possible that young people simply like the Democrats better and are 
identifying with the Democratic Party at higher rates in recent elections than older 
Americans.  
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLARIZATION 
There has been a proliferation of literature on the concept of polarization in recent 
years, though it is clear that there are three major sources of disagreement over what 
polarization entails. The first source of disagreement relates to the technical definition of 
the concept, which I will explain further below. The second source of disagreement is over 
who is polarized— is this a phenomenon occurring only among elites, or are rank-and-file 
partisans polarized as well? The third source of disagreement resides in the nature of 
polarization among the masses (if it exists), and whether it is ideological or affective in 
nature.  
Regarding the first source of disagreement, polarization is, to some, a process-
oriented concept characterized by the widening differences in group preferences between 
the parties concurrent with growing intra-party cohesion in attitudes and opinions 
(Jacobson 2009; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). To others, a more literal outcome-
oriented definition of polarization focuses on the magnitude of divisions within the 
electorate, where large divisions in attitudes on an issue results in a bi-modal clustering of 
opinions at opposite ends of a distribution (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005). Scholars 
advocating the latter definition criticize claims of process-oriented polarization by arguing 
that as the divide between party elites grows wider, citizens are simply following their lead 
and “sorting” themselves into groups rather than actually taking more extreme positions on 
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matters of public policy. These researchers claim that instead, due to relatively low levels 
of knowledge among the public about politics, most Americans have the tendency to report 
middle-scale responses to questions on ideology and policy because they do not hold 
deeply-seated opinions on many issues (Hetherington and Rudolph 2016). Indeed, there 
are many issues on which bi-modal distributions of opinion do not appear as would be 
expected from the process-oriented conception of polarization.  
Addressing the second source of disagreement, which is related to the first, there is 
little doubt that party elites have become increasingly polarized over the last fifty years 
(e.g. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Theriault 2008) largely over policy preferences 
(Layman 1999). But there is considerable debate as to whether the masses have polarized 
on substantive matters of public policy as well. Some argue that citizens have not polarized 
since most citizens, as noted above, hold moderate policy positions. Instead, their choices 
at the ballot box have become more disparate and extreme, so partisan sorting makes it 
appear as if the masses have polarized (Levendusky 2009). Others contend that everyday 
citizens have in fact become ideologically polarized on issues (Abramowitz 2010; 
Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). 
The third source of disagreement stems from a more recent group of studies which 
contend that rather than polarizing on issues and ideology, the type of polarization 
occurring among everyday Americans is affective in nature (e.g. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 
2012; Levendusky 2013). From a group identity perspective, affective polarization occurs 
when individuals view opposing partisans (as members of the outgroup) with increasing 
dislike, and co-partisans (as the ingroup) positively.10 More specifically, affective 
polarization is the tendency of Republican identifiers to view Democrats negatively and 
                                                 
10 The “outgroup” is the group to which a person does not belong, while the “ingroup” is the group to 
which a person does belong. 
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other Republicans positively while Democratic identifiers indicate unfavorable feelings 
towards Republicans and positive feelings towards other Democrats (Campbell et al. 1960; 
Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).   
Given these alternative standards of polarization—affect and ideology—I 
investigate whether either exists among young people today. In this chapter, I investigate 
the possibility of differences in affective polarization between the older and younger 
electorate. In Chapter 4 I explore the prospect of disparities in substantive polarization, or 
aggregate differences in opinions and behavior based on issue positions.  
AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION 
When it comes to affective polarization, there are a number of contributing factors 
that can lead an individual to polarized feelings towards the party with which she does not 
identify. First, the polarization of elites may act as a cue to the masses to follow elite 
opinion (Key 1966). If political elites are becoming increasingly antagonistic towards each 
other, citizens may be adopting those sentiments as well. Today’s adversarial media 
environment and the negative tone of campaigns may also encourage stronger affective 
reactions among those exposed to such messaging (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; 
Hetherington and Rudolph 2016).  
Affect towards the parties may also be produced or changed through retrospective 
evaluations of party performance in office, as well as assessments of current national 
conditions— particularly for individuals who are less familiar with politics. The wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the economic collapse in 2008, were critical national events that 
were difficult for even the most politically disinterested individuals to ignore. Therefore, 
the conduct of the George W. Bush administration could have led to negative assessments 
of the incumbent party’s performance. The period effects produced by critical events like 
 35 
these can change the basic party predispositions of young voters as they develop views of 
the political world that differ from previous age cohorts (Beck 1975; Ghitza and Gelman 
2014; Miller 1992). These events may therefore not only impact party identification among 
young Americans, but influence feelings or emotions towards the parties as well. Indeed, 
even individuals with relatively little political experience like young people can express 
how they feel about politics and the parties rather than provide a substantive determination 
as to what they think about politics. 
I examine the aggregate partisan attitudes of 18-29-year-olds compared to older 
individuals using American National Election Survey feeling thermometers from 1992 to 
2016. My theoretical perspective is simple: party identification is a dominant attitude that 
shapes political orientations and preferences. The conventional wisdom for the age gap in 
vote choice is that young people just like the Democrats better and are identifying as 
Democrats at higher rates than older Americans (e.g. Cozby 2013; Rundio 2008). If this is 
the case, the strong Democratic preference among young people (and resulting age gap in 
vote choice) would easily be explained by young voters voting based on their partisanship. 
As such, my first hypothesis (H1) is that a greater proportion of 18-29-year-olds identified 
with the Democratic Party between 2004 and 2012 than older adults. 
In addition, as mentioned many times before, partisanship is among the attitudes 
known to be more malleable among young Americans relative to older citizens (Franklin 
1984). Older voters tend to be stronger partisans since party identification strengthens as a 
function of the length of time an individual prefers and votes for a party (Converse 1976; 
Franklin 1984). Considering this, it is also possible that affective attitudes towards the 
parties are similarly malleable among individuals just reaching political age. If H1 holds 
and young people are identifying with the Democratic Party at higher rates than older 
adults, it is likely that they hold stronger affective feelings towards the Democratic Party 
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as a result. As such, my second hypothesis (H2) is that young Democratic identifiers and 
leaners hold warmer feelings or affect toward the Democratic Party than older Americans 
in each election year from 2004 to 2012.   
If H1 and H2 do not hold, and young people are not identifying with the Democratic 
Party at higher rates or hold warmer affect towards the Democratic Party than individuals 
over 30 years of age, it is equally conceivable that 18-29-year-olds simply dislike the 
Republican Party more than older adults. Antipathy towards the Republicans is likely given 
that young voters were socialized into politics during the turbulent political environment 
that characterized the George W. Bush administration, which included two controversial 
wars and the collapse of the financial system. Therefore, my third hypothesis (H3) is that 
young Republican identifiers and leaners demonstrate less affective attachment to the 
Republican Party than their older counterparts in each election year from 2004 through 
2012, and therefore do not like the Republican Party as much as older Republicans. In fact, 
given my theory that young people are generally less attached to the parties, we should 
expect affective polarization to be weaker among younger Americans since their partisan 
ties have yet to take deep root. Thus, a fourth hypothesis (H4) is that older partisans of both 
parties are more affectively polarized than their younger counterparts in each election year 
under study. If this hypothesis holds, partisanship and feelings about the parties among the 
young were likely not the drivers of the age gap in vote choice from 2004 to 2012. It would 
also speak to the necessity of additional research exploring the attitudes of young 
Americans that led to the behavioral differences we saw at the ballot box. 
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CANDIDATE AND INCUMBENT ASSESSMENTS 
While party identification is a long-term predisposition that dominates vote choice 
and tends to affect attitudes towards the candidates, my theory is that the weaker party ties 
of young voters leaves open the possibility that they are affected to a greater extent by the 
short-term forces that impact candidate choice, like candidate qualities, political context, 
and issues. It is therefore prudent to perform additional analyses using ANES 
thermometers, and investigate attitudes towards the presidential candidates themselves.11  
Some scholars suggest that “personality” or trait characteristics of a presidential 
candidate provide the best explanation for shifts in the vote from one election to the next 
(Markus and Converse 1979; Stokes 1966). Assessments of a candidate’s competence, 
integrity, and charisma may inform voters of how he or she will perform in office (Miller, 
Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986). Some voters may use superficial characteristics such 
as a candidate’s style or attractiveness as criteria when making their vote decisions. While 
somewhat troubling for democracy, using superficial characteristics to assess candidates is 
not uncommon since today’s media coverage of campaigns tends to focus on these personal 
characteristics rather than substantive policy ideas for their sensational, headline-grabbing 
nature (Patterson 1993; Gilens, Vavreck, and Cohen 2007). Evidence shows that these 
media narratives do affect citizens’ perceptions of the candidates and their ability to handle 
the job (Johnston, Hagen, and Jamieson 2004). 
Therefore, candidate factors may contribute to the age gap in vote choice we 
observed from 2004 to 2012. While it is difficult to determine exactly what candidate 
thermometer evaluations measure, as they likely incorporate a number of factors including 
personal trait evaluations and the policy preferences of the candidates (both of which will 
                                                 
11 Party and candidate thermometer assessments are highly correlated, and likely endogenous to each other. 
Thermometer assessments of candidates are also endogenous to vote choice. However, it is nonetheless 
useful to independently investigate candidate thermometer assessments for any unusual patterns as well. 
 38 
be explored further in Chapters 4 and 5), it is nonetheless useful to examine whether 
aggregate candidate thermometer evaluations of the candidates diverge by age group to 
inform my next empirical chapters. It is possible that young people simply liked the 
Democratic candidates better than older adults from 2004 to 2012, as “likeability” is 
something that pundits and journalists discuss in each election cycle. As such, my fifth 
hypothesis (H5) is that young partisan identifiers and leaners of both parties held warmer 
feelings towards the Democratic candidates than their older partisan counterparts from 
2004 to 2012. If this is indeed the case, young Democrats should feel warmer towards the 
Democratic candidate than older Democrats for the years of interest; similarly, young 
Republicans should hold warmer feelings towards the Democratic candidates than older 
Republicans.  
It is doubtful, though, that candidate “likeability” alone would be the primary 
driving force for the Democratic advantage among young people for two reasons. First, 
there were two different presidential candidates on the Democratic side from 2004 to 2012. 
While political pundits (and even some social scientists) suggest Barack Obama’s 
likeability won him the presidency in 2008 (e.g. Bligh and Kohles 2009; Cannon 2012; 
O’Reilly 2012; Olbermann 2012), and no one doubts that Obama utilized his charisma and 
rhetorical gifts in his presidential campaigns, John Kerry certainly did not capture the same 
amount of attention nor was a “likeable” a candidate in 2004 (Stevenson and Elder 2004). 
In addition, young voters voted for Democratic candidates at the congressional and 
gubernatorial levels at higher rates, even in midterm elections, than older individuals 
during this period as well (Barr and Moore 2006; CIRCLE 2010). So this phenomenon was 
not isolated to presidential-level elections nor to presidential candidates.   
Consistent with my theory, it more plausible that rather than being attracted to the 
Democratic candidates, young people were repelled by the Republican candidates to a 
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greater extent than older individuals as the Republican brand was tainted by the 
performance of the party in office during the George W. Bush administration. Thus, my 
sixth hypothesis (H6) is young Americans of both parties will hold more negative 
assessments of the Republican candidates than older Americans in each election year from 
2004 to 2012. 
Finally, I look at thermometer assessment ratings of the incumbent president. 
Because young people have less experience with politics, the current state of affairs should 
color their assessments of the incumbent president to a greater extent than older Americans 
(Fiorina 1981, 46-54). Young partisan identifiers and leaners may be particularly pleased 
with incumbent presidents when national conditions are good, and especially displeased 
with those incumbents during periods of turbulence. Therefore, my seventh hypothesis 
(H7) is that retrospective assessments of incumbent performance in office among young 
partisans of both parties should exaggerate the tendencies of their older counterparts. If this 
is the case, young partisans of both parties should hold cooler feelings towards the 
incumbent during periods of turmoil, especially towards George W. Bush in 2004 and 
2008, than older partisans of their respective parties. 
DATA AND MEASURES 
Using American National Election Studies Time Series survey data from 1992 to 
2016,12 I first calculate the proportions of 18-29-year-olds and 30+ individuals who 
identify with each party, as Independents, or who have no preference or identify with a 
third party. Then, among those who identify with or lean towards one of the major parties, 
                                                 
12 I extend my analysis back to 1992 because ANES surveys prior to 1992 did not include weight variables 
to account for selection probabilities and nonresponse to maintain consistency. Because affective 
polarization is a relatively recent phenomenon (e.g. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Hetherington and 
Rudolph 2016), extending the analysis back two and a half decades is sufficient to pick up on changes in 
attitudes towards the parties. 
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I examine aggregate changes in three types of indicators of inter-party social distance— 
citizens’ feelings towards the parties themselves, changes in inter-party social distance (i.e. 
affective polarization), and attitudes towards the candidates and incumbents at the top of 
each party’s tickets. To determine whether emotions and rates of affective polarization 
differ between young and older Americans, I use feeling thermometers for the parties and 
candidates that run on a 0-100 scale, where values from below the neutral point of 50 
indicate cooler feelings towards the subject and values above 50 suggest warmer feelings 
towards an individual or group. I use the ANES pre-election thermometer assessments for 
candidates and parties in my analyses to minimize any spillover effects the election results 
may have on public attitudes in the post-election thermometers.  
In addition, I create a common survey-based measure of affective polarization for 
each individual by calculating the difference between a partisan’s outparty and inparty 
feeling thermometer ratings for the parties, producing negative polarization scores.13 
Feeling thermometer ratings, though, are subject to a positivity bias that influences 
evaluations of political objects (Knight 1984). While this bias is a systematic error that 
exists in the aggregate, there is also a wide variation in individuals’ personalities. Some 
people have generally cooler personalities or more negative while others are naturally 
warmer positive. At the suggestion of Marc Hetherington, I account for this variation in 
response patterns by calculating each respondent’s mean score for all post-election group 
thermometers and subtract this average from each of their pre-election candidate and party 
thermometer assessments.14 The practical effect of doing so adjusts the scale for each 
                                                 
13 Previous research indicates that while self-identified party identifiers reflect the highest levels of 
polarization, partisan leaners also show significant levels of partisan affect and behave like partisans 
(Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Because of this, I group leaners in with party identifiers for the purpose of 
analysis. 
14 The number of post-election group thermometers included on ANES surveys varied from year to year, 
from a low of 19 thermometers in 1996 to a high of 33 thermometers in 2004. To preserve the number of 
cases under analysis, if an individual did not provide a response to one or more group thermometer 
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individual such that their feeling thermometer ratings for the candidates and parties are a 
deviation from a baseline created from their respective average thermometer scores. The 
resulting adjusted thermometer ratings are centered around a neutral point of zero, with 
increasingly negative values indicating greater coolness towards an individual or group, 
and values above zero suggest warmer feelings towards an individual or group.  
After calculating the outparty-inparty polarization scores and adjusted thermometer 
ratings for individuals, I compute the aggregate thermometer means for two age groups—
18 to 29-year-olds, and everyone else over 30 years of age— and perform three separate 
difference-of-means tests for each adjusted party thermometer, adjusted candidate 
thermometer, incumbent thermometer, and the outparty-inparty polarization scores for 
every year from 1992 through 2016. For each thermometer or polarization score, I first 
perform a difference-of-means test between all 18-29-year-olds and all individuals over 30 
years of age, regardless of partisanship. I then disaggregate each age group by partisanship, 
running a second difference-of-means test between young and older Democratic identifiers 
and leaners, and a third difference-of-means test between young and older Republicans for 
each thermometer to determine whether there are significant differences in attitudes 
between young and older partisans in each election year under study.  
Next, I plotted the average adjusted thermometer ratings for all older and younger 
respondents, all Democratic respondents by age group, and Republican respondents by age 
group on the same graphs. Young respondents were plotted using dotted lines, while older 
Americans were plotted using dashed lines. Black lines signify the averages for all 
respondents, while red lines identify Republicans and blue lines Democrats. Regular dots 
indicate no statistically significant difference between the young and older age groups. 
                                                 
variables, his or her average group thermometer rating was calculated using only those thermometers for 
which he or she provided a response. 
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Yellow diamonds indicate a statistically significant difference of mean between young and 
older groups as the p<.05 level or better. Green diamonds indicate a statistically significant 
difference at the less traditional p<.1 level.  
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Table 3.1: Party Identification by Year and Age Group, in Percentages 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Republican          
18-29 24 21 16 20 17 17 33  
30 and Over 26 29 27 31 28 26 26 
Democrat          
18-29 27 31 28 31 28 33  23 
30 and Over 38 40 36 32 35 34  34 
Independent          
18-29 42 36 41 45 46 44  40 
30 and Over 30 24 25 30 30 33  33 
No Pref/3rd Party              
18-29 7 11 15 4 8 5 4 
30 and Over 6 7 12 7 6 7 7 
        
18-29 Net (D-R) 3 10 12 11 11 16  -10 
30+ Net (D-R) 12 11 11 1 7 8  -8 
 
A cursory glance at party identification rates in the ANES data suggests there was 
about equal movement in identification with both the Democratic and Republican parties 
among the young between 2000 and 2004 (Table 3.1). Around forty-five percent of 18-29-
year-olds identified as Independent in both 2004 and 2008 on the directional 3-point party 
identification question15, indicating that young people were actually reluctant to identify 
                                                 
15 The “direction” question to determine party identification reads, “Generally speaking, do you usually 
think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?”. The follow-up “intensity” 
question comes in two forms. For individuals who identify as either a Democrat or Republicans, the 
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with either party during this period (though they lean towards the Democrats on the follow-
up intensity question and behave like partisans). In fact, Democratic identification among 
young people actually dropped between 2004 and 2008 (from 31% to 28%) even though 
the proportion preferring the Democratic candidate at the ballot box grew larger in 2008. 
Plus, in each year from 2004 to 2012, a higher proportion of individuals over the age of 30 
identified as Democrats than young people. This is pretty compelling evidence to reject 
H1—there was no sudden shift in party identification towards the Democrats among young 
people, nor were they identifying with the Democratic Party at higher rates than older 
adults. We can reject the conventional wisdom used to explain the age gap in vote choice 
between 2004 and 2012. This is, so far, consistent with my theory that young people are 
generally less attached to the parties. 
Next, looking at the average group thermometer ratings used to create the adjusted 
thermometer ratings for candidates and parties (Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2), we see that there 
were no statistical or substantive differences between young partisans and their older 
counterparts with the exception of 2004. In 2004, the average group thermometer score for 
young Democrats dropped from the 2000 average while the mean group score for older 
Democrats increased substantially. This resulted in a 5.7-point gap between the age groups, 
 
 
                                                 
question reads, “Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or a not very strong 
[Democrat/Republican]?” For individuals who identify as Independents on the direction question, the 
follow up is, “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?” As 
Miller (1992) discusses, there is actually a distinction between party identification and partisanship. Party 
identification suggests the presence of a psychological attachment to one of the parties, and is measured 
through the direction question. Partisanship is more of a behavioral concept, which is measured combining 
the direction and intensity questions. Following the lead of other affective polarization scholars, I include 
leaners in my measures of affective polarization primarily to maintain a large enough N of young people 
for analysis. 
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Figure 3.1: Average Group Thermometer Ratings 
 
Note: Yellow diamonds indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older  
respondents at the p<.05 level or better. 
 
Table 3.2: Average Group Thermometer Ratings 
 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Dem Young 58.7 62.4 62.9 61.5 61.5 59.3 64.1 
Dem Older 59.9 62.9 63.7 67.2 62.8 59.3 62.1 
Rep Young 56.5 57.1 62.8 64.3 60.3 57.5 57.6 
Rep Older 55.5 57.9 60.1 65.6 58.5 57.5 57.6 
Note: Cells highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older 
respondents at the p<.05 level or better. 
which was both a statistically significant and substantive difference that year. This is 
indicative that the normal pattern of opinions was disrupted that year, particularly among 
young Democrats. While it is interesting this occurred the same year we first observe the 
age gap in vote choice, a statistically significant difference in a group thermometer 
averages is hardly conclusive. But the positivity bias suggested by previous scholars (e.g. 
Knight 1984) is apparent in that all average group thermometer ratings lie above the neutral 
point of 50 for both age groups of both parties for all years under study, validating the need 
to adjust the scales for each party and candidate thermometer. As mentioned above, each 




















average group score from each of their individual party and candidate thermometers 
ratings, setting a new neutral point for each respondent at zero. 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY ASSESSMENTS 
Figure 3.2: Democratic Party Thermometer Ratings 
 
Note: Yellow diamonds indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older respondents at the p<.05 level 
or better. 
Table 3.3: Pre-Election Adjusted Democratic Party Ratings 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
All Young 0.3 -1.5 -1.3 -2 -2.1 0.9 -10.5 
All Older 0.8 -1.7 -3.5 -8.1 -4.4 -4.2 -10.4 
Dem Young 9.7 8.7 10.1 8.7 9.2 15.1 3.8 
Dem Older 12.6 11.5 11.2 8 11 14.2 7.4 
Rep Young -10.6 -14.8 -15.2 -21.7 -18.9 -15.8 -24.2 
Rep Older -12.9 -18.2 -21 -24.7 -22.5 -24.5 -30 
Note: Cells highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older 
respondents at the p<.05 level or better. 
 
Next, looking at the average adjusted thermometer ratings between all young and 
all older respondents towards the Democratic Party regardless of partisanship (the black 


















2004 when the attitudes among older Americans grew cooler towards the Democrats but 
the average attitudes of young Americans remain fairly consistent from 2000. A difference 
of means test indicates this gap was statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Attitudes 
between young and older Americans also diverged at a statistically-significant level in 
2012, resulting in a difference of just over 5 points. Overall, it seems that young people 
hold warmer affective feelings towards the Democratic Party than older individuals when 
partisanship is not taken into account. But even more interesting nuances appear when 
respondents are disaggregated by partisanship. 
Consistent with the findings of affective polarization scholars, the attitudes of 
Democrats (designated by blue lines) towards their own party have remained fairly 
consistent16 over time while Republicans’ attitudes (designated by red lines) towards the 
outparty have been growing cooler in recent election years. This trend is pronounced 
among older Republicans, whose average adjusted thermometer ratings dropped from a 
high of -12.9 in 1992 to a low of -30 in 2012— a decrease of 17.1 points in the span of 
twenty years. In fact, the difference in attitudes between all older and all younger 
respondents in 2012 appears to be largely driven by the divergence in attitudes between 
older and younger Republicans, where the attitudes of older Republicans towards the 
Democratic Party dropped slightly from 2008 while the average ratings of younger 
Republicans actually rose between 2008 and 2012, resulting in a 9-point difference 
between the age groups. 
In fact, average assessments of the Democratic Party among young Republicans 
were consistently warmer than those for older Republicans in all years under study. The 
substantive differences between young and older Republicans ranged in magnitude, from 
                                                 
16 Though there is a drop between 2012 and 2016. 
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a 2.3-point difference in 1992 to an 8.7-point disparity in 2012, though the differences 
between the two age groups only reach statistical significance in 2000 and 2012. These 
findings suggest that the weaker and more malleable partisan attachments of young people 
generate less outparty animosity than for older partisans, whose party identifications have 
theoretically crystallized with age. This also lends support to H4—that affective 
polarization affects older partisans to a greater extent than younger partisans, at least 
among Republican identifiers and leaners. 
Democratic identifiers and leaners of all ages are much warmer towards the 
Democratic Party than are Republicans, as we should expect. However, the substantive 
differences between young and older Democrats were minimal. Young Democrats did not 
hold warmer feelings towards their party than older Democrats, giving us reason to reject 
H2. In fact, the only statistically significant difference between young and older Democrats 
in any year was 1992, when the average adjusted thermometer score for young Democrats 
was 3.1 points cooler than for older individuals. Thermometer ratings for both age groups 
reached their nadir in 2016 when young Democrats had an average adjusted thermometer 
rating of 3.8 and older Democrats an average of 7.4 points, while both age groups reached 
their highest levels in 2012 with average thermometer ratings of 15.1 and 14.2, 
respectively. 
REPUBLICAN PARTY ASSESSMENTS  
Figure 3.3 and Table 3.4 present the results for Republican Party thermometer 
assessments. As one would expect, Republican identifiers and leaners of all ages are much 
warmer towards the Republican Party than Democrats are for all years under study. 
Consistent with the findings of affective polarization scholars, the attitudes of Democratic 
identifiers and leaners towards the outparty have grown consistently cooler over the 
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twenty-four-year period under investigation. Democratic youth are not as cool towards the 
Republican Party as older Democrats for most years under study, to the point where there 
is a statistically significant divergence in the means in 2004 (p<.05) and 2012 (p<.1), 
though these differences are not as substantively large (5 and 3.7 points, respectively) as 
those we see between young and older Republicans towards the Democrats presented 
above. 
Figure 3.3: Republican Party Thermometer Ratings 
 
Note: Yellow diamonds indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older respondents  
at the p<.05 level or better. Green triangles indicate a statistically significant difference in means at the p<.1 level. 
Table 3.4: Pre-Election Adjusted Republican Thermometer Ratings 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
All Young -4.3 -9.6 -11.8 -13.7 -15.5 -11.9 -11.5 
All Older -6.4 -5.9 -6.6 -9.7 -11.8 -10.9 -14.7 
Dem Young -15.7 -21.4 -21.2 -23.3 -28.6 -25.1 -30 
Dem Older -19.5 -20.3 -21.3 -28.3 -29.5 -28.8 -31.4 
Rep Young 11 8.1 2.4 6 7.2 4.69 3.4 
Rep Older 10.9 12.6 11.5 8 9 9 2.4 
Note: Cells highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older 























Interestingly, like the case with young Republicans, these results suggest young 
Democrats are less antagonistic towards the outparty than older Democrats which again 
provides evidence to support H4—affective polarization appears more pronounced among 
older partisans than younger partisans. Furthermore, the fact that there is less animosity 
among young Democrats towards the Republican Party also suggests that the Democratic 
advantage among young people at the voting booth is probably not driven primarily by the 
attitudes of young Democrats. 
Assessments of Republican attitudes towards their own party are far more 
interesting. Young Republicans were consistently cooler towards their own party than older 
Republicans for all years under study until 2016. While the differences were substantively 
small (<2 points) most years, there are statistically significant differences at the p<.1 level 
in 1996 (a 4.5-point difference) and 2012 (a 4.3 difference), and a statistically significant 
(p<.05) and rather large 9.1-point difference in 2000. In 2016, however, the average 
adjusted thermometer score for young Republicans was about one-point higher than for 
older Republicans. Nonetheless, this is strikingly different from what we observe between 
young and older Democrats towards their own party during the same period, where young 
and older Democratic inparty ratings were on par with each other. So there appear to be 
two simultaneous forces at work where young Republicans were cooler towards their own 
party from 1992 through 2012 while at the same time consistently demonstrating warmer 
feelings towards the Democrats than older Republicans. This confirms H3—that young 
Republican identifiers and leaners are less affectively attached to the Republican Party than 
older Republicans.  
Substantive differences in thermometer ratings exist when comparing the results of 
Tables 3.3 and 3.4. The lower outparty means for Democrats, both older and younger, 
suggest they hold more negative feelings towards the Republican Party than Republicans 
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hold towards the Democratic Party. From 2004 on, the average outparty ratings among 
older Democrats hovered between -28 and -30 points, while older Republicans outparty 
ratings of Democrats did not dip below -25 until 2016. Similarly, the lowest average 
outparty rating for young Republicans came in 2016 when the mean dropped to -24.2, while 
the floor for young Democrats’ outparty ratings was -30 that same year. 
Average thermometer ratings among all young people regardless of partisanship 
(black dotted line in Figure 3.2) hovered near zero for the Democratic Party for most of the 
time period under study, ranging from a high of .9 in 2012 to a low of -10.5 in 2016. But 
average thermometer ratings among all young people were much lower for the Republican 
Party (black dotted line in Figure 3.3), ranging from a high of -4.3 in 1992 to a low of -
15.5 in 2008. While young people generally held warmer feelings for the Democratic Party 
than older adults, average thermometer ratings hovering at or below zero imply that young 
people are not necessarily attracted to the Democratic Party per se, but are perhaps repelled 
by the Republican Party to a greater extent than older people. 
AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION ASSESSMENTS 
Outparty-inparty assessments are the conventional tool used by scholars to measure 
affective polarization, created by simply subtracting an individual’s assessment of his own 
party from his assessment of the outparty. The more negative the result, the greater the 
level of affective polarization he holds. Looking first at the differences in average outparty-
inparty assessments between partisans of all ages (Figure 3.4, Table 3.5), the increasingly 
negative polarization scores suggest affective polarization was on the rise from 1992 to 
2012, particularly among Democrats. The average polarization scores among Democratic 
identifiers and leaners dropped non-monotonically over the twenty-year period under 
examination, from a high of -30.7 to a low of -42.4 in 2012, though they bounced back up 
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a bit to -37.6 in 2016. Average Republican outparty-inparty scores, on the other hand, 
dropped from a high of -23.4 in 1992 and have hovered right around the -30 mark ever 
since. This is consistent with the findings of previous affective polarization studies that 
find that Democratic outparty ratings have declined more precipitously than Republican 
assessments of the Democratic Party (e.g. Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012). Disaggregating 
these assessments by age provides an explanation for why we see such a trend. 
Figure 3.4: Outparty-Inparty Polarization Scores 
 
Table 3.5: Pre-Election Outparty-Inparty Adjusted Polarization Scores 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
All Dem -30.7 -31.5 -32.1 -35.5 -39.8 -42.4 -37.6 
All Rep -23.4 -29.4 -29.8 -32.3 -30.7 -30.7 -31.4 
 
 While the trend in polarization scores for young Democrats (Figure 3.5 and Table 
3.6) generally mirrors those of older Democrats, young Democrats do not appear to be as 
affectively polarized as older Democrats. In fact, the magnitude of the difference between 














Figure 3.5: Outparty-Inparty Polarization Scores by Age 
  
Note: Yellow diamonds indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older 
 respondents at the p<.05 level or better. 
Table 3.6: Pre-Election Outparty-Inparty Adjusted Polarization Scores by Age 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Dem Young -25.5 -30.1 -31.2 -32 -37.7 -40.2 -33.8 
Dem Older -32.1 -31.9 -32.5 -36.7 -40.5 -43 -38.7 
Rep Young -21.7 -23.1 -17.6 -27.6 -26 -20.5 -28.1 
Rep Older -23.9 -30.9 -32.6 -33.2 -32.6 -33.4 -32.4 
Note: Cells highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young 
and older respondents at the p<.05 level or better. 
 
only statistically significant in 1992 when there was a substantively large gap of 6.6 points. 
However, the movement in the outparty-inparty polarization scores among Republican 
youth varies quite considerably from those of older Republicans. Not only are young 
Republicans consistently less affectively polarized than older Republicans, there are quite 
substantive gaps between the age groups in many years and statistically significant 
differences in some.  We see a significant reduction in affective polarization among young 
Republicans at the end of Bill Clinton’s administration in 2000 when young Republicans 

















older Republicans, resulting in a 15-point difference in average affective polarization 
scores (Figures 3.2 and 3.3, respectively). We also see less affective polarization among 
young Republicans compared to older Republicans in 2012 after Barack Obama’s first term 
in office, where there is both a statistically significant and substantively large 12.9-point 
gap in polarization scores between young and older Republicans. This provides the best 
evidence to confirm H4—affective polarization appears to affect older partisans of both 
parties to a greater degree than younger partisans. Consistent with my theory, young people 
are less emotionally attached to the party they identify with or lean towards and are less 
antagonistic towards the outparty. This suggests that partisanship should matter more to 
the vote of older Americans, and is something that I will test further in Chapter 5. In 
addition, because we observe a significant reduction in affective polarization among 
Republican youth after periods in which the presidency has been held by the Democrats 
(and one instance in which we see a reduction of affective polarization among Democratic 
youth after a Republican president in 1992), differences in polarization scores may be 
related to opinions of the incumbent president. This warrants the idea that a closer look at 
thermometer ratings of candidates and incumbents should be performed. 
PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE ASSESSMENTS 
An examination of the Democratic presidential candidate thermometer ratings 
displays some interesting patterns (Figure 3.6 and Table 3.7). First, ignoring partisanship 
and looking at average thermometer ratings by age group (black lines in figure 3.6), we see 
that the opinions of young and older Americans were relatively similar from 1992 to 2000. 
But in 2004, a 10.2-point gap in average thermometer ratings emerges where young 
Americans hold much more positive feelings towards the Democratic candidate, and this 
gap persists through 2012 (though it shrinks to 6.5 points). This age gap mirrors the patterns 
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we see in vote choice, where young Americans are much more favorable towards the 
Democratic presidential candidate than older Americans from 2004 through 2012. While 
young people were not altogether favorable towards John Kerry in 2004 (given that the 
average is below 0), his average thermometer rating among 18-29-year-olds was still much 
warmer than the average for older individuals. However, the age gap in affect towards the 
Democratic candidate reverses itself in 2016, when Hillary Clinton’s average adjusted 
thermometer score was about eight points lower for 18-29-year-olds than among older 
Americans. 
Figure 3.6: Democratic Presidential Candidate Thermometer Ratings 
  
Table 3.7: Pre-Election Democratic Presidential Candidate Thermometer Ratings 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
All Young -2 -0.2 -6.3 -4.6 3.3 4.1 -22.3 
All Older -1.9 -1 -4.9 -14.8 -4.9 -2.4 -14.1 
Dem Young 8.3 12.1 0.13 4.3 13.2 20.5 -1.8 
Dem Older 9.6 13.9 8.7 3.3 10.2 20.2 6.7 
Rep Young -14.2 -16.2 -14.8 -24.5 -13.6 -18.6 -38.4 
Rep Older -15.8 -20.5 -21.1 -32.6 -23.6 -26.8 -38.2 
Note: Cells highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older 


















When disaggregating by party, affect towards the Democratic presidential 
candidate was similar for both young and older Democrats (blue lines in Figure 3.6) for all 
election years except 2000 and 2016, when young Democratic identifiers and leaners were 
much cooler towards Al Gore (8.6 points) and Hillary Clinton (8.5 points) than older 
Democrats were, respectively (differences are statistically significant at the p<.05 level). 
In 2000, the average for older Democrats was over eight points higher than the average for 
younger Democrats, which hovered just above zero that year. The statistically significant 
age gap between all young and older Americans in 2016 appears to stem largely from the 
disparate opinions between young and older Democrats towards Hillary Clinton.  
The age gap in affect towards the Democratic presidential candidates between all 
young and older American in 2004, 2008, and 2012 seem to be rooted in the dissimilar 
opinions between young and older Republicans. From 2004 to 2012, young Republican 
identifiers and leaners statistically diverged (p<.05) from older Republicans between six 
and ten points, rating the Democratic presidential candidate more warmly each election 
year than their older counterparts.17 Thus, there is limited support for H5—while young 
Democratic identifiers and leaners did not hold warmer feelings towards Democratic 
candidates than older Democrats from 2004 through 2012, young Republicans held less 
cool feelings towards the Democratic candidates than older Republicans did those years. 
  
                                                 
17 While there is a statistically significant difference in opinions between young and older Republicans in 
2000 as well, this cancels out the statistically significant gap between young and older Democrats that year. 
 56 
Figure 3.7: Republican Presidential Candidate Thermometer Ratings 
 
Table 3.8: Pre-Election Republican Presidential Candidate Thermometer Ratings 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
All Young -5.6 -10.1 -8.2 -17.4 -13.3 -13.2 -22.5 
All Older -5.4 -7.1 -4.1 -6.6 -7.4 -8.9 -21.6 
Dem Young -18 -20.4 -18.3 -32.3 -24.5 -27.7 -41.8 
Dem Older -20.2 -20.3 -19.4 -31.5 -23.8 -29.2 -45.3 
Rep Young 11 6.2 5.6 10.3 5.5 7.37 -5.8 
Rep Older 14.5 9.7 14.2 17.7 11.9 14.1 4.2 
Note: Cells highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older 
respondents at the p<.05 level or better. Cells highlighted in green indicate a statistically significant difference at the 
p<.1 level. 
Looking next at the Republican presidential candidate thermometers (Figure 3.7 
and Table 3.8), we see a pattern similar to that in the Democratic presidential candidate 
thermometers. First, ignoring partisanship, there is a statistically significant divergence in 
attitudes between all young and older Americans from 2000 to 2012 (black lines in Figure 
3.7), where young people rate the Republican presidential candidates more coolly than 
older Americans.18 In fact, the bottom really seems to fall out under Bush from 2000 to 
                                                 
18 This difference is statistically significant at the p<.05 level for all years from 2000 to 2016 except 2012, 





















2004 among young people—he was the same Republican candidate both years, but his 
average thermometer rating was much lower in 2004 among the young, and was 10.8 points 
lower than the mean for older Americans that year. Given that his partisanship was the 
same and his personal qualities were the same, this suggests that other short-term forces 
were at work and the drop was perhaps issue- and/or performance-based. Disaggregating 
by partisanship, we see that there are no real substantive nor statistically significant 
differences of note between young and older Democrats (blue lines in Figure 3.7) in their 
attitudes towards the Republican candidate for any year between 1992 and 2016.  
Once again, though, we see considerable differences in the attitudes between young 
and older Republican identifiers and leaners, and this time towards Republican presidential 
candidates (red lines in Figure 3.7). From 2000 through 2016, there were statistically 
significant and quite substantive (7- to 9-point) differences where young Republicans were 
not as warm towards their candidates as older Republicans. In fact, young Republicans 
even provided Donald Trump with a negative average thermometer score in 2016. This 
provides limited support for H6. Young Republicans do hold cooler feelings towards 
Republican candidates than older Republicans, but young Democrats do not hold cooler 
feelings towards the Republican candidates than older Democrats. 
INCUMBENT PRESIDENT ASSESSMENTS 
When examining the thermometer ratings of incumbent presidents for each year 
under examination (Figure 3.8 and Table 3.9), some general patterns emerge. It appears 
that differences in outparty-inparty assessments between young and older partisans are at 
least correlated with assessments of the incumbent president. Correlation, of course, does 
not suggest causation. But it is curious that there is a statistically significant gap in 
incumbent thermometer ratings between all young and all older Americans from 2004 to  
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Figure 3.8: Incumbent Presidential Thermometer Ratings 
 
Note: Yellow diamonds indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older respondents  
at the p<.05 level or better. Green triangles indicate a statistically significant difference in means at the p<.1 level. 
Table 3.9: Pre-Election Incumbent President Thermometer Ratings 
 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
All Young -5.6 -0.2 -4.7 -17.4 -24.1 4.1 -2.8 
All Older -5.4 -1 -7.1 -6.6 -18.9 -2.4 -6 
Dem Young -18 12.1 7.1 -32.3 -38.4 20.5 15.1 
Dem Older -20.2 13.9 9.1 -31.5 -38.7 20.2 17.2 
Rep Young 11 -16.2 -19.9 10.3 0 -18.6 -16.2 
Rep Older 14.5 -20.5 -27.9 17.7 4.7 -26.8 -32.2 
Note: Cells highlighted in yellow indicate a statistically significant difference in means between young and older 
respondents at the p<.05 level or better. Cells highlighted in green indicate a statistically significant difference at the 
p<.1 level. 
2012 (black lines in Figure 3.8)—the years in which we also observe the age gap in vote 
choice. Young voters in 2004 were over ten points cooler towards Bush than older voters 
were, and this was the same year that young Americans preferred Democrat John Kerry at 
a much higher rate than older individuals. 
In 2008, the average adjusted thermometer ratings for all young people dropped 
almost seven points lower from their 2004 levels to -24.1. The gap in opinion between 





















drop in average attitudes of older people to -18.9. Once again, young Americans viewed 
Bush more coolly than older Americans did that year. While the age gap in attitudes 
towards the incumbent remained in 2012, this is due to the fact that 18-29-year-olds viewed 
Barack Obama much more favorably after his first term than older individuals did. In fact, 
the average adjusted thermometer ratings for young Americans remained positive at 4.1 
points that year, while the average for older Americans was -2.4.  
Unsurprisingly, in years during which a Republican is president, thermometer 
ratings for the incumbent among Republican respondents of all ages spike, then plummet 
during Democratic presidencies. The reverse is true for Democrats. Disaggregating by age 
and partisanship, average thermometer ratings among young and older Democrats mirror 
each other quite precisely for all years under study (blue lines in figure 3.8). Where we see 
a divergence in attitudes is, once again, between young and older Republicans (red lines in 
Figure 3.8). While thermometer ratings among both young and older Republicans dropped 
at the end of Bill Clinton’s second term, there is a statistically significant (p<.05) difference 
in thermometer ratings in 2000, where incumbent president ratings for Bill Clinton among 
Republican youth were not as cool as those for older Republicans. Similarly, while 
incumbent ratings among all Republicans dropped between 2008 and 2012 in the switch in 
incumbency from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, the thermometer assessments for 
Obama among older Republicans dropped much more steeply than for younger 
Republicans, resulting in a statistically significant gap between the two groups. This gap 
between older and younger Republicans in assessments of Obama persisted into the 2016 
election. This lends limited support for H7—young partisans do seem to be affected by 
incumbent performance in office to a greater degree than older partisans, but this effect 
seems to be limited to Republican identifiers and leaners. But when taking partisanship out 
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of the equation, assessments of George W. Bush were much lower among young 
Americans in 2004 and 2008 than among older adults. 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Scholars have noted that average Republican outparty ratings of the Democrats 
have not declined as quickly as Democratic outparty ratings of the Republicans over the 
last few decades (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Levendusky 2013). The analysis above 
not only confirms these findings, but also uncovers at least one partial explanation for why 
this is the case. Affective polarization—in terms of positive or negative feelings towards 
the parties— is not as pronounced among young Americans as it is among older Americans. 
This is likely due to the relative newness of young people to politics and government, 
whose party affiliations have yet to solidify into lifelong predispositions. But this appears 
to be particularly true among young Republican identifiers and leaners, whose average 
assessments of the Democratic Party and Democratic presidential candidates have not been 
as cool as the assessments of older Republicans. 
These findings also demonstrate that attitudes towards the Democratic Party among 
young Democrats have been no more positive than the attitudes of older Democrats over 
the last twenty years. Attitudes of young Republicans towards the Democratic Party were 
only statistically-significantly different from older Republicans in 2000 and 2012. When 
looking at the combined attitudes of all young Americans, despite partisanship, we do see 
statistically significant differences in 2004 and 2012—two years of the three in which we 
have observed an age gap in vote choice. However, when looking at the average 
Democratic Party thermometer scores, it is only in 1992 and 2012 that the average for 
young people is above zero. This is indicative that young people are not attracted to the 
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Democratic Party per se. Rather, Republican youth are not as affectively attached to their 
party as older Republicans.  
In addition, while the average thermometer score for Democratic candidate John 
Kerry in 2004 was below the neutral point of zero in 2004, the floor really appeared to fall 
out from under George W. Bush that year when his thermometer rating among young adults 
plummeted to -17.4. Evaluations of Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012 were not far above 
zero both years, but were considerably warmer than the -13.3 and -13.2 averages 
Republicans John McCain and Mitt Romney earned respectively. These findings 
demonstrate that the attitudes of young voters towards the parties and their candidates do 
differ from those of older voters, sometimes quite considerably, and that a closer look at 
what causes these differences in attitudes is warranted.  
More importantly, however, these findings demonstrate that affective polarization 
affects older partisans to a greater degree than younger partisans, confirming part of my 
theory that party factors have a greater effect on the attitudes of older Americans relative 
to younger Americans. It does not appear that younger voters were casting their ballots for 
the Democrats to a greater degree from 2004 to 2012 because of stronger emotional 
responses to the parties or their candidates, or at least to a degree that would explain the 
increased Democratic vote share among this age group. So the age gap in vote choice is 
not explained by the emotionalism of the young.  
What these data do suggest that retrospective assessments of the incumbent 
president’s time in office and performance of the government during his administration 
may affect young voters in a more extreme manner than older voters. The pro-Democratic 
voting tendencies of the young may be narrowly-based. They may only be as deep as the 
issue context and/or other contextual factors that existed in the 2004-2012 time frame. This 
idea will be explored further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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As such, in Chapter 4 I turn to the idea of substantive polarization and issue 
preferences as factors that may explain the age gap in vote choice. Some scholars argue 
that it is hard to see polarization when looking at ideology and issue preferences because 
these are hard-to-grasp ideas with a bias towards moderation, so less-knowledgeable 
individuals tend to place themselves in the middle of survey response scales (Palfrey and 
Poole 1987). Yet the partisan and ideological sorting of elites in Washington over the last 
few decades has made it easier than ever to distinguish between the general policy stances 
of the parties, leading to clearer candidate choices for voters even if voters are unaware of 
the specific policy desires of a candidate or party (e.g. Fiorina et al. 2005). Thus, issue 
preferences, one of the short-term factors affecting vote choice, will be explored more 
thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Substantive Polarization and Issue Proximities 
In the previous chapter, I investigated the role of partisanship and affective 
polarization as a possible explanation for the age gap in vote choice from 2004-2012. The 
results of Chapter 3 suggest party identification and affect are not driving young voters 
towards the Democratic Party and its candidates; if anything, they suggest that young 
people today are less attached to both major parties than older partisans, and this is 
especially pronounced among young Republicans. This is consistent with my theory that 
young people are less attached to the parties than older individuals. Now that I have 
established that their attitudes and emotions towards the parties and candidates are different 
from the older electorate, I move to my next causal claim—that the short-term factors 
affecting vote choice differentially impact young people relative to older Americans, 
especially in times of political turbulence. In this chapter, I examine the effects of 
prospective issue preferences and proximities on candidate choice for both young people 
and the older electorate. 
As noted in Chapter 3, political elites have polarized in recent decades on matters 
of public policy including economic, social, and foreign policy issues. At the same time, 
survey data suggest young people have become more dovish on defense and more liberal 
on social issues in recent years when compared to the older electorate (e.g. Keeter, 
Horowitz, and Tyson 2008; Kohut 2008). Because of this, the strong preference for 
Democratic candidates among 18-29-year-olds may be due, at least in part, to the issue 
positions held by the party and its candidates aligning more closely to their own than the 
positions held by Republicans. In fact, the toxic stew in which the Republican Party was 
mired after the turn of the 21st century may have encouraged young people to drift further 
to the left in reaction to the perceived movement of the Republican Party to the right during 
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the George W. Bush administration, particularly on foreign policy and social issues. 
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether, in the aggregate, young 
people have moved to the left on issue positions, see a difference between the candidates 
on issues, and whether they are using those issue preferences when making their decisions 
at the ballot box.   
ISSUE POSITIONS AND THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING 
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, because party identification is generally a 
durable attachment, it is a strong and consistent predictor of vote choice and can drive issue 
preferences. However, studies have found that party loyalties may change in response to 
an individual’s policy preferences, particularly on the polarizing issues associated with 
periods of partisan change (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Alvarez and Bedolla 2008; 
Carsey and Layman 2006). This is especially true for young Americans since their 
relatively malleable attitudes are susceptible to the strong information flows present in 
political campaigns (Zaller 1992), allowing for important political socialization 
opportunities and possibly causing their less-crystallized party loyalties to shift ((Jennings 
and Niemi 1981; Sears and Valentino 1997). But many young people have little exposure 
to everyday political events, and politics may be low-visibility even in presidential election 
years if the issues of a campaign are rather low in salience. As a result, young people may 
not pay enough attention to politics for issues to have a strong impact on their attitudes and 
behavior unless large exogenous events—like war or recession— make politics relevant to 
them. 
While policy attitudes and partisanship may endogenously affect each other, policy 
preferences can also have an independent effect on vote choice. The central assumption of 
proximity voting is that a citizen will cast her vote for the candidate whose policy positions 
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are closest to her own views in a given election (Downs 1957). In fact, several studies 
indicate voters judge the policy positions of candidates and support the candidate whose 
policy preferences most closely match their own on the salient issues of a campaign 
(Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Hillygus and Shields 2008; Jessee 2009). However, Americans 
are generally poorly informed about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), leading some 
scholars to argue that most voters are unable to (accurately) vote based on prospective 
policy preferences (Converse 1964; Popkin 1991). Young Americans may be particularly 
uninformed about the issue preferences of candidates since politics is not very relevant to 
their lives at this point in the life cycle, and spatial voting may only occur among older and 
more sophisticated voters who have more experience with the parties and their candidates.  
Yet it may not be necessary for young voters to know the exact policy positions of 
a candidate to know that Democratic candidates generally hold liberal positions on social 
and economic issues while Republican are on the conservative side of the spectrum. In fact, 
the ideological polarization of party elites in recent decades makes it much easier for voters 
to distinguish between the parties and their candidates on matters of policy (Abramowitz 
2010). Retrospective assessments of incumbent performance in office can also clue voters 
in on the parties’ and candidates’ prospective stances on certain issues (Fiorina 1981; 
Fiorina et al. 2005). Thus, even if young people are reluctant to identify with the parties, 
they can still use the candidates’ party labels as heuristics for issue positions. 
Given my theory that young people are particularly susceptible to the short-term 
factors influencing the vote including issue preferences, particularly in times of relative 
political turmoil, I investigate four hypotheses in Chapter 4. If the masses are truly 
polarizing on substantive policy issues like some scholars suggest (e.g. Abramowitz 2010), 
my first hypothesis (H1) is that, in the aggregate, young people generally hold more liberal 
positions on social issues, foreign policy issues, and economic issues than older people and 
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that over time, in the aggregate, these issue preferences have moved further to the left. If 
this hypothesis holds, it could help explain the pro-Democratic voting tendencies of the 
young that led to the age gap in vote choice we saw from 2004 to 2012 since Democratic 
candidates generally hold more liberal positions on issues. 
Of course, it might be the case that young people have always been liberal and that 
the strong preference for Democratic candidates among 18-29-year-olds in recent elections 
is due to the growing ideological polarization of candidates. Indeed, a necessary condition 
for a policy attitude to impact vote choice is that a citizen sees a difference in the 
candidates’ stands on that issue (Fournier et al. 2003). Because of the turbulent political 
climate from 2004 to 2012, it is plausible that young people were more aware of the 
candidates stands on the important issues of the day and were acting on those policy 
preferences to a greater degree than before. Thus, my second hypothesis (H2), which is not 
necessarily exclusive to H1, is that young people were better able to distinguish between 
the candidates’ positions on matters of public policy from 2004 to 2012 than in years prior 
to 2004. If this hypothesis rings true, we should see the candidates’ perceived positions on 
these issues become more extreme in recent presidential elections.  
In addition, because of the turbulent political climate from 2004 to 2012, it is 
plausible that young people were more aware of the candidates stands on the important 
issues of the day and were acting on those policy preferences to a greater degree than 
before. Regardless of whether either or both of the first two hypotheses hold, my third 
hypothesis (H3) is that young people are proximally closer to Democratic candidates on 
the important issues in recent elections—particularly on foreign policy and economic 
issues—and that they are using those issue proximities when choosing their preferred 
candidate.  
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Finally, there were few very salient issues on the national agenda during the 1996 
and 2000 elections, and studies suggest that issues did not have a strong impact on vote 
choice in those election years (Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Miller and Klobucar 2003). Given 
their lack of political engagement during times of relative political blandness, this should 
be particularly true among young voters. As such, my fourth hypothesis (H4) is that young 
people used issue preferences to a greater extent during the period from 2004 to 2012 than 
in earlier election years when making their candidate preference decisions because politics 
and issues were not as salient in prior years. If this hypothesis holds, we should either see 
a few issues—namely foreign policy and economic issues— having a much stronger effect 
from 2004 to 2012 relative to earlier elections, holding all other variables at their means, 
or a larger number of issues affecting the vote choice of young people in the period from 
2004 to 2012 compared to earlier elections. 
DATA AND DESIGN 
To test my hypotheses, I use pre-election American National Election Studies Time 
Series data from 1996 to 2016 to obtain comparable measures of citizens’ policy views and 
perceived presidential candidate policy positions. The virtue of the ANES is its 
commitment to asking certain issue questions in the same way each election year (with 
some exceptions, as noted below), allowing for comparability and an examination of trends 
over time. However, it is also limited in the respect that the issue questions asked may not 
exactly match the political context in a particular election year. For example, one of the 
issue questions asks about levels of defense spending but not specifically the “Iraq War” 
(though, as discussed below, defense spending actually works as a fairly good proxy for 
the war). Another vice is that the ANES does not always include all of the same issue 
questions in each year’s Time Series Survey, or will sometimes only ask for the 
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respondent’s position on an issue but not where the candidates stand. This becomes 
particularly problematic on the Time Series Surveys prior to 1996; as such, I only extend 
these analyses back to 1996. 
Model 1 
I first examine the aggregate mean scores for self-placement, Democratic candidate 
placement, and Republican candidate placement on a number of ANES issue scales to 
determine if there has been aggregate movement in opinion among young people on these 
issues, and whether there has been aggregate movement in perceived candidate positions 
on those issues. I then create proximity models based on the spatial theory of voting, which 
assume each voter’s policy preference can be represented by a point in space on a single 
issue, and the policy position of each candidate on that issue can be represented by a point 
in the same space. Rational voters are assumed to select the candidate whose policy 
positions are closer to their own. Because political information levels among the youth are 
notoriously low (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), young Americans may need to rely on 
general impressions of where a candidate’s position is rather than the actual position a 
candidate holds. Thus, in Model 1, what matters is where the survey respondents perceive 
the candidates’ positions to be in relation to their own positions on issues rather than using 
an objective measure of a candidate’s position. I compare each citizen’s own policy 
position to their perceived candidate positions on each issue scale to determine whether 
individuals used issue proximities when making their candidate preference decisions. I split 
the sample by age, running the analyses first for 18-29-year-olds and then for all citizens 
over the age of 30. 
I use candidate preference as my dependent variable rather than actual vote choice 
since voter turnout among 18-29-year-olds is low, due to a variety of factors. Voting is a 
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habit that takes a few election cycles to develop and, due to their newness to politics and 
the voting process, young people are less likely to have formed this habit (Plutzer 2002). 
Young citizens also face greater institutional barriers to voting than older Americans such 
as their higher rates of residential mobility and the necessity to re-register to vote each time 
they move (Niemi and Weisberg 2001). In addition, there are a multitude of other reasons 
an individual might not vote in an election year, yet they may hold real preference as to 
who wins the presidency. Because of this, I extend my analysis to include young nonvoters 
to see if these issue preferences exist among them as well, and whether these issue 
preferences are predictive of candidate support.   
The ANES uses a seven-point issue position scale for the following issues: 
government spending and services, defense spending, national health insurance, 
government job guarantees, aid to blacks, and environmental policy/jobs (see Appendix A 
for question wording). These issues were chosen because they were asked fairly 
consistently from 1996 to 2016, with a few exceptions noted below. 
The independent variables for issue proximities in my first model were created as 
follows: 
CPij = |Rij- λijR | - |Rij- λijD | for j= 1… 6 
where candidate proximity (CPi) for issue j is determined by the absolute value of the 
difference between a respondent’s (Ri) position on issue j from his perception of the 
Republican candidate’s position on that same issue (λiR), minus the absolute value of the 
difference between the respondent’s position on the issue and his perception of the 
Democratic candidate’s position on the issue (λiD). |Rij- λijR | and |Rij- λijD | can each take 
values between 0 and 6, so CPij can take values between -6 and +6. A negative value for 
CPij indicates that the respondent’s position on the issue is closer to his perceptions of 
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where the Republican candidate stood on that issue, while positive values indicate a 
position closer to that of the Democratic candidate. A value of 0 indicates that an individual 
perceives himself to be equidistant from both candidates on a given issue. Values closer to 
the extremes of -6 or +6 suggest a respondent not only sees stark differences between the 
candidates, but also that his preferences match closely with one of the candidates. 
I use probit regression to estimate my models, controlling for a variety of social 
attributes thought to be important in guiding voting decisions including gender, race, 
partisanship, and union membership. These demographic controls are important because 
such groups historically vote for Democratic candidates. A dummy variable for self-
identified born-again Christians and evangelical voters was added as well, as this group 
has moved solidly within the Republican coalition in recent years (Fiorina 2005). 
Additionally, I include partisanship in my model as a control since party identification is 
generally the most reliable predictor of candidate preference. My dependent variable is 
candidate preference, a binary variable where 0 is a preference for the Republican 
candidate and 1 indicates preference for the Democratic candidate. 
ISSUES AND EXPECTATIONS 
 Some of the issue scales used in this analysis may be more relevant for young 
people than for older voters depending on the political context in a presidential election 
year. Young voters have been found to be more racially tolerant, more supportive of an 
activist government, more anti-war, and more “liberal” in general than older citizens in 
recent years (Kohut 2008). Young voters also favor an expanded role for government in 
creating social programs (Keeter, Horowitz, and Tyson 2008), and such views may be 
particularly salient given that the economic recession in 2008 made it difficult for young 
people to find jobs for many years. For these reasons, on economic issues, I expect that 
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young people would favor increasing government spending and services and government 
job guarantees – especially in 2008 and 2012 during the recession.  
When it comes to the tradeoff between protecting the environment and maintaining 
jobs and our standard of living, the expectations are a little less clear. Given the Democratic 
Party’s refocused efforts to address climate change and the environment after the 2000 
election, young people might be proximally closer to the Democratic Party in 2004 when 
maintaining jobs was not as high a priority. But in 2008, as unemployment rates were 
rising, self-interest over jobs might prevail over sociotropic concerns about the 
environment among the young. If it does, we might expect young people to be proximally 
closer to the Republican candidate that election year. 
However, there was a slight change to the question wording in 2012 and 2016 that 
affects the comparability of these years to previous years on the question of environmental 
protection as it may significantly impact the self-placement of respondents on this issue. 
Prior to 2012, the prompt pitted environmental protection against protecting jobs and a 
standard of living, and read “Some people think it is important to protect the environment 
even if it costs some jobs or otherwise reduces our standard of living… Other people think 
that protecting the environment is not as important as maintaining jobs and our standard of 
living.” However, the new wording in 2012 and 2016 read “Some people think the federal 
government needs to regulate business to protect the environment. They think that efforts 
to protect the environment will also create jobs... Others think that the federal government 
should not regulate business to protect the environment. They think this regulation will not 
do much to help the environment and will cost us jobs.” The new version of the question 
includes the matter of regulating of business, and both sides of the frame include creating 
or saving jobs. This is something that must be taken into consideration when analyzing the 
results, as young people are likely to want to both protect the environment and create jobs. 
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In terms of social issues, Barack Obama took a clear stance on national health 
insurance in his 2008 campaign and after the passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010. 
Given their preference for an expanded role for government in creating social programs 
mentioned above, I expect that 18-29-year-olds perceive Obama’s views to be closer to 
their own in both 2008 and 2012. In addition, because of the racial backgrounds of the 
presidential candidates in 2008 and 2012 and the Democratic Party’s historical stance on 
civil rights, young people might have an impression of where the candidates stand on the 
Aid to Blacks issue. Given the increase in “liberal” attitudes noted above, young people 
are expected to be closer to the Democratic Party’s candidates on this issue, especially in 
2008 and 2012.  
On foreign policy issues, studies indicate that attitudes on foreign affairs (here, 
proxied by defense spending) have a significant effect on electoral choice (Aldrich, 
Sullivan, and Borgida 1989; Fiorina 1981). The Iraq War drew more media coverage in 
2004 than the issues of the economy and terrorism, and evaluations of Iraq had a larger 
impact on assessments of Bush’s overall presidential performance, particularly among 
individuals who had less exposure to and paid less attention to political news (Malhotra 
and Krosnick 2007). In fact, the negative effects of reported local and national casualties 
on public support for Bush’s handling of the Iraq War were much larger among individuals 
who were inattentive to the news relative to those who were regular news consumers 
(Althaus, Bramlett, and Gimpel 2012). Personal connections to a war also lead individuals 
to pay more attention to war as a political issue (Lau, Brown, and Sears 1978). For all these 
reasons, defense spending should be notably salient from 2004 to 2012 for young people, 
and candidate proximity on this issue should have a particularly strong effect on candidate 
preference since young citizens generally held negative assessments of the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Kohut et al. 2012).  
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PROJECTION AND MODEL 2 
When using citizens’ perceptions of candidate stances on issues, projection is 
always cause for concern. Projection might lead individuals to impute their own issue 
preferences onto their favored candidate (Lenz 2009), especially among voters who do not 
know much about the candidates’ issue preferences. Even if young people engage in 
projection at higher rates than older adults (and there is no evidence to suggest they do so), 
it still would not explain how they come to prefer these Democratic candidates at much 
larger proportions than older folks in the first place since a large-scale shift in partisanship 
has already largely been ruled out as a cause. But studies have found that projection occurs 
more often on unimportant issue attitudes because people are unlikely to have paid close 
attention to candidates’ stands, and infer them using their own preferences (Krosnick 
1988). However, unimportant issues are also unlikely to impact vote choice. On issues that 
an individual deems important, though, he or she is more likely to pay attention to 
differences among candidates or infer difference using party platforms.19 
There is also little reason to expect projection to be more powerful in the period 
from 2004 to 2012 than in earlier elections. In fact, the ideological polarization of party 
elites in recent elections has made it easier for voters to distinguish between candidates and 
parties on general issue preferences (Abramowitz 2010). Because the likelihood of 
projection rises under uncertainty, it is more likely to occur on specific issues if the 
                                                 
19 Despite their relative inexperience with politics, young people do consider some issues more important 
than others. For example, a March 2004 survey of 18-24 year old college undergraduates conducted by 
Harvard University’s Institute of Politics reveals that the issue area of most concern to a plurality of college 
students at the time was defense issues (33%), with 21% specifically citing war (Harvard IOP 2004). Also, 
when asked which was more important when choosing a president—their personal qualities like experience 
and leadership, or their positions on specific issues—66% stated that their positions on specific issues 
mattered more while only 28% cited personal qualities. Fifty-seven percent of those who said the 
candidates’ positions on specific issue were more important to their vote choice would have voted for John 
Kerry had the election been held that day and only 33% for Bush, while 57% of those who though personal 
qualities mattered more would have voted for Bush to 37% who would have voted for Kerry. 
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positions of the candidates and parties are indistinct nor not well-known in certain election 
years (like in 1996 and 2000, arguably). As a result, rates of projection should have 
diminished in recent elections given the growing distinction in policy preferences between 
the parties and their candidates.  
Nonetheless, in an attempt to avoid issues of projection, I follow Krosnick’s (1998) 
lead and run a second model using sample means to approximate a candidate’s true position 
on an issue. In this second model, the independent variables of interest are created by 
finding the difference between a respondent’s own policy views and the sample means for 
candidates’ perceived issue stances. Because candidates’ issue preferences are difficult to 
measure, the sample means provide relatively objective measures of a candidate’s issue 
position to help avoid possible projection biases. 
My second proximity voting model representation, using the sample means for each 
candidate’s position on a single issue, is as follows: 
 
CPij = |Rij- μjR | - |Rij- μjD |  for j=1…6 
where candidate proximity is determined by the absolute value of the difference between 
the respondent’s (Ri) position on issue j and the sample average of the Republican 
candidate’s position on that same issue (μjR), minus the absolute value of the difference 
between the respondent’s position on the issue and the sample average of the Democratic 
candidate’s position on the issue (μjD). Like in the first model, CPij can take values between 
-6 and +6, and a value near 0 indicates that an individual is equidistant from the sample 
means for both candidates. If projection is indeed occurring, we might see evidence for it 
if a variable is statistically significant in Model 1 using the subjective perceptions of the 
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candidates’ stances on issue but is statistically insignificant in Model 2 using the more 
objective measures for candidate issue positions.  
In sum, young Americans are expected to hold issue preferences that are proximally 
closer to the Democratic candidates’ positions than those of the Republican candidates in 
recent elections. Because the 1996 and 2000 elections were rather low-salience compared 
to more recent presidential elections, I expect that most issues will not have the same 
impact on candidate preference for those years than from the period from 2004 to 2012.  
A BRIEF CAVEAT 
A few caveats must be noted regarding the 2000 and 2008 ANES survey data. In 
2008, the survey was split-sampled with respondents randomly assigned to one of two 
different formats for the spending and services, healthcare, jobs, environment, and defense 
spending questions (the old format was used for the aid to blacks question for all 
respondents). The old format, which was used in most of the other Time Series surveys, 
used a single question to determine each respondent’s own position and their perceived 
candidate positions on an issue. However, the new format split the issues questions into 
two separate questions (see Appendix A for the full text of both versions). The first question 
determines the respondents’ and perceived candidates’ general positions from a directional 
perspective, and the follow up question asks the degree to which they support that position.  
The most troubling problem with the 2008 Time Series Survey is that, while most 
of the old and new version questions resemble each other closely, the new 2008 Jobs 
question is an entirely new question despite the ANES labeling it as a “new” Jobs question. 
The old version of the question asks the degree to which the respondent feels the 
government should guarantee a job and good standard of living, or whether it should let 
people get ahead on their own. The new version of the question does not ask about jobs at 
 76 
all. Instead, it asks whether respondents and candidates favor or oppose (and to what 
degree) making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens. Because of the 
discrepancy in questions, I present the results for just the old versions of these questions in 
my main analyses. I combine the two formats for these questions into a single variable and 
present the results for the combined analyses in Appendix A, along with the results for the 
two different formats in separate models.  
In 2000, the ANES was performed both face-to-face and by phone, and the issue 
questions were asked differently depending on the interview mode. The issue questions 
asked over the phone were asked on a 5-point scale, while face-to-face respondents were 
given the traditional 7-point scale questions. The ANES created a summary variable that 
recoded the 7-point responses into a 5-point response by combining the three middle 
responses as a single midpoint response (i.e. 3, 4, and 5 responses were coded as 3). Like 
with the 2008 data, I ran my analyses on both formats individually and on the combined 
data, but I only present the results from the face-to-face data in my primary analysis to 
remain consistent with other years. I present the results using the summary variables in 
Appendix A. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
For most issues in most years under study, both young and older people were better 
able to place the candidates on the issue scales than they were to place themselves. In fact, 
many suggested that they “hadn’t thought about it” when asked where they would place 
themselves on an issue scale20, yet were comfortable with placing the presidential 
candidates on that same scale. In 2012, for example, 71 percent of young people placed 
themselves and both candidates on the Government Spending and Services. Another 17 
                                                 
20 Individuals who reported that they “hadn’t thought about it” were recoded to the neutral midpoint of 4 to 
preserve cases. 
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percent were able to place both candidates on the Government Spending and Services scale 
but when asked about their self-placement indicated that they “hadn’t thought much about 
it” and therefore did not place themselves on the scale, while the last 12% were missing at 
least one candidate placement. Out of 1,410 citizens over the age of 30, 1,320 (85%) were 
able to place themselves and both candidates on the scale while the last 15% were missing 
at least one candidate placement or their own self-placement.  
Similarly, on the issue of Defense spending, 87 young people in the 2012 sample 
(20%) placed both candidates on the scale but did not indicate their own preferences on the 
scale, while 285 (64%) were able to place themselves and both candidates on this scale. It 
was largely the same case for older individuals, where 190 (12%) did not offer a self-
placement score on the defense spending scale but placed both candidates on the scale, 
while 1,127 (73%) placed themselves and both candidates on the scale. This same general 
pattern holds true for all issue variables in the 2016, 2012, and 1996 ANES data, and most 
of the variables in the 2008, 2004, and 2000 data.21 The considerable proportions of young 
people who are unwilling to offer self-placement positions on issues while still offering 
                                                 
21 There were some exceptions to this pattern that should be noted. Self-placement rates were lower and 
candidate placement rates higher among respondents who received the old versions of the questions in 
2008, following the same general pattern as 2012. But the question format for the new version of the issue 
placement questions were designed to elicit self-placement responses by creating each scale using 2 
questions. The first is a directional question, asking which of two alternatives the respondent/candidates 
prefer (or if they prefer the status quo) (See Appendix A). A follow-up intensity question asks the degree to 
which they agree with the alternative selected in the directional question. Because the question format 
breaks down the issues into simpler concepts, there were more survey respondents who offered their own 
self-placement and fewer who offered candidate placements on the issue scales. Additionally, in 2004, a 
larger proportion of individuals offered a self-placement than offered candidate placements on the spending 
and services scale among older Americans, and on the government aid to blacks scale for both age groups. 
This is also the case for both age groups on the job guarantees, aid to blacks, and environment/jobs tradeoff 
scales in 2000 as well. 
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Table 4.1: Average 7-point Scale placement, by Issue and by Year 
    2016   2012  2008 (old version)  2004  2000 (FTF only)  1996  
    Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep 
Spending 
& Services 
Young  3.87 2.99 4.9 3.92 2.98 4.8 3.6 2.92 4.13 3.25 3.24 4.4 3.33 3.46 4.18 4.01 3.35 4.72 
(s.e.) (.15) (.14) (.16) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.13) (.11) (.14) (.11) (.1) (.13) (.13) (.13) (.12) (.11) (.11) (.1) 
 Older 3.9 2.65 4.94 4.19 2.61 5.09 3.72 2.75 4.42 3.65 3.01 4.51 3.68 2.93 4.32 4.12 3.09 4.76 
  (s.e.) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Job 
Guarantees 
Young 3.91 3.28 5.52 3.88 3.06 5.19 3.86 3.26 4.87 3.71 3.42 4.88 4.21 3.78 4.31 4.18 3.46 4.89 
(s.e.) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.1) (.11) (.09) (.13) (.11) (.11) (.13) (.10) (.11) (.15) (.12) (.13) (.13) (.1) (.09) 
 Older 4.34 3.03 5.62 4.47 2.94 5.49 4.39 3.1 5.1 4.34 3.28 5.11 4.58 3.69 4.75 4.48 3.32 4.93 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.04) 
Enviro/ 
Jobs 
Young 3.16 3.12 5.06 2.93 2.85 4.77 3.68 3.72 4.51 3.47 4.33 4.36 3.74 3.61 4.23 3.33 3.63 4.49 
(s.e.) (.16) (.14) (.17) (.1) (.1) (.09) (.12) (.107 (.11) (.12) (.1) (.11) (.14) (.12) (.11) (.1) (.1) (.09) 
 Older 3.24 2.71 5.18 3.33 2.76 4.76 4.09 3.74 4.41 3.75 4.11 4.17 3.66 3.36 4.54 3.67 3.52 4.39 
  (s.e.) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.04) 
Health 
Insurance 
Young 3.78 3 5.67 3.68 2.6 5.28 3.34 2.98 5.11     --      --      --      --      --      --  3.77 2.99 4.98 
(s.e.) (.18) (.14) (.13) (.13) (.12) (.10) (.15) (.12) (.13)     --      --      --      --      --      --  (.13) (.12) (.09) 
 Older 4 2.75 5.42 4.11 2.44 5.31 3.76 2.93 5.01     --      --      --      --      --      --  4.0 2.94 4.89 
  (s.e.) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.06)     --      --      --      --      --      --  (.05) (.05) (.04) 
Aid to 
Blacks 
Young 3.89 3.33 5.56 4.29 3 5.03 4.22 2.77 4.75 4.13 3.54 4.71 4.38 3.79 4.46 4.66 3.44 4.76 
(s.e.) (.17) (.13) (.16) (.11) (.07) (.09) (.15) (.116 (.12) (.14) (.08) (.1) (.17) (.12) (.11) (.13) (.1) (.09) 
 Older 4.38 2.94 5.5 4.89 3.16 5.2 4.77 3.03 4.94 4.65 3.48 4.78 4.81 3.49 4.6 4.82 3.41 4.82 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.04) 
Defense 
Spending 
Young 4.01 3.8 5.36 4.05 3.94 4.7 3.77 3.74 5.34 4.22 3.93 5.61 4.18 4.05 4.6 3.84 3.96 4.39 
(s.e.) (.15) (.15) (.13) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.12) (.12) (.11) (.11) (.11) (.1) (.13) (.09) (.1) (.1) (.11) (.08) 
 Older 4.64 3.77 5.23 4.28 3.63 4.7 4.31 3.43 5.36 4.61 3.54 5.66 4.66 4.07 4.89 4.12 3.98 4.53 




candidate positions suggests that many young people are not simply adopting the issue 
positions of their preferred candidate or projecting their own, and that projection may not 
be occurring at very high rates. 
Table 4.1 reflects the average self- and candidate-placements on each of the 7-point 
issue scales by age group. As mentioned earlier, for 2008 I display the means for only the 
old version of the questions to maintain consistency with the rest of the years under study, 
especially given the dramatic difference in the job guarantees question in the new version, 
and display the means for only the face-to-face respondents in 2000 (Table 4.1A displays 
the combined means for 2000 and 2008, while Table 4.1B displays the means for 2008 and 
2000 separated by version. Both tables can be found in the Appendix A). On each of these 
scales, 4 is the midpoint. Means lower than 4 are on the liberal side of the issue spectrum 
while means above 4 are on the conservative side. 
Economic Issues 
Figure 4.1: Government Spending and Services – Self and Candidate Placement 
 
Note: Means below 4 are on the liberal side of the issue spectrum while means above 4 are on the conservative side. 
 
Looking first at the government spending and services self-placement means over 
time (solid black lines in Figure 4.1), there does appear to be some variation in the self-
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placement means for young people (figure on the left). With the exception of 1996, where 
the mean is almost exactly at the midpoint of 4, the lower means for young people in all 
other years are on the more liberal side of the midpoint, favoring increased spending.22 
However, there does not appear as though these aggregate positions have become more 
liberal in recent election years as the means gravitate towards more liberal positions in the 
early Aughts, but then move towards moderation in 2012 and 2016. Individuals over the 
age of 30 (figure on the right), appear consistently more conservative than young people 
on this issue but again, there is no discernable pattern to the variation in means across time. 
Both young and older Americans have consistently placed the Democratic 
candidate (blue dashed lines) on the liberal side of the midpoint from 1996 to 2016. 
Average Democratic candidate placements among both age groups have also grown more 
liberal over time on this issue, though the movement has not been monotonic. At the same 
time, there also appears to be an over-time trend indicating that the perceived stances of 
Republican candidates on this issue have grown more conservative over time (red dotted 
lines). Thus, young and older people alike see differences between the candidates, as the 
Republican candidate means were on the conservative side of the midpoint and the 
Democratic candidate means on the liberal side of the midpoint in each year under study. 
The differences between the candidate means for both age groups have been growing over 
time as well suggesting that on this issue, the masses have perceived increasing polarization 
among the political elites.  
 
 
                                                 
22 The issue scales are coded such that values between 1 and 3 are considered the liberal side of the issue 
scale that Democrats tend to agree with, while values between 5 and 7 are considered the conservative or 
Republican side of the scale, with 4 at the midpoint. 
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Figure 4.2: Government Job Guarantees - Self and Candidate Placement 
 
We do see some evidence of growing liberalism in the aggregate among young 
people on the issue of government job guarantees (Figure 4.2). In 1996 and 2000, the 
averages for young people were on the conservative side of the issue spectrum at 4.18 and 
4.21, respectively. However, beginning in 2004 the average for 18-29-year-olds moved to 
the liberal side of the midpoint and has remained there since. For all years under study, the 
means for young people were also more liberal than the averages for individuals over the 
age of 30. Older individuals during this time period remained consistently on the 
conservative side of the midpoint with not much variation from year to year. 
There also appears to be some evidence of greater ideological polarization between 
the candidates on the issue of government job guarantees in recent elections. The 
Democratic candidate averages for young people do seem to be generally growing more 
liberal, from 3.46 in 1996 to 3.28 in 2016. For individuals over the age of 30, Democratic 
candidate placement averages have also grown more liberal from an average of 3.32 in 
1996 to 3.03 in 2016. At the same time, average Republican candidate placement scores 
have grown more conservative. The most conservative average candidate placement for 
both age groups came just recently in the 2016 election when Donald Trump was perceived 
as much more conservative on this issue than previous Republican presidents. This has led 
to a widening gap between the mean Democratic and Republican placement scores. While 
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there was a 1.43-point gap between the average Democratic candidate placement and the 
Republican candidate mean among young people in 1996, the gap grew to 2.24 points by 
2016. Similarly, the gap between the candidate means for older Americans grew from 1.61 
in 1996 to a difference of 2.59 points in 2016.  
Among young people, this growing gap between the candidates appears to be driven 
primarily by the perceived movement to the right among Republican candidates. Among 
older citizens, however, the widening gap is due to the growing extremity in the perceived 
positions for candidates of both parties. In addition, in terms of candidate proximity in the 
aggregate, the mean scores for Republican candidates were actually proximally closer to 
the self-placement averages for the young in 1996 and 2000. This changes from 2004 to 
2016, where mean self-placement scores for young people were closer to the average scores 
for the Democratic candidates. For all years under study, however, the average self-
placement means for individuals over the age of 30 were proximally closer to the averages 
for the Republican presidential candidates. 
Figure 4.3: Environment/Jobs Tradeoff - Self and Candidate Placement 
 
On the environment/jobs tradeoff scale (Figure 4.3), despite my expectations for 
2008, young people have remained on the liberal side of the midpoint in the aggregate, 
preferring environmental protection over the potential cost to jobs for all years from 1996-
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2008. They are also must closer to the Democratic candidates in 2012 and 2016 with the 
change in question wording to the regulation of business.23 Older individuals have also 
been fairly consistently liberal on this issue as well with the exception of 2008, when the 
mean is on the conservative side of the midpoint. They appear to be becoming more liberal 
on this issue over time as well. 
In terms of aggregate candidate placement, there does seem to be a slight trend 
towards liberalism in the perceived Democratic candidate stances on this issue among 
young people, though the trend towards liberalism is much more pronounced amongst older 
Americans. Perceptions of Republican candidate positions have grown much more 
conservative for both age groups in recent elections, and the ideological polarization 
between the candidates appears to be increasing.24 But there is some important variation 
that should be noted here. The fact that both young and older Americans gave John Kerry 
an average score on the conservative side of the midpoint demonstrates that Americans do 
consider the positions of individual candidates on these issues rather than just regularly 
placing the Democratic candidates on the liberal side of the scale and Republican 
candidates on the conservative side of the scale. In addition, in the aggregate the average 
self-placement scores for young adults are spatially closer to the means for Democratic 
candidates than those for the Republican candidates for all years under study. For citizens 
over the age of 30, the average self-placement scores are closer to the means for Democratic 
candidates in all years except 2008 when the self-placement average was closer to the mean 
for the Republican presidential candidate. 
                                                 
23 The slight change in question wording in 2012 and 2016 likely accounts for the drop in the means among 
both older and younger Americans those election years. 
24 Again, this may in part be attributable to the slight change in question wording in 2012 that was 
continued on the 2016 ANES. 
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Social Issues 
Figure 4.4: National Health Insurance - Self and Candidate Placement 
 
Though there were only four years in which the national health insurance question 
was asked, there does not seem to be much movement among young people over time 
(Figure 4.4). Though the mean does vary a few tenths of a point from year to year, the 
mean for young people stays consistently on the liberal side of the issue spectrum and 
consistently more liberal than the means for older Americans. There is more aggregate 
movement among older Americans on this issue. Where the average in 1996 was at the 
midpoint of 4, it moved from the liberal side of the spectrum in 2008 back to the 
conservative side in 2012 to 4.11 before returning to the midpoint in 2016. 
Though there are fewer years with data on the national health insurance scale, there 
is some evidence of ideological polarization of the candidates on this issue. The average 
perceived distance between the candidates has grown, from a difference of 1.99 points 
between the candidates in 1996 to a difference of 2.68 points in 2012 among young people. 
Among older people, this gap widens from a 1.95 difference in the candidate means in 
1996 to a 2.87-point gap between the candidate means in 2012.While both age groups have 
placed the Democratic candidates on the liberal side of the issue spectrum and Republicans 
on the conservative side, the increasing ideological polarization between the candidates 
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appears to be largely driven by the perceived movement of Republican candidates to the 
right.  
Figure 4.5: Government Aid to Blacks - Self and Candidate Placement 
 
 
On the government aid to blacks scale (Figure 4.5), both young and older 
Americans consistently remain on the conservative side of the issue scale for all years 
under study until 2016, when the average for young people dips below the midpoint. While 
the averages for young people have nonmonotonically grown more liberal, the averages 
for older people remained steadily conservative over time on this issue until 2016, when 
the average for 30+ year-olds moderated a bit (though remain on the conservative side of 
the midpoint). Older Americans have also remained consistently more conservative than 
young people on this issue in the aggregate. 
There was a slight movement towards greater liberalism in the Democratic 
candidate placement averages for both young and older adults in recent election years, 
especially in 2008 and 2012 when Barack Obama was at the top of the Democratic ticket. 
The mean rebounded in 2016 towards a more moderate position among the young, though 
interestingly it grew even more liberal for Americans over the age of 30 with Hillary 
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Clinton at the top of the ticket. At the same time, the means for the Republican candidate 
among both age groups grew more conservative in 2012 and 2016 than in previous years.  
In fact, the differences between the candidates’ averages seem to have grown in 
recent election years for both age groups, suggesting growing perceived ideological 
polarization of elites on this issue as well. Among the young, there was a gap of 1.32 points 
between the candidates’ average positions in 1996 which widened to a difference of 2.23 
points by 2016. For older Americans, this gap appears to have widened from 1.41 points 
in 1996 to 2.56 points in 2016. Interestingly, the self-placement means for both young and 
older Americans were closer to the average Republican candidate means for all years under 
study until 2016, when the self-placement average for the young was much closer to the 
average for the Democratic candidate. 
Defense Issues 
Figure 4.6: Defense Spending – Self and Candidate Placement 
 
 
There is some variation in the means across time on the defense spending issue for 
young people, but the means do not vary in a consistent manner (Figure 4.6). In 2000, 2004, 
and 2012 the average for young Americans was on the conservative side of the midpoint 
(favoring increased spending) while in 1996 and 2008, the averages were on the more 
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liberal side (favoring decreased defense spending) of the midpoint. Older people, on the 
other hand, remain consistently on the conservative side of the midpoint in the aggregate, 
and the mean each year is more conservative than the mean for young Americans. It is 
interesting to note that there was a significant drop in the mean (almost .5) from 2004 to 
2008 for young people in the height of the Iraq War where, in the aggregate, young people 
supported reduced defense spending. Among older individuals, there was some movement 
to the left between 2004 and 2008 as well, though the average remained well on the 
conservative side of the midpoint. 
The averages for the Democratic presidential candidates’ positions are not far from 
the midpoint in most years among 18-29-year-olds. Despite the fact that the mean 
Democratic candidate position for young people has been on the liberal side of the midpoint 
except in 2000, it does not appear as though young people view Democratic candidates as 
becoming more liberal on this issue over time. On the Republican side, while it does not 
look as if young people view all Republican candidates as more conservative on this issue, 
young people did see quite a stark difference between the Republican and Democratic 
candidates on this issue in 2004, 2008, and 2016. Two of these three elections took place 
in the midst of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. In 2004 and 2008, the differences between 
the mean Republican and mean Democratic candidate placements were 1.68 and 1.6 points, 
respectively. In addition, in every year under study, the average Democratic candidate 
placement among 18-29-year-olds was proximally closer to the self-placement means than 
were the averages for the Republican presidential candidate. 
Average Democratic candidate placement scores among individuals over the age of 
30 were more liberal than the Democratic candidate placement means for young people on 
the defense spending scale in each year under study except 2000. Like younger citizens, 
older Americans gave Al Gore in an average score on the more conservative side of the 
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midpoint, and this average was slightly more conservative than the mean for the 
Democratic candidate among young people. There may be slight leftward trend in the 
average Democratic candidate placement among older citizens; however, there does not 
appear to be a discernable trend suggesting greater perceived conservatism of Republican 
candidates among this age group as Republican candidate averages vary considerably by 
year. Like among young people, though, the gap between the average Democratic 
candidate placement and average Republican candidate placement grew particularly wide 
in 2004 and 2008 during the height of the Iraq War. These years, the distance between the 
candidates’ averages for voters over 30 grew to 2.12 and 1.93 points, respectively, as older 
people noted a considerable difference between the candidates on this issue as well. 
In all, there is some evidence to support H1. The average self-placement scores for 
young people are consistently more liberal than the means for older individuals in all years 
on all issues. However, there is not much evidence indicating young people have moved 
further to the to the left on issues in recent years. It is only on the issues of government 
spending and services, job guarantees, aid to blacks, and the environment/jobs tradeoff that 
young people seem to have become slightly more liberal in the aggregate in elections after 
2004 compared to elections prior to 2004. However, the magnitude of the aggregate 
movement in the means is very small on most of these issues, and the movement has been 
non-monotonic in nature. In addition, while Americans over age of 30 are consistently 
more conservative in the aggregate than 18-29-year-olds on all issues, older folks are not 
becoming more conservative on these issues either. In fact, they appear to be moving left 
on the environment/jobs tradeoff and on government aid to blacks.  
Have aggregate perceptions of candidate stances on these issues changed over time 
and has the distance between the candidates has grown to the point where young people 
see distinct differences between the candidates on matters of public policy? Yes, and both 
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young and older Americans see these differences widening over time on the government 
spending and services, government jobs guarantees, environment/jobs tradeoff, national 
health insurance, and aid to blacks scales. In fact, the greatest perceived differences 
between the candidates among both age groups occurred in 2016 on these issues. Thus, the 
public is seeing greater ideological polarization between the parties’ candidates, 
confirming my second hypothesis (H2). While young people have always perceived a 
difference between the candidates (in the aggregate) on most matters of public policy, these 
differences are becoming more apparent. While young people did not necessarily see a 
greater difference between the candidates on all issues from 2004 to 2012 compared to 
earlier elections, they certainly did on some of the more salient issues related to problems 
facing the nation. In particular, young people did see a greater difference between the 
candidates on defense spending, national health insurance, government job guarantees, and 
government aid to blacks between 2004 and 2012 when compared to the 1996 and 2000 
elections. 
Probit Results - Model 1 
While these comparisons of aggregate means are good for looking at general trends 
in perceptions of candidate stances on issues, it is critical to look at individual level data to 
determine which prospective issue proximities actually affect vote choice. In any election 
year, some issues will be more salient to voters than others depending on the national 
context in which the election occurs. To determine whether young people were proximally 
closer to Democrats on important issues from 2004 to 2012, and were using those issues to 
make their candidate choice decisions, I turn next to my proximity models.  
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Table 4.2: Model 1-- Determinants of Candidate Preference (Probit) 
  2016 2012 2008 (Old) 2004 2000 (FTF) 1996 
Independent Variables Young Older Young Older Young Older Young Older Young  Older Young Older 
Party Identification .49** .34*** .56*** .321*** .44*** .36*** .58*** .43*** .61*** .38*** .67**  .41*** 
  (.17) (.06) (.21) (.05) (.13) (.05) (.12) (.05) (.24) (.05) (.22) (.04)  
Female .82 .21 -.3 .07 -.03 .03 -.39 -.11 .24 .30 .05  .13 
  (.55) (.21) (.27) (.16) (.39) (.18) (.36) (.15) (.41) (.18) (.44)  (.14) 
Black 1.52* .81 .43 1.03* (omitted) 2.44*** 3.1*** .29 (omitted) 1.6*** 2.9**  1.4*** 
  (.67) (.48) (.44) (.47)  (.48) (.68) (.23)  (.36) (1.1) (.37)  
Latino -.4 .51 .10 .65*** .86 .45* -.22 .01 -.19 .5 1.6*  .1 
  (.58) (.32) (.37) (.18) (.5) (.2) (.63) (.46) (.55) (.4) (.76) (.24)  
Union Household -.9 -.06 .49 -.24 -1.4** .06 .73* .6** -.46 .16 1.7*  .11 
 (1.04) (.25) (.47) (.22) (.53) (.24) (.35) (.19) (.64) (.24) (.74) (.19) 
 Evangelical -.78 -.12 -.48 -.33* -.86* -.68*** -.43 -.13 -.49 -.26 -.84  -.03 
 (.66) (.25) (-.48) (.17) (.43) (.17) (.41) (.16) (.46) (.2) (.46) (.15) 
Spending -- .13*  .09  .08  .16 .07  .18  .17***  .44*  .03  .27  .18*** 
  -- (.06) (.1) (.05) (.13) (.07) (.11) (.05) (.2) (.06) (.23) (.05)  
Job Guarantees .48*** .19** .21* .07 -.08 .04 .12 .17*** -.03 .18** .11  .19*** 
  (.14) (.07) (.09) (.05) (.14) (.05) (.11) (.05) (.19) (.07) (.15) (.05)  
Environment .33* .24***  .20*  .14*  .33 .1  .18*  .03  .36*  .31*** .3  .16** 
 (.13) (.06) (.1) (.05) (.19) (.25) (.09) (.04) (.16) (.06) (.17) (.06)  
Healthcare/Insurance .03 .12** .11 .11** .16 .07 -- -- -- -- .22  .17*** 
  (.08) (.05) (.07) (.04) (.09) (.05) -- --  -- (.14) (.04) 
Aid to Blacks .36* .08 .06 .08 .03 .15*** .13 .10 .03 .19** .69**  .22*** 
  (.16) (.06) (.11) (.04) (.10) (.04) (.17) (.06) (.17) (.07) (.26) (.06)  
Defense .14 .27*** -.07 .23*** .04 .15** .45*** .19*** -.04 .19 .16  .12* 
  (.13) (.08) (.11) (.06) (.22) (.05) (.11) (.05) (.17) (.1) (.19) (.05)  
Constant -2.6*** -1.8*** -1.57** -1.11*** -.62 -.84*** -1.6*** -1.51*** -1.7 -1.3*** -.88  -.67*** 
  (.76) (.32) (.51) (.26) (.46) (.25) (.36) (.19) (.79) (.23) (.64) (.17)  
Pseudo R2 .73 .76 .63 .66 .53 .6 .68 .62 .43 .58 .76  .68 
N 116 688 350  1308  116 761  180  799  87  635  160  1125 
Notes: *p<= .05; **p<= .01; ***p<= .001; the “black” variable was omitted from the 2008 young analysis due to perfect separation 
The healthcare/insurance question was not asked at all in 2000, and candidate placement was not asked in 2004. Missing values were coded as the midpoint 
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The results of the probit regressions for Model 1 are reported in Table 4.2. Probit 
coefficients are interactive and nonlinear, and are thus difficult to interpret. Nonetheless, 
party identification, unsurprisingly, is statistically significant and in the predicted direction 
for all years under study for both age groups. But rest of the demographic control variables 
were only sporadically in play during the period under study. The dummy variable for 
female was only statistically significant in 2000, and only for young voters. Being black 
was a fairly consistent predictor of voting Democratic for both young and older voters. For 
18-29-year-olds, this was statistically significant in 1996, 2004, and 2016, and it was a 
perfect predictor in both 2000 and 2008. Among older voters it was statistically significant 
and in the expected direction for all years under study except 2000 and 2016.  
The Latino dummy variable was only statistically significant for young voters in 
1996, but it became a statistically significant predictor of the vote in 2008 and 2012 among 
older voters. Being a member of a union household inconsistently predicted candidate 
support among the young, and had a positive effect on Democratic candidate preference in 
1996 and 2004 but had a negative effect in 2008. Among older voters, union membership 
was only statistically significant and in the predicted direction in 2004. Finally, 
evangelicalism predicted decreased Democratic support for the young in 2008, but was 
statistically significant and in the expected direction among older voters in 2000, 2008, and 
2012. 
Among my independent variables of interest, looking first at the economic issue 
variables, ideological proximity to the candidates on the government spending and services 
issue was only statistically significant and in the predicted direction among the young in 
2000. Ideological proximity on this issue was statistically significant for older voters in 
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1996, 2000, 2004, and 2016.25 This might be expected given the federal budget surpluses 
in the late 1990s and relatively secure economy during these years. But government 
spending on programs is not a highly salient issue most years, especially among young 
people who only receive the “loudest shouts” from the political world, so it is unsurprising 
that this issue is not a predictor of candidate preference among young voters from 2004 to 
2012.  
Ideological proximity on the government jobs guarantees scale appears to have a 
statistically significant effect on the vote choice of young Americans in 2012 and 2016, 
which were the only years in which it was statistically significant.  Given the lingering high 
unemployment rates among young people after the recession, coupled with rising amounts 
of student debt, this result is not altogether surprising. Perhaps this variable was not 
statistically significant in 2008 among young people because the unemployment rate, while 
rising (it was at 6.5 in the beginning of November that year), was just beginning to spike 
at time of the election (BLS 2017). What is surprising is that these effects are not seen 
among older Americans in 2012. In fact, the issue of government jobs guarantees only has 
a statistically significant impact on the vote choice of older Americans in 1996, 2000, 2004, 
and 2016. Nonetheless, given that this issue only impacts the young in 2012 and 2016, it 
might help explain the persistence of the age gap in vote choice in 2012.  
Environment/jobs tradeoff proximity was statistically significant among young 
people in 2000, 2004, 2012, and 2016. The aggregate means on this issue discussed above 
suggest young people were generally much closer to the perceived Democratic candidates’ 
positions on this issue in all years, suggesting young people were more interested in the 
sociotropic benefits of protecting the environment over the self-interest of job creation in 
                                                 
25 This variable was omitted from the model for the young in 2016 due to multicollinearity. 
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2000 and 2004. In 2012 and 2016, the change in question wording to both protect the 
environment and create jobs may certainly help account for its statistical significance. It is 
possible that this issue aids to the age gap in vote choice from 2004 through 2012 as it 
seems to have an effect on the candidate preference of young people in more years than it 
does older voters, but it is not very likely. The magnitude of the effects are relatively small 
in 2004 and 2012 relative to size of the coefficients in 2000 and 2016—the latter of which 
are both years during which there was no age gap. In addition, the issue proximity variable 
was insignificant in 2008. 
Moving to social issues, on the issue of national health insurance the estimated 
coefficient for the young is often larger than for older Americans across the models but 
because they are not statistically significant in any year, it is hard to say whether these 
predicted effects are different from 0. National health insurance does have significant 
effects on the candidate preference of older Americans in all years except 2008. Perhaps 
this issue is not as salient among young voters as it was for older voters that year since 
young people do not have the levels of health problems as older individuals do.  
The Aid to Blacks variable was only statistically significant for both age groups in 
1996 during Bill Clinton’s re-election campaign. It is interesting to note that the aid to 
blacks variable was statistically significant among older Americans in 2008 but not in 2012 
with the same Democratic candidate at the top of the ticket. Most surprisingly, though, is 
that fact that this variable was not statistically significant among young Americans in 2008 
and 2012, but was statistically significant in 2016 when Hillary Clinton was at the top of 
the Democratic ticket. More than anything, though, this was probably driven by reactions 
against the vitriolic speech of Donald Trump and his perceived extreme conservatism on 
this issue. Nonetheless, opinions on this issue do not impact vote choice during the period 
in which we observe the age gap in vote choice.  
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Finally, ideological proximity to the candidates on defense spending appears to 
influence vote choice among older adults in each year under study except 2000. It only 
appears to influence youth voting in 2004, but the magnitude of this effect is much stronger 
than the effect among older voters holding all other variables at their means. The salience 
of the Iraq War was high during that election year, and even young people with little 
interest in politics experienced the deployment of friends and family overseas. It is 
therefore possible that issues of defense spending and the Iraq War were a catalyst for the 
age gap in vote choice that began that year. However, the insignificance of this variable in 
2008 and 2012 suggests this issue alone does not explain the persistence of the gap into 
those election years. 26 
FURTHER ANALYSIS—PROJECTION MODELS 
As mentioned earlier, it is possible that issue evaluations are a consequence of 
candidate choice rather than a cause, leading individuals to project their own policy 
positions onto their preferred candidates (Bartels 2002; Lenz 2009). In a single election, 
projection might be a problem. But we have no theoretical reason to expect that projection 
would be more powerful from 2004 to 2012 than it did in elections prior to the turn of the 
century, nor do we have a theoretical reason to believe it would impact young people to a 
greater degree than older Americans.  
Nevertheless, I ran a second set of models to help determine whether projection is 
occurring by using the sample means for candidate placement instead of a respondent’s 
                                                 
26 The fact that defense spending does not appear to affect vote choice in 2008 seems to be an issue of 
question wording above all else. I ran separate probit regressions for each question format, the results of 
which are displayed in Table 4.2B in the Appendix. The coefficient for old version of the defense spending 
question is statistically insignificant for the young while the coefficient for the new version of the question 
is statistically significant and in the expected direction. One would expect that defense spending would 
impact candidate preference in 2008 given that young people held negative assessments of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
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perceptions of a candidate’s stands to provide more objective measures of candidate issue 
positions. A sign that projection may be present is if variables with statistically significant 
effects in Model 1 do not have statistically significant effects in Model 2 using the more 
objective measures of candidate positions on issues. This would indicate that individuals 
are either perceiving their preferred candidates to be closer to their own position than where 
the public’s average position for that candidate is (and thus projecting their own positions 
onto candidates) or they are adopting what they think is their preferred candidate’s position 
on an issue.   
Probit Results—Model 2 
The results for Model 2 can be found on Table 4.3. Comparing the results between 
Models 1 and 2, we see only limited evidence of possible projection in certain election 
years, for certain issues. In fact, projection seems to be more pronounced among older 
voters, particularly in more chronologically-distant elections. But the preponderance of 
evidence indicates that both young and older voters take the candidates’ issue positions (on 
certain issues) into account when making their vote decisions and choose the candidates 
who, even using the more objective measures for candidate positions, are spatially closer 
to them.  
Looking first at the economic issues, it is difficult to discern whether projection 
was a concern for young people on the government spending and services variable in 2016 
since it was excluded from Model 1 due to multicollinearity and nonconvergence. But 
using the sample averages for the candidates’ positions in Model 2, we see that government 
spending and services has a positive and statistically significant effect on candidate choice  
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Table 4.3: Model 2 - Determinants of Candidate Preference (Probit, Using Average Candidate Placement) 
  2016 2012 2008 (old) 2004 2000 (FTF) 1996 
Independent Variables Young Older Young Older Young Older Young Older Young  Older Young Older 
Party Identification .54*** .51*** .66*** .46*** .63*** .46*** .63*** .55*** .59*** .51*** .89***  .52*** 
  (.25) (.05) (.12) (.05) (.16) (.05) (.11) (.04) (.16) (.05) (.19) (.03)  
Female .25 .21 -.26 .08 .03 -.09 -.38 -.09 .23 .22 .58  .16 
  (.39) (.19) (.29) (.15) (.37) (.18) (.34) (.14) (.34) (.16) (.39)  (.13) 
Black .53 1.32*** .84 1.7*** omitted 2.87*** 1.58** .5* omitted 1.38*** .92  1.6*** 
  (.45) (.39) (.48) (.35) -- (.58) (.57) (.21) -- (.3) (.61) (.39)  
Latino .41 .59* .33 .59*** .35 .44* .11 -.08 -.22 .26 1.74**  .39 
  (.50) (.27) (.36) (.17) (.49) (.2) (.43) (.43) (.51) (.3) (.56) (.24)  
Union Household -.2 -.11 .56 -.12 -1.76** .02 .63 .52** .21 .1 1.48  .26 
 (.65) (.21) (.45) (.21) (.61) (.22) (.33) (.17) (.58) (.22) (.92) (.17) 
 Evangelical -.74 -.14 -.59 -.38* -.67 -.72*** -.28 -.26 -.45 -.35* -.78  -.12 
 (.44) (.26) (.41) (.16) (.39) (.17) (.34) (.15) (.35) (.17) (.42) (.13) 
Spending .23* -.002  .33**  .15**  0 .15*  -.05  .2**  .15 .03  -.41*  .18*** 
  (.1) (.06) (.11) (.06) (.14) (.07) (.15) (.06) (.17) (.08) (.2) (.05)  
Job Guarantees .05 .08 -.07 .01 -.08 -.06 .16 .15** -.01 .06 .38  0 
  (.1) (.05) (.09) (.05) (.18) (.07) (.13) (.05) (.25) (.11) (.21) (.06)  
Environment .38** .13**  .12  .16**  .66* .24  3.2  .1  .33 .22* .29  .17 
 (.14) (.05) (.1) (.05) (.25) (.16) (3.17) (1.62) (.28) (.1) (.28) (.1)  
Healthcare/Insurance -.02 .11* .05 .1* .33* .06 -- -- -- -- .36***  .19*** 
  (.1) (.05) (.07) (.04) (.15) (.05) -- -- -- -- (.11) (.04) 
Aid to Blacks .09 .15*** .14 .04 .16 .16* -.04 .07 -.25 -.02 -.05  .21** 
  (.13) (.05) (.1) (.06) (.15) (.07) (.21) (.07) (.27) (.12) (.30) (.07)  
Defense -.25 .18** .07 .50*** .23 .12 .22* .16*** -.3 .3** -.37  .17 
  (.18) (.07) (.2) (.11) (.15) (.06) (.11) (.05) (.23) (.1) (.43) (.14)  
Constant -2.6*** -2.5*** -2** -1.8*** -1.08* -1.1*** -1.7*** -1.8*** -2.1*** -1.8*** -2.2***  -1.25*** 
  (.56) (.27) (.55) (.26) (.53) (.25) (.33) (.18) (.65) (.21) (.65) (.16)  
Pseudo R2 .61 .64 0.6 0.60 .56 .53 .59 .56 .32 .48 .69  .58 
N 116 688 350  1308  116 761  180  799  87 635  160  1125 
Notes: *p<= .05; **p<= .01; ***p<= .001; the “black” variable was omitted from the 2008 young analysis due to perfect separation 
The healthcare/insurance question was not asked at all in 2000, and candidate placement was not asked in 2004. Missing values were coded as the midpoint 
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for young Americans. But projection may have occurred on this issue among adults over 
the age of 30 in 2016 and among younger people in 2000. While government spending and 
services appears to have a statistically significant on candidate preference in Model 1, the 
statistical significance disappears in Model 2. This is indicative that voters were not in 
agreement as to where to place the candidates on this issue, and were perhaps projecting 
their own positions onto their preferred candidates.  
Government services and spending does not seem to have an effect on either age 
group in Model l in 2012. But issue proximity on government spending and services 
appears to have a statistically significant impact for both young and older Americans when 
using the sample averages for candidate positions in Model 2. Because this variable is not 
significant in Model 1, but is significant in Model 2, we can be reasonably certain that 
projection is not a great cause for concern on this issue. Individuals generally voted for the 
candidate whose average perceived position on the issue was spatially closer to their own, 
some of whom may have been unaware of that candidate’s actual position on the issue. 
Had projection been a problem, we should have seen the opposite occur where the 
coefficients were statistically significant in Model 1 and not statistically significant in 
Model 2. The same thing occurred among older adults in 2008 and younger people in 1996, 
where government spending and services did not have a statistically significant effect on 
candidate preference in Model 1 but did Model 2. However, in 1996 the coefficient for 
young people was negative suggesting they voted for the candidate who was actually 
proximally further from them on this issue. 
There is also evidence of possible projection for both age groups on the government 
job guarantees scale in 2016, for young people 2012, and for older individuals in 2000 and 
1996. The coefficients were statistically significant in Model 1 but were insignificant in 
Model 2 using the more objective measures of candidate positions. Again, this points to 
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the possibility that there was little consensus as to where the candidates stood on this issue, 
and that individuals were projecting their own positions onto the candidates on this issue.  
On the environment/jobs tradeoff scale, there is no evidence of projection in 2016 
given that the variables were statistically significant in both models for both age groups. 
But in 2012, 2004, and 2000 we do see evidence of possible projection among the young 
as the coefficients for these variables were statistically significant in Model 1, but when 
using the sample means for the candidate positions the coefficients in Model 2 were not 
significant. Projection may have also occurred among older voters in 1996. Interestingly, 
however, is that fact that the environment/jobs tradeoff coefficient for young people in 
2008 was not statistically significant Model 1 but was statistically significant when using 
the more objective measures for the candidates’ positions in Model 2. Again, this probably 
means that young people were unaware of the candidates’ stands on this issue in 2008 and 
just so happened to be proximally closer to their preferred candidates that year.  
Moving next to social issues, there is no evidence for projection on national health 
insurance in 2016 as this variable was statistically significant for older Americans in both 
models. Both presidential candidates took relatively clear stances on these issues in the 
2016 election, so this is unsurprising. But among young people in both 2008 and 1996, 
there were no statistically significant effects in Model 1 but when using the more objective 
measures for the candidates’ positions, national health insurance was statistically 
significant in both years. Again, this probably means that young people were unaware of 
the candidates’ stands on these issues in 2008 and 1996 and just so happened to be 
proximally closer to their preferred candidates on these issues that year. 
On the Aid to Blacks scale, projection may be a factor among the young in both 
2016 and 1996. While this variable was statistically significant in Model 1 both years, it 
was not statistically significant in Model 2. However, this variable was statistically 
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insignificant in Model 1 but was statistically significant in Model 2 among older Americans 
in both 2016 and in 2008. Again, this probably means this issue was low in salience, and 
individuals just so happened to be proximally closer to their preferred candidates those 
years. 
Finally, in the case of defense spending, there is evidence of possible projection 
among older Americans on this issue on both 2008 and 1996 as the coefficients were 
statistically significant in Model 1 but is insignificant in Model 2. In 2004, there was no 
evidence of projection for either young or older Americans. The issues of defense and 
environment/jobs had statistically significant effects on the vote choice of the young using 
both objective and subjective measures for the issue positions of the candidates. It is highly 
likely that the candidates’ positions on these issues were widely known and particularly 
salient that election year. Even if young people were not certain about the position John 
Kerry held, it was evident where George W. Bush stood on issues of defense spending in 
the midst of the Iraq War.  
From a more comprehensive perspective, it is in the relatively low-salience election 
years of 2000 and 1996 that we see the most evidence of possible projection, as the salience 
literature suggests (Bartels 2002). In Model 1, candidate positions on government spending 
and services appears to significantly affect candidate preference for both 18-29-year-olds 
as well as citizens over 30 years old in 2000. Government job guarantees, defense spending, 
and environmental issues also have a statistically significant impact on vote choice for 
older Americans in Model 1. However, when using the more objective measures for 
candidate issue positions in Model 2, the significance of all of these variables disappears 
with the exception of defense spending for the 30+ group. This is indicative of uncertainty 
as to the positions of the candidates on these issues, and that individuals were projecting 
their own issue preferences onto their candidate of choice in that election year. 
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The same can largely be said for 1996. In Model 1, government aid to blacks 
appears to have a statistically significant impact on the vote choice of both young and older 
Americans. However, in Model 2, the variable is only statistically significant for the 30+ 
crowd, leaving room for the potential for projection among 18-29-year-olds. In fact, every 
single issue proximity variable was statistically significant for older Americans in 1996 in 
Model 1 but, when using the more objective measures in Model 2, only government 
spending and services, national health insurance, and government aid to blacks seems to 
have an effect on vote choice for older voters while defense spending, government job 
guarantees, and environmental issues may face issues of projection. On these low-salience 
issues that election year, where the candidates’ positions were probably not clearly 
articulated or widely known among the public, the likelihood of projection should increase. 
Model 2 also shows that young people generally voted for the candidate closest to 
themselves on the national health insurance scale, though this variable was statistically 
insignificant in Model 1. 
In sum, issue salience seems to be a factor that when considering the impact of issue 
proximities on candidate choice. It is on the relatively low-salience issue of environmental 
policy where projection seems mostly likely to occur among the young, though we do see 
some evidence of possible projection on aid to blacks in 2016 and 1996, government job 
guarantees in 2016 and 2012, and government spending and services in 2000. But the 
possibility for projection appears more frequently among older Americans on more issues 
in years where the election is lower-salience and the positions of the candidates on these 
issues are perhaps not as widely known. The larger number of issues possibly affected by 
projection among older Americans may be due to their stronger partisan attachments and 
greater affect towards the parties and their candidates. In addition, in light of Lenz (2009), 
on very salient issues during an election year (like defense spending during a war), the 
 101 
relative positions of the candidates on these issues are broadly known and less prone to 
projection.  
What this all amounts to is that issue positions can and do have an independent 
effect on vote choice. But salience is key to accurately using issue proximities to predict 
candidate choice, and many vote models still fail to account for salience when they model 
issue effects. Both young and older voters see a difference between the candidates on some 
issues, and do seem to use issue proximities to a limited degree when choosing which 
candidate to support. Thus, we do see some evidence for H3—that young people were 
proximally closer to Democratic candidates on the important issues in recent elections, 
specifically defense issues in 2004, and seemed to use those issues when making their vote 
decisions. In 2004, defense spending had a very large effect on vote choice for young 
people, holding all other variables at their means. And as noted in the footnote above, while 
defense spending was statistically insignificant among young people in 2008, it is likely 
due to the split sampling of the question that year as the “new” version of the question was 
statistically significant among the individuals who received it (Table 4.2B in Appendix). 
The statistically significant coefficients for government spending and services in 2012 and 
2016, and national health insurance in 2008 suggest that young people do generally stand 
closer to the Democratic presidential candidates on issues but they may not be aware that 
they do because these issues were not very salient to them.  
There is also only limited support for H4, that young people used prospective issue 
preferences to a greater extent during the period from 2004 to 2012 than in earlier election 
years, but this only seems to be true for defense spending in 2004. Again, this limited 
closed-ended list of issues does not cover the whole universe of issues that may impact 
vote choice in any election year, and many of these issue scales are poor proxies for other 
foreign or domestic issues that that were salient in the national context. What this list does 
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demonstrate, particularly with the issue of defense spending in 2004, is that only very 
salient issues of a campaign are likely to have a strong effect on the vote choice of young 
people.  
DISCUSSION 
The major purpose of this chapter has been to explore the prospective issue attitudes 
of young people from 2004 to 2012 to determine whether these short-term factors affected 
candidate preference for young people during this turbulent period in politics. The evidence 
for this was rather limited, with the exception of defense issues in 2004 (and possibly 
2008). But while it is limited, there is some real evidence that support for Kerry and Obama 
among younger voters was at least partially based on prospective issue preferences, and 
these issues were incredibly salient during those election years. Older voters, with more 
political experience and higher levels of political sophistication, seem better able to 
incorporate prospective issue proximities into their candidate choice calculations. 
On some issues, in certain campaign years, issue preferences could be an artefact 
of projection where individuals adopt their preferred party’s or candidate’s position as their 
own or project their own positions onto their preferred candidate. I cannot say definitively 
whether projection is occurring since projection effects are not directly testable using these 
data, and such a claim would have weak internal validity. But shifts in the aggregate results 
between Model 1 and Model 2 suggest the possibility that that projection occurs among 
both young and older individuals for certain issues in certain election years. Indeed, it 
seemed to impact older people more in the low-salience elections in 1996 and 2000. It is 
plausible that older individuals, with stronger affective attachments to the parties, may 
engage in projection more often when issues are not very salient in an election year (e.g. 
Alvarez and Nagler 1998). If young people are not as affectively attached to the parties as 
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older citizens are, they appear less likely to project their own issue preferences onto the 
candidates and more likely to admit they do not know where a candidate stands on an issue. 
For young people, projection may be more prevalent on low-salience issues like the 
environment over many election cycles. It also seemed to particularly affect young people 
on the government job guarantees issue in the 2012 and 2016 elections, as employment 
was an important issue to young Americans in the aftermath of the 2008 recession since 
young people held the highest unemployment rates in the country (Maloney 2010).  
Projection does not seem to occur as much in years like 2004, where only one or 
two issues affected vote choice. But the issue that had the strongest effect on candidate 
choice among young people was extremely high-salience and the candidate’s positions 
were relatively well-known, allowing them to recognize differences between the candidates 
on those issues and vote for the candidate whose positions on those issues are aligned more 
closely with their own preferences. In fact, most changes in an individual’s political 
loyalties during their political socialization period are triggered by political events that are 
usually focused only on a narrow range of specific attitude objects (Sears and Valentino 
1997). This means that only a few issue areas might have a rather large impact on a young 
person’s partisanship and behavior at any one point in time. 
Regardless of whether projection is occurring or not, most issues that affect the vote 
choice of young people also affect vote choice for older Americans within an election, 
though more issues tend to factor into the vote choice of older Americans. It is conceivable 
that prospective issue proximities do not make that much of an impact on the vote choice 
of young people since it they require rather firm preferences on a wide range of public 
policies that these low-interest, low-engagement voters may simply not have. Instead, it 
may be the more general problem concerns of voters that make a difference among 
elections. Campaigns prime certain issues or problems over others to increase their salience 
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so voters often weigh these issues more heavily when making candidate evaluations 
(Petrocik 1996). The closed-ended issue position questions included in the ANES do not 
allow for the full universe of issues on which a citizen may base their vote. It is therefore 
possible that I find only limited effects for issue proximities because the impact of policy 
attitudes on candidate preference depends on the importance or salience of those attitudes.  
Open-ended responses are perhaps the best way to measure the salient 
considerations individuals use when making their candidate choices as they do not impose 
much survey-based constraint on individuals’ responses. To get around the limitations 
stemming from closed-ended questions, which are limited in scope and may not reflect the 
salience of the national context, I utilize open-ended party and candidate likes-dislikes 
questions in the next chapter to identify references to extant national circumstances and 
candidate performance. In addition, these open-ended responses allow us a better look at 
how partisanship, retrospective assessments of party performance, prospective issue 
preferences, candidate traits, and the national context more generally factor into the 
considerations affecting candidate choice.  
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Chapter 5: Retrospective Voting and Salience 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, 18-29-year-olds today are both more 
independent of the parties than older Americans are and more independent than previous 
generations were at the same age. Given their relative lack of attachment to the political 
parties (Chapter 3), it is possible that the age gap in vote choice from 2004 to 2012 resulted 
less from the movement of young people and more from the non-movement of older 
individuals to the political forces affecting the nation. Young people should be more 
reactive to the shorter-term factors affecting vote choice than older Americans given their 
weaker partisans roots and more malleable attitudes, particularly in times of political crisis. 
Due to their general disinterest in politics, in quieter political times these short-term forces 
may not lead to noticeable behavioral differences from older Americans simply because 
they are not paying as much attention to the political context. Thus, in this chapter I 
examine whether young people are more reactive to candidates, national context, and 
issues—including retrospective assessments of party performance on those issues—during 
times of political turbulence.  
While studies of individual-level vote choice often provide no more than a cursory 
nod to the national context and the actions of candidates and their campaigns, both are 
necessary for understanding the diverging opinions of the young from older Americans. 
The national context was a toxic stew for Republicans in 2004 and 2008, and the incumbent 
thermometer ratings in Chapter 3 suggest there was some strong anti-Bush sentiment 
simmering in the minds of young people. It is plausible that this sentiment tainted the 
Republican brand as a whole, leading younger people to be particularly negative towards 
Republican candidates. But by 2016 the national context had changed, and the anti-
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Republican sentiment was no longer present. And in this most recent presidential election, 
the age gap in vote choice disappeared. 
The political environment from 2004 to 2012 was a period of particular unrest due 
to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the most severe recession since the Great 
Depression. The issues young people faced when coming of political age during this period 
were arguably more compelling than those previous age cohorts faced at the same age (with 
the possible exception of older Baby Boomers), to the point where it was difficult for even 
the most disinterested of young people to ignore the problems facing the country. In 
Chapter 4, I did not find solid evidence that young people were using prospective issue 
proximities when making their vote choice decisions during this period, with the exception 
of defense spending in 2004. Yet the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, related to defense 
spending, may be the most salient issue impacting young people since the Vietnam War. 
Perhaps all it takes are retrospective assessments of party or candidate performance on one 
or two very large and salient problem areas to move the attitudes and behavior of young 
people in a meaningful way. 
In addition, the closed-ended nature of the issue scales in Chapter 4 did not allow 
for the whole universe of issue areas to be explored nor do they allow an investigator to 
uncover which issue areas were particularly salient in an election year. Prospective issue 
proximities also do not take retrospective assessments of party performance on salient 
issues or national problems into account. This chapter seeks to rectify this by identifying 
references to extant circumstances and candidate or incumbent performance and the extent 
to which these short- and long-term factors enter the candidate choice equation for both 
young and older voters using American National Election Survey responses to open-ended 
questions about party and candidate likes and dislikes. Because political conditions, 
predominant events, and campaign messaging can alter the salience of issues for voters, 
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open-ended responses allow for a more nuanced examination of the considerations 
affecting voters’ evaluations of the parties and candidates. 
Individual-level policy attitudes change slowly, so the critical difference among 
elections is not necessarily the exact policy positions of voters and candidates per se; in 
fact, because young people are fairly politically inexperienced and unsophisticated, we 
probably should not expect them to hold specific positions on issues or know exactly where 
candidates stand. Instead, the problem concerns of the voters likely have a greater effect 
on candidate choice since voters often do not have clear ideas about what policies best deal 
with a problem (Petrocik 1999). As such, this chapter applies John Petrocik’s (1996) issue 
ownership theory of voting, which posits that candidates and their campaigns will frame 
the vote as decision to select the candidate who is better able to resolve the salient problems 
of the day. Depending on national conditions and context, candidates attempt to increase 
the salience of some problems over others, and voters then choose among candidates based 
on their perceptions of which party is better able to “handle” those issues. Given the results 
of Chapters 3 and 4, my research question for Chapter 5 is quite simple: What effect did 
national conditions and the problems on the national agenda during the period between 
2004 and 2012 have on the candidate choice decisions of young people? 
I posit that prevailing national conditions and retrospective evaluations of party and 
incumbent performance on salient national problems damaged evaluations of the 
Republican Party and reduced support for its candidates among young people. With weaker 
predispositions, the more malleable partisan attitudes of the young should result in 
performance issue attitudes and candidate factors—the short-term forces affecting the 
vote—having a strong impact on candidate choice for 18-29-year-olds. The effects of these 
short-term forces should be moderated by party factors among the older electorate due to 
their more crystallized partisan predispositions, leading to the age gap in vote choice we 
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saw from 2004 to 2012. The effects among the young should be especially large for 
perceived failures on performance issues areas, particularly those of economic policy and 
foreign policy. In addition, the Republican Party’s renewed focus on moral issues, an issue 
area they “own”, during this period was seemingly at odds with the relatively liberal and 
less religious attitudes of young people today and may have contributed to the anti-
Republican sentiment of the time.  
Given the turbulent nature of the issues on the national agenda during this period—
the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, the economic recession in 2008, and the fight for gay 
rights/marriage—the candidate and issue factors should be stronger evaluative measures 
among young people when assessing parties and candidates for office between 2004 and 
2012 relative to prior election years, and their behavior affected accordingly.  Once the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely over, the economy had sufficiently recovered, 
and the Supreme Court came to a decision on the issue of gay marriage in Obergefell v. 
Hodges (2015), the age gap in candidate choice disappeared in 2016 as the anti-Republican 
context from 2004 to 2012 shifted back to a pre-Iraq equilibrium.  
This leads to four hypotheses to be tested. My first hypothesis (H1) is that perceived 
Republican failures on performance issues—especially economic policy and foreign 
affairs—should provide Democrats with a performance lease on these issue areas from 
2004 through 2012. This should be reflected in the partisan valence scores for these issue 
areas, which will be discussed further below.  
The turbulent national context, and perceived performance failures on salient 
national problems, should also factor into candidate choice from 2004 to 2012 among 
voters of all ages. However, because older people have more deeply-rooted political 
predispositions like party identification, the effects should be more pronounced among 
younger citizens. The salience of the issues on the national agenda was sufficient such that 
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even young people, who are normally disengaged with and uninterested in politics, were 
paying attention and could attribute blame to the Republican Party. In fact, because of their 
relative inattention to and disinterest in politics under normal political conditions, 
performance issues and candidate assessments should have an effect of greater magnitude 
on candidate choice of the young during turbulent periods in politics compared to more 
quiescent times. Thus, my second hypothesis (H2) is that issue and candidate factors should 
have a greater relative impact on the candidate choice of young people from 2004 to 2012 
than in previous election years due to national conditions and the nature of the issues on 
the political agenda during this period. Performance issues on foreign affairs and economic 
issues, in particular, are expected to have an effect of greater magnitude on the vote of 
young people during this period when compared to elections prior to 2004, perhaps along 
with moral issue attitudes due to the shift in focus among Republican candidates in the 
2004 election.  
Party-related factors, on the other hand, should factor into candidate choice more 
frequently among older adults relative to younger voters for all years under study, and 
especially in recent elections due to their more crystallized partisan attachments and higher 
levels affective polarization as demonstrated in Chapter 3. This should also temper the 
impact of short-term forces on the vote choice of older Americans, especially during the 
period from 2004 to 2012. As such, my third hypothesis (H3) is that party-related factors 
should factor into the candidate choice decisions of older Americans more regularly than 
for younger people, mitigating the effects of short-term forces during periods of political 
unrest. 
Finally, given the relatively turbulent nature of politics in the 1970s in the aftermath 
of the Vietnam War and Watergate, we should also expect short-term factors to have 
stronger effects on candidate choice among young people during this period compared to 
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more quiescent times. Therefore, my fourth hypothesis (H4) is that performance issue and 
candidate assessments had a greater relative impact on candidate choice for young people 
in 1972 and 1976 compared to subsequent election years. However, because the country 
had just experienced a change in party systems after the end of the New Deal Party system 
(Bibby and Schaffner 2008; Sundquist 2011), and because affective polarization is a 
somewhat recent phenomenon, the party roots that stabilize the attitudes and behaviors of 
older voters may not be as deep and the party effects not as pronounced during this period 
when compared to 2004 through 2012. 
ISSUE OWNERSHIP AND THE NATIONAL CONTEXT 
According to the issue ownership theory of voting, parties have distinct issue-
handling reputations rooted in the party coalitions. Party constituency ownership of an 
issue area tends to be long-term because the foundation of ownership lies in the 
sociologically distinctive constituencies of the parties, and the social groups that make up 
the party constituencies want different benefits, protections, or changes from the status quo 
from government (Petrocik 1996).  Issue handling reputations emerge as parties promote 
the policy concerns of their constituencies that are reinforced by political conflict and their 
performance on those issues. Candidates campaign on issues that are advantageous to them 
due to these party reputations to prime the salience of those issues as considerations citizens 
use when making their vote decisions.  As such, issue ownership may be an asset to a 
candidate because just being associated with a party gives the impression that they are able 
to implement better policies and programs for dealing with problems “owned” by their 
political party.  
While issue-handling reputations are generally stable in the long run, these party 
reputations are regularly tested and reinforced by the choices made by political 
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officeholders (Petrocik, Benoit, and Hasen 2003). Some issue areas, like foreign affairs 
and the economy, are not owned by either party and any issue handling advantage or 
ownership is conferred by the record of the incumbent. Short-term circumstances can 
change a party’s advantage on a performance issue when performance problems arise, such 
as foreign policy failures or when economic downturns occur. Therefore, retrospective 
evaluations can work for or against the incumbent party depending on whether conditions 
are good or bad in the country, and are usually associated with issues and administrative 
performance (Weisberg and Hill 2004, 29). The non-incumbent party or candidate can gain 
a “lease”, or short-term ownership of a performance issue, in times of political turmoil 
where the challenger can claim that the incumbent party could not handle the job.  
Unlike the issue proximities explored in Chapter 4, what is key to the issue 
ownership theory is not the candidates’ stands on particular policies, but what problems 
they promise to resolve. What the public perceives as a problem that needs solving depends 
both on existing national conditions and on whether campaigns engage in priming the 
issues they own (Petrocik 1996). While issue emphases in campaigns are specific to 
candidates, Republicans generally tend to “own” issues areas like moral values, tax and 
spending, and problems of crime and national security while Democrats “own” areas like 
social welfare, civil liberties, and civil rights. Therefore, an issue ownership interpretation 
of an election has three expectations: 1) each party has distinct issue handling reputations, 
and their ability to handle national problems depends on the performance record of the 
incumbent, 2) candidates focus the election on issues advantageous to themselves, and 3) 
voters will choose their preferred candidate based on the issues made salient by those 
campaigns.  
Thus, national context is important when considering the short-term factors 
affecting vote choice. As I have stated many times by this point, an individual’s political 
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views and attitudes are most affected by the political events they experience during their 
adolescence and early adulthood (e.g. Bartels and Jackman 2014; Beck 1975; Nie, Verba, 
and Petrocik 1979). When the political context is calm, young people should develop 
political views that resemble the political views of the rest of the electorate as they socialize 
into politics. But because some periods of time are more intensely political than others, 
performance issues may have a greater impact on the vote in more turbulent times, and 
especially on the youngest cohort of voters entering the electorate (Green, Palmquist, and 
Schickler 2002; Miller 1992). Retrospective judgments of party performance in office 
based on directly experienced or perceived event and conditions, particularly on issues an 
individual considers important, may be used as a heuristic for prospective judgments about 
a party or candidate’s future performance in office (Fiorina 1981, 200; Fournier et al. 
2003).  
Because of this, prospective and retrospective assessments of Republican 
performance on salient national problems are expected to be large factors in the candidate 
preference of the young from 2004 to 2012. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan increased 
the salience of foreign policy issues, as most Americans knew someone directly impacted 
by troop deployments or casualties during these engagements. Young people were also 
impacted by the 2008 economic recession harder than older adults, facing higher levels of 
unemployment for a longer period of time (Maloney 2010). Republican “failures” on these 
issue areas likely provided Democrats with a temporary “lease” on these issues, creating a 
political environment favoring the Democrats. While political context should have an 
effect on the attitudes and behaviors of both older and younger Americans, the effects may 
be especially pronounced among young people since political predispositions like party 
identification have deeper roots among older voters (Franklin 1984), and should have 
moderating effects on the short-term forces. 
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In addition, an area unexplored by the issue scales in Chapter 4 include moral 
issues, which rose in prominence among Republicans27 and were a focus of candidates after 
the 2000 elections. While economic issues were once a main divider among groups within 
the parties, the connection between political party and frequency of church attendance has 
strengthened, resulting in a “culture war” that incentivizes candidates to focus on moral 
issues as part of a wedge campaign strategy (Fiorina et al. 2005, Gelman 2014). George 
W. Bush’s campaign in 2004 brought the conservative values and issue preferences of 
Born-again and evangelical Protestant activists to the forefront of the Republican platform, 
leading to more ideologically extreme issue positions on social issues within the 
Republican Party (Jacobson 2009).  
This is also significant because moral issues are an issue area at odds with a cohort 
of young voters who are less religious and more educated than previous generations 
(Keeter, Horowitz, and Tyson 2008; Kohut 2008). Moral issues like gay rights have a 
strong effect on shaping partisanship (Dancey and Goren 2010), which likely exacerbated 
the age gap in electoral choice from 2004 to 2012. Values-based appeals on moral issues 
like gay marriage and abortion affected individual-level vote choice in 2004 mostly by 
reinforcing and mobilizing Bush’s support among those already planning to vote for him, 
while failing to persuade new voters (Hillygus and Shields 2005, Mulligan 2008). 
Additionally, while moral value attitudes among Republican identifiers have not 
necessarily become more conservative, they have become a more potent predictor of 
candidate trait evaluations among Democrats (Hetherington and Rudolph 2016). 
Thus, national conditions were ripe for Democratic candidates from the period 
between 2004 and 2012. The nature of the problems facing the country were difficult for 
                                                 
27These are issues generally associated with the activism of the Religious Right such as abortion, stem cell 
research, and prayer in schools. 
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even the most politically disinterested individuals to ignore. Republican failures on these 
salient issues likely had a greater effect on young people, with their weaker political 
predispositions and less crystallized partisan ties, impacting candidate choice to a greater 
extent than older Americans whose more rooted partisanship can temper the period effects 
during times of political turbulence. Once national conditions improved and the context 
was no longer so anti-Republican, the voting behavior of young people returned to mirror 
that of the older electorate. 
DATA AND DESIGN 
While most studies applying the issue ownership theory look at media accounts to 
determine the salience of issues in a campaign, I use a resource that is highly underutilized 
by public opinion and voting behavior scholars that directly reflect the extant 
circumstances and national context, highlighting the most salient considerations among the 
public when making their candidate choice decisions in an election. I examine open-ended 
responses to the candidate likes/dislikes and party likes/dislikes questions from the 1972 
through 2012 ANES Time Series studies to determine 1) whether prospective and 
retrospective assessments of issue performance and candidate evaluations became more 
important to the candidate choice of young people from 2004 to 2012 relative to elections 
prior to 2004, 2) which performance issue areas became more important, and 3) whether 
party factors played into the candidate preference equation among the older electorate more 
frequently than for the young.28 
The ANES open-ended questions, which have been included in each survey since 
its inception in 1948, ask what each respondent likes or dislikes about the candidates and 
the parties. For example, the Democratic presidential candidate “like” question reads, 
                                                 
28 2016 ANES open-ended responses were not available in time for coding and analysis. 
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“What is it that [you] like about [Democratic presidential candidate’s name]?” The 
Republican Party dislike question reads, “What [do you] dislike about the Republican 
Party?” The respondent is then able to provide free-form responses to these questions, and 
the first five mentions are coded according to the codebook provided by the ANES.29  
The 1972 through 2004 open-ended responses were pre-coded by the ANES, and 
the categories into which they were coded can be found in the appendices for each year of 
study at www.electionstudies.org. After 2004, the American National Election Studies no 
longer coded these open-ended responses, so I hand-coded the 2008 and 2012 open-ended 
responses myself according to the 2004 Times Series codebook and analyzed these 
responses in the same fashion as I did the earlier studies. For the 2,323 respondents in 2008, 
I coded 11,817 open ended statements. In 2012, 2,056 face-to-face respondents provided 
13,386 responses. A small number of new categories specific to 2008 and 2012 were 
contextually created based on the data, developed through a careful reading of the 
statements provided by respondents.30 Each response was assigned to one, and only one, 
category according to the codebook.31  
 
                                                 
29 Up to the first five like or dislike mentions are coded per party/candidate from 1976 to 2012. However, 
there are two things to note about the 1972 data. First, the ANES only asked the party- and candidate-
likes/dislikes questions of half the sample to reduce overall interview length that year (Miller 1999). 
Second, only three responses to each question were coded by the ANES for each respondent. Although not 
many respondents provided four or five mentions to these questions in subsequent years, the frequencies of 
responses in 1972 should naturally be lower than for the later years of the study because of the ceiling 
change. This may also have an effect on the probit model predicting candidate choice in 1972, as will be 
discussed further below. 
30 Two categories were added in 2008, both related to Barack Obama. The first was a general candidate 
comment relating to Obama’s “name”, and the second referred to the birther controversy surrounding his 
candidacy. Two other categories were added in 2012, the first referring to programs related to student loans 
and financial aid and the second related to illegal immigration and the Dream Act. 
31 Using an across-time coding reliability method (Schreier 2012), a random sample of ten percent of the 
2008 statements were blindly recoded after a nine-month break. According to this method, the researcher 
should forget the original coding scheme and will rely on the codebook to recode the sample, thus creating 
a trustworthy inter-coder reliability score. This yielded a Krippendorff’s alpha score of 0.864, far above the 
standard α ≥ .80. 
 116 
Table 5.1: Proportions of Individuals Offering Likes/Dislikes Comments, by Year and 
Age Group 
  Number of Comments 
  Year Age Group 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7-8 9-10 10+ 
2012 18-29 10 14 20 11 11 8 27 
 30+ 6 9 11 13 13 12 36 
2008 18-29 13 21 16 12 11 9 18 
 30+ 7 11 16 17 14 11 24 
2004 18-29 7 15 14 11 11 9 33 
 30+ 5 8 10 12 12 14 39 
2000 18-29 15 16 12 11 10 9 27 
 30+ 7 11 11 13 12 10 36 
1996 18-29 13 18 18 17 10 7 17 
 30+ 7 11 16 16 13 11 25 
1992 18-29 13 13 14 11 11 9 29 
 30+ 6 9 10 13 13 11 39 
1988 18-29 20 13 11 12 10 8 25 
 30+ 9 10 13 12 11 10 35 
1984 18-29 10 13 13 15 10 9 29 
 30+ 7 11 12 14 12 9 35 
1980 18-29 7 13 18 15 13 10 22 
 30+ 5 11 15 16 14 14 25 
1976 18-29 6 13 16 15 14 9 26 
 30+ 6 10 14 16 14 11 30 
1972 18-29 7 12 16 16 16 13 20 
 30+ 6 10 13 18 13 13 26 
Note: Rows may not total to 100 due to rounding 
These open-ended responses are extremely useful for understanding how 
individuals see and relate to the political world, providing a window into the unguided, 
unfettered considerations individuals use to evaluate political candidates and the parties, 
and are particularly appropriate for examining the way in which citizens think about an 
election. In all years under study, a very large majority of respondents provided at least one 
response to the open-ended questions. The average proportion of older Americans who 
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provided at least one response across these eleven election years was about 94%, with a 
high of 95% in 2004 and a low of 91% in 1988. Response rates among eighteen-to-twenty 
one-year-olds were not quite as high as among older adults, yet still a large majority 
provided at least one response in each election year. The average proportion of responses 
across these election years was about 90%, with the lowest response rate in 1988 of about 
80% and the highest in 1976 of about 94%. Table 5.1 provides a more detailed breakdown 
of the number of likes/dislikes responses provided by young and older voters each year, in 
percentages. In seven of the eleven election years, at least one-quarter of 18-29-year-old 
respondents provided 10 or more responses to the likes/dislikes questions, and the 
proportions were even higher among older adults. 
I adapt John Kessel’s models measuring partisan advantage utilizing open-ended 
responses. These were originally based on models developed by Donald Stokes in The 
American Voter (1960) and refined over the next 30 years (Kessel 2004, 65). The strength 
of using open-ended likes/dislikes questions is that there is not much survey-imposed 
constraint on responses. As such, responses to these questions reflect some of the most 
salient considerations voters make when considering the national context in an election 
year, including the problems facing the nation and the candidates who promise to solve 
those problems. Open-ended questions allow a researcher to measure attitudes towards the 
candidates, parties, issues, and groups in the electorate as well as the impact of those 
attitudes on vote choice, which I do for the eleven presidential elections identified above. 
The models that follow are good for making historic comparisons, and allow an 
investigator to compare the sources of vote decisions across elections (Kessel 2004; Smith 
and Kessel 1995; Smith, Radcliffe and Kessel 1999).  
Attitude analysis using open-ended responses involves identifying both a general 
object (candidate, party, issue, or group connection) and a valence – a positive or negative 
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judgment – towards that object, with each comment given equal weighting. Responses 
within each of the four object categories and their valences are disaggregated and coded 
further into one of 17 specific domains described below, and these domains provide even 
greater insight into factors related to candidate choice within each age group (the coding 
scheme for these domains is provided in Appendix B). I determine partisan valence scores 
for two age groups (18-29-year-olds, and those over 30) within the electorate by 
performing calculations at the mass level for each election from 1972 to 2012 for the four 
broad object categories and seventeen specific domains found in Table 5.2. Valence scores 
on these domains provide valuable insight into how the extant circumstances and national 
context affect voter perceptions of candidate and party performance on salient national 
problems. In other words, valence scores can give us a sense of which party has ownership 
of a particular issue area in an election year. 
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The Domains 
Table 5.2: Object and Domain Descriptions 
Object Domain Comments relating to: 
Candidate Record and Performance 





Political/military experience, business-type comments (e.g. 
efficiency), management of advisors 
 Intelligence 
Intelligence, education, knowledge/information, articulation and 
communication skills, being realistic, and accepting new ideas 
 Trust Principles, honesty, scandals 
 Personality 
Strength, charisma, religiosity, other personal traits under the 




Personal characteristics that are not intelligence- or personality- 
related; includes race, age, members of the candidate’s family 
Party People in the Party Specific people in the party, both present and historical 
 Party Affect 
Positive or negative affect towards a party, including being a 
traditional partisan voter and trusting the party 
 
Party Administration  
and Conduct 





Defense-military issues, international issues (including defense 
spending), terrorism, and war (e.g. Iraq, Vietnam) 
 
Economic Policy and 
Conditions 
Macroeconomic concerns including inflation, recession, 
unemployment, big business, taxes, government spending 
 
Social Welfare and 
Benefits 
Healthcare/insurance, Social Security, distributional economic 
mentions (unless specifically referring to taxes) 
 Moral Issues 
Abortion, gay rights/marriage, religion, school prayer, stem-cell 
research, immigration 
 
Energy and the 
Environment 
Environmental regulations, air and water pollution, and energy-
related concerns (drilling, alternative energy sources) 
 Other Domestic Issues 
Domestic issues not included in one of the specific issue-areas 
above, like crime or gun control. Includes civil liberties. 
 General Issue Comments 
Issues (no specific issue/activity mentioned) like vague 




Group Associations References to social, racial, or economic groups 
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The party, candidate, and issue domains were adapted from Kessel’s models to best 
address my research questions.32 Candidate-related comments are divided into six 
domains: Record and Performance in Office, Experience and Management, Intelligence, 
Trust, Personality, and other General Candidate comments. The Record and Performance 
in Office category includes comments related to how a candidate has performed in 
previously-held offices or as a current incumbent. These include general mentions of 
performance rather than performance on specific issues, such as “He’s doing a good job.”. 
Experience and Management includes mentions of political and military 
experience, business-related comments such as efficiency, and how a candidate manages 
advisors and others around him. The Trust category contains comments relating to 
principles, honesty, and scandals. Intelligence includes statements about intelligence, 
education, knowledge and information, being realistic, having common sense, and 
accepting new ideas. This also includes statements about a candidate being able to clearly 
communicate ideas to the public. Responses indicating strength, charisma, religiosity, and 
other personal traits under the control of the candidate (not including things like age or 
race) are coded under Personality. General Candidate Comments include any reference to 
a candidate that does not fit into one of the other five subcategories, including statements 
like “I just like him” or “I hate everything about him.” 
                                                 
32 The candidate domains I use are the same as those used in Kessel’s models. For the party domains, 
Kessel only included two domains—People in the Party and Party Affect. I split party affect comments and 
party administration and conduct comments into two different domains. The issue domains I use differ 
slightly as well. Kessel’s issue domains included Civil Liberties, Natural Resources, and Agriculture. 
Instead of Civil Liberties (which received few mentions, especially in recent election years), I included the 
Moral Issues domain, and instead of Natural Resources I created a more comprehensive Energy and the 
Environment domain. Finally, because many issue areas did not fit well into the other domains, and 
virtually no one provided responses in the Agriculture domain, I replaced it with an Other Domestic Issues 
domain. In addition, while Kessel did not create an object category or domain for Group Associations, I 
included these comments in my models because so many individuals provided responses referring to group 
associations similar to one of Converse’s (1964) levels of conceptualization since Petrocik (1999) notes 
that Democrats “own” the topic or issue area of social class and group relationships. 
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Party-related comments are divided into three domains: People in the Party, Party 
Affect, and Party Administration and Conduct. People in the Party includes mentions of 
people in a party other than the candidate himself, like party leaders in Congress, past 
presidents, and state or local candidates. The Party Affect category contains comments 
suggesting positive or negative affect towards one of the parties, including things like being 
a traditional partisan voter, trusting the party, and having a belief that the party can win. 
Party Administration and Conduct is a catch-all category for responses that refer to the 
organization, composition, and performance of the parties such as whether the party is well-
organized, representative of the country, factionalized, or listens to the people.  
Issue-related to comments are divided into six domains: Foreign Affairs and Policy, 
Economic Policy and Conditions, Social Welfare, Moral Issues, Energy and the 
Environment, Other Domestic Issues, and General Issue comments. The Foreign Policy 
category includes both defense-military issues and international issues like defense 
spending, missile defense, terrorism, national security, and war (including the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and mentions of bringing troops home). Economic Policy and Conditions 
responses refer to macroeconomic concerns like inflation, recession, unemployment, taxes, 
government spending, “bad times”, and jobs.33 This domain also includes comments like 
“The economy is better under them” or “Cost of living is lower under them” when referring 
to one of the parties or candidates.  
Social Welfare includes domestic distributive policies like public education, 
welfare, healthcare/health insurance (including Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable 
Care Act), Social Security, and aid to the poor. Moral Issues include divisive cultural issues 
                                                 
33 Distributional economic mentions are generally included in the social welfare category. 
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including abortion, gay rights and gay marriage, and immigration.34 Energy and the 
Environment handles comments referring to environmental regulations, air and water 
pollution, and energy-related concerns like drilling for oil or developing alternative energy 
sources. Other Domestic Issues contains domestic issues not included in one of the specific 
issue-areas mentioned above (e.g. crime, gun control). Finally, General Issue Comments 
incorporates responses that refer to issues but do not necessarily indicate a specific issue 
or activity, such as general assessments of “ideas” or “stands”, continuing unspecified 
Republican or Democratic policies, and references to liberalism and conservatism. 35 
Group Associations is the only category that is both an object and domain. All 
group-related mentions such as “He’s good for Hispanics” or “They’re for the rich” are 
categorized within this object/domain. This also includes vague comments like Democrats 
are “more for the people” or Republicans are “good for corporations”. 
Valence Calculation 
Mass partisan valence scores are created by first coding each response as positive 
or negative within each broad object category and specific domain. Take, for example, a 
respondent in 2008 answering the Republican candidate-like question with “He’s pro-life, 
a war veteran, and I like his tax plan.” This response includes three objects: an issue 
(abortion/pro-life), a candidate (war veteran), and another issue (tax plan/policies). 
                                                 
34 Immigration is included as a Moral Issue based on the classification of moral and cultural issues by Ellis 
and Stimson (2012, pp.50-53). I ran models with immigration coded as a domestic issue as well, though the 
model fit was poorer and less predictive. 
35 Following Kessel’s coding scheme, strictly ideological mentions such as “He is liberal” or “They are too 
conservative” were coded under General Issue Comments. This can be justified by considering that 
ideology can be conceptualized in three ways. The first is as a sort of self-identification, though individuals 
left of moderate tend to avoid the term “liberal” (Jarvis 2005), favoring the term “progressive”. The second 
is to think of ideology in terms of attitude constraint, and ideological levels of conceptualization as 
described by Converse (1964). But the third way to think about ideology, as it is utilized in this 
categorization scheme, is most often espoused by spatial voting scholars (e.g. Jessee 2009) by viewing 
degrees of liberalism and conservatism as a summary of issue positions across issue domains.  
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Because all three were provided under the “like” question, all three have a positive valence. 
Each of these mentions are then re-coded into one of the seventeen domains—here into 
Moral Issues, Experience and Management, and Economic Policy and Conditions, 
respectively. 
Next, each response is sorted into one of four columns according to which party 
that response favors or disfavors—pro-Republican, anti-Republican, pro-Democrat, or 
anti-Democrat (the three mentions in the example in the paragraph above would be coded 
as pro-Republican mentions.) These columns are then combined to create a summary 
measure expressed in terms of mass Democratic partisan valence (by convention), as 
positive attitudes about Democrats and negative attitudes about Republicans tend to 
produce Democratic votes (Kessel 2004, 68). The sum of pro-Democratic and anti-
Republican responses are taken as a proportion of all comments, and turned into a valence 
score by subtracting 50 from the sum to create a neutral point at zero. Negative values 
indicate a negative Democratic valence and thus a Republican advantage on that particular 
domain, while values above zero indicate a positive Democratic valence. The model is: 
 
Democratic Valencej= [((Pro-Democraticj) + (anti-Republicanj))*100 /N]-50 
where j stands for a particular domain (j= 1…17). The valence within each domain is 
constructed in this manner, with each comment weighted equally. Higher positive values 
indicate stronger Democratic valences and lower negative values indicate stronger 
Republican valences for a domain, while valences close to zero demonstrate only marginal 
advantages to one candidate or party on a domain. 
The distribution of the total number of comments is worth mentioning. Tables 5.6 
through 5.16 in Appendix B provide breakdowns of the number of positive and negative 
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comments for both parties for each age group, by attitude objects and specific domains, for 
each presidential election year under study (1972-2012). For most years, the plurality of 
comments concern issues for both age groups in each election year with the exceptions of 
1976 and 1980 for both age groups and 1986 for older Americans, even though respondents 
are not directly asked about issues. These issue mentions include both prospective and 
retrospective assessments of party and candidate performance on these issues. The sheer 
number of issue-related comments, despite the prompts asking specifically about the 
candidates and parties, suggests that many voters do in fact evaluate political candidates 
and the parties based on issue concerns and not solely on blind party devotion or seemingly-
superficial candidate traits.  
MASS VALENCES BY AGE GROUP 
Tables 5.3A and 5.3B display the valences for each domain in each election year, 
by age group. The aggregate valences on the issue domains are the best way to determine 
which issue areas are perceived to be “owned” or “leased” by a party or candidate in any 
given election year. Again, higher positive values indicate stronger Democratic valences 
and lower negative values indicate stronger Republican valences for a domain, while 
valences close to zero demonstrate only marginal advantages to one candidate or party on 
a domain. In addition, the valences for the candidate and party domains also suggest which 
party or candidate held an advantage on those particular traits. These candidate, party, and 
issue assessments are a direct reflection of the national conditions and circumstances in an 
election year. 
For most years, the valences for the young on most domains run in the same 
direction as valences for older individuals, with a few exceptions. Most notably, young and 
older Americans appear divided on Moral Issues, with the positive valence for the young  
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Table 5.3A: Aggregate-Level Valences, by Age Group 1996-2012 
Object or Domain  2012 2008 2004 2000 1996 
Record and 
Performance 
18-29  21.63 26.67 -2.00 1.35 13.27 
30 and over   16.16 15.77 -2.76 1.79 16.12 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  -10.16 -11.59 -6.25 13.41 -4.22 
30 and over   -9.94 -17.91 -1.84 9.92 -10.00 
Trust 
18-29  24.51 2.94 -27.36 -14.06 -29.80 
30 and over   20.26 -9.56 -9.63 -16.20 -36.98 
Intelligence 
18-29  34.13 25.64 14.91 13.46 35.71 
30 and over   33.28 26.75 17.73 16.12 25.27 
Personality 
18-29  25.00 -1.06 -34.81 -15.08 11.54 
30 and over   22.26 6.56 -30.00 2.69 -0.80 
General Candidate  
Comments 
18-29  22.89 22.54 16.67 -3.33 21.43 
30 and over   19.02 14.27 3.47 -7.71 13.48 
Total Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  17.58 12.92 -0.95 -1.75 5.56 
30 and over   14.49 4.65 -5.69 -0.83 0.65 
Party Administration  
and Conduct 
18-29  12.90 8.48 -6.71 3.75 3.23 
30 and over   11.05 6.68 -2.69 -2.79 -4.35 
Party Affect 
18-29  22.00 20.19 15.85 11.29 10.47 
30 and over   21.64 20.56 8.30 9.92 9.11 
People in the Party 
18-29  11.76 27.78 18.75 -12.07 22.73 
30 and over   11.90 18.79 -12.41 -2.99 5.81 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  14.54 13.74 1.61 5.16 5.77 
30 and over   12.87 10.13 -1.69 -0.09 0.91 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  6.82 19.54 15.09 -18.29 -11.90 
30 and over   1.15 14.85 8.34 -15.59 -5.06 
Economic Policy 
18-29  14.71 17.02 11.48 7.14 3.13 
30 and over   4.25 18.36 7.98 0.84 6.85 
Social Welfare 
18-29  15.29 19.14 17.47 13.35 23.28 
30 and over   10.54 15.05 4.84 0.84 6.61 
Moral Issues 
18-29  16.21 0.39 13.16 2.00 7.01 
30 and over   2.21 -10.13 -1.61 -2.07 -5.11 
Energy and the  
Environment 
18-29  22.22 33.64 36.49 25.56 31.25 
30 and over   15.22 16.67 43.44 18.86 37.25 
Other Domestic 
Issues 
18-29  29.00 18.75 27.33 5.80 11.18 
30 and over   19.46 2.63 18.59 3.13 6.94 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  7.63 14.53 5.17 7.14 8.57 
30 and over   5.82 9.47 -9.47 -13.56 -2.03 
Total Issue Comments 
18-29  14.55 16.21 11.08 6.50 8.14 
30 and over   6.86 11.08 3.95 0.79 2.83 
Group Associations 
18-29  40.08 36.43 35.45 34.11 33.52 
30 and over   36.92 37.30 33.03 28.62 30.87 
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Table 5.3B: Aggregate-Level Valences, by Age Group 1972-1992 
Object or Domain  1992 1988 1984 1980 1976 1972 
Record and  
Performance 
18-29  12.93 6.63 -24.77 7.65 12.68 -19.79 
30 and over   11.36 6.67 -18.27 8.56 5.60 -27.59 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  -15.83 -11.07 -10.68 -3.37 -9.15 -31.41 
30 and over   -15.51 -16.07 -11.13 -8.59 -14.56 -29.92 
Trust 
18-29  -9.78 3.97 2.94 26.62 -3.80 15.00 
30 and over   -10.71 9.29 -0.89 12.35 -10.36 6.14 
Intelligence 
18-29  27.66 12.03 -3.93 24.39 12.26 -27.94 
30 and over   15.70 8.97 0.17 19.96 -2.67 -35.05 
Personality 
18-29  -12.89 5.42 -24.65 -10.91 -12.04 -28.57 
30 and over   -10.40 0.82 -25.40 -9.09 -7.58 -33.62 
General Candidate  
Comments 
18-29  12.43 1.41 6.94 11.88 8.82 -7.69 
30 and over   7.89 2.50 0.05 11.81 2.25 -19.98 
Total Candidate  
Comments 
18-29  2.21 -1.41 -7.64 4.92 -0.53 -15.27 
30 and over   0.77 -3.88 -7.26 3.63 -3.66 -19.77 
Party Administration  
and Conduct 
18-29  2.79 -3.14 1.73 -1.05 -0.68 -4.55 
30 and over   -2.22 -7.97 -5.76 -5.41 -7.57 -10.90 
Party Affect 
18-29  1.79 10.55 20.73 -1.72 27.14 22.22 
30 and over   12.50 10.54 19.59 15.38 17.53 13.03 
People in the Party 
18-29  -7.63 -3.66 -14.63 7.14 15.94 -13.33 
30 and over   2.69 -8.90 -13.16 2.17 12.20 -22.24 
Total Party Comments 
18-29  1.68 0.46 2.52 -1.29 5.90 -3.65 
30 and over   0.39 -2.37 -2.73 -0.53 0.64 -7.59 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  -6.20 -4.51 6.79 -4.34 -4.25 -10.61 
30 and over   -2.47 -3.54 -0.78 -12.60 -12.87 -15.28 
Economic Policy 
18-29  20.76 -9.36 -9.25 -30.54 10.82 8.82 
30 and over   20.89 -5.98 -8.63 -19.00 13.35 9.64 
Social Welfare 
18-29  21.12 11.42 11.07 -1.46 11.18 -9.85 
30 and over   13.85 7.59 4.76 -4.25 -0.75 -9.10 
Moral Issues 
18-29  9.89 -16.99 -7.94 8.14 -4.76 -50.00 
30 and over   -2.35 -22.41 -2.94 -6.76 -15.00 -50.00 
Energy and the  
Environment 
18-29  38.10 15.31 41.30 7.89 28.57 25.00 
30 and over   32.10 10.83 42.42 -12.90 21.43 25.00 
Other Domestic Issues 
18-29  18.85 -18.18 14.42 8.65 8.57 7.78 
30 and over   24.74 -12.58 11.17 0.67 3.00 0.00 
General Issue  
Comments 
18-29  3.17 -17.20 -9.02 -8.20 14.38 -8.06 
30 and over   -2.89 -14.71 -21.51 -11.41 -8.54 -21.39 
Total Issue Comments 
18-29  10.10 -5.79 3.07 -6.95 7.79 -4.28 
30 and over   8.15 -2.86 0.00 -8.08 0.17 -7.67 
Group Associations 
18-29  29.85 29.22 32.11 26.34 35.96 36.73 
30 and over   33.88 32.75 33.82 32.66 32.87 27.72 
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favoring the Democrats and the negative valence for older Americans favoring Republicans 
for six years under study—2008, 2004, 2000, 1996, 1992, and 1980. This suggests one of 
two things. First, it is possible that issue ownership does not work very well for young 
people; perhaps young people do not think of the Republicans as better able to handle moral 
issues in the early 2000. This is a distinct possibility and would reflect their lack of 
attachment to the parties (and reliance on conditions and performance when evaluating 
party-handling capacities). More likely, however, this reflects their policy preferences, 
which substitute for performance assessments when there is no set policy. This would 
indicate that among young people for whom Moral Issues are salient, they generally 
preferred prospective Democratic performance on issues like abortion and gay marriage, 
while individuals over the age of 30 generally prefer the Republican Party’s stances and 
future performance on these types of issues. If this is the case, GOP attempts to prime their 
issue handling advantages within the broader electorate might have hurt them with younger 
voters if voters use Moral Issue attitudes and assessments when making their vote choice 
(as will be discussed below). The age groups are also somewhat divided on General Issue 
comments, with the young preferring Democratic stances and performance and older 
Americans preferring Republican in 2004, 2000, 1996, 1992, and 1976.  Finally, on Foreign 
Policy in 1984 and Energy and the Environment in 1980, 18-29-year-olds preferred 
Democrats when it came to prospective and retrospective assessments of party and 
candidate performance in these issue areas while adults over 30 generally favored the 
Republicans. 
Valences were divided on certain candidate domains as well, including Personality, 
Trust, and Intelligence. Surprisingly, in the aggregate, 18-29-year-olds preferred John 
McCain’s personality traits to Barack Obama’s in 2008 while older people were more 
favorable to the Democratic candidate on this domain; similarly, the valence for young 
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people on the Personality domain suggested a preference for Republican George W. Bush 
in 2000 while older people preferred the personality traits of Al Gore that same election 
year. However, young people preferred Bill Clinton and older individuals preferred Bob 
Dole on candidate personality in 1996.  In terms of candidate Trust, young people were 
more favorable to the Democratic candidates in both 2008 and 1984 and while older 
Americans were more favorable to the Republicans on this candidate domain. Finally, on 
candidate Intelligence, young people preferred the Republican in 1984 while older 
individuals preferred the Republican (though only marginally). The reverse was true in 
1976 when the young held the Democratic candidate in higher esteem on this domain while 
older Americans favored the Republican. 
Finally, we see division in aggregate valences on all party domains, particularly on 
Party Administration and Conduct. On the Party Administration and Conduct domain, the 
valence for young Americans favored the Democrats in 2000, 1996, 1992 and 1984 while 
the valences for individuals over the age of 30 favored the Republicans. There was only 
one year, 1980, for which older and younger people held distinct opinions on Party Affect 
where Republicans held a slight advantage among the young and Democrats a greater 
advantage among older individuals. Finally, when evaluating People in the Party, young 
people held Republicans in higher esteem in 1992 while Democrats were slightly 
advantaged among older individuals. The opposite was true in 2004 where the valence 
among young people strongly favored the Democrats, while the valence for People in the 
Party among older Americans strongly favored the Republicans.  
NATIONAL CONTEXT AND ISSUE OWNERSHIP FROM 2004-2012 
From 2004 to 2012, candidate and party perceptions for 18-29-year-olds and those 
over 30 are fairly comparable for many domains. But looking first at 2012, there are some 
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differences worth discussing in the candidate domains. There is a moderate disparity 
between 18-29-year-olds and older adults when assessing the Record and Performance of 
the candidates. While the valences for both age groups favor Obama with quite large 
magnitudes, there is over a 5-point difference between the valences where young people 
are even more favorable towards the Democratic candidate. But the differences in valence 
scores on all other candidate domains were smaller, and both age groups were favorable 
towards Obama on these domains with the exception of Experience and Management 
where the plurality of Pro-Republican comments for Mitt Romney pointed to his extensive 
business experience prior to his career in government. 
Next, looking at the 2008 valences for candidate and party domains, young people 
appeared to trust Barack Obama more than older individuals, the latter of whom offered 
many more positive comments about John McCain and negative comments about Obama. 
Somewhat surprisingly, older individuals were collectively more positive towards Obama 
than the young were regarding candidate Personality, as comments by the young showed a 
slight preference for McCain. With the exception of Experience and Management, where 
both young and older Americans favored McCain the mass valences for the rest of the 
candidate and party domains young and older Americans alike favored the Democrats, 
though to varying degrees. In addition, there were at least ten-point gaps in the valences 
for Record and Performance and General Candidate Comments, where young people 
preferred Barack Obama to John McCain to a greater degree than those over 30. 
A closer look at the 2004 valences show fewer domains where the age groups were 
on opposite sides in terms of candidate and party domains, with the exception of People in 
the Party where the difference was very large in magnitude (almost 30 points). There were 
also a few other notable differences in valences between young and older Americans worth 
mentioning. Both young and older Americans who mention Trust placed theirs in George 
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W. Bush, likely buoyed in the wake of 9/11. Young and old alike favored Kerry in terms 
of General Candidate Comments, but the valence for the young is over 13 points higher for 
the Democratic candidate. 
However, the largest difference in valences between the age groups from 2004 to 
2012 comes in the issues domains. For both age groups during this period, issue valences 
generally favored the Democrats, confirming H1—Democrats appear own or lease all issue 
areas for both age groups from 2004 to 2012, with the exception of Moral Issues for older 
adults. In fact, the shift to positive valences on Foreign Policy from 2004 to 2012, when 
compared to the negative valences on this issue for elections prior to 2004, indicate the 
Democrats earned a temporary “lease” on this issue area due to poor retrospective 
assessments of Republican performance on foreign affairs. While Democrats also had 
ownership on the Economic Policy domain from 2004 to 2012, this issue domain actually 
appears to be leased by Democrats long before the 2004 election, likely buoyed by the good 
economy during the Clinton administration (and the recession during George H.W. Bush’s 
first term in office). Republicans do not appear to have had a lease on this issue since the 
Reagan administration in the 1980s.   
In 2012, we see about 5-point disparities between older and younger Americans on 
the Foreign Policy, Social Welfare, and Energy and Environment domains where the 
valence scores for the young were more favorable to the Democratic candidate. Even larger 
10-point disparities appear in the domains of Economic Policy and Other Domestic Issues, 
while there is a whopping 14-point disparity between young and older Americans on the 
Moral Issues domain. So even though the valences on all these issue areas were favorable 
to the Democratic Party and its candidate in 2012, young people held particularly favorable 
views relative to older individuals. 
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Looking next at 2008, large gaps (>10 points) existed between older and younger 
Americans with regards to Energy and the Environment and Other Domestic Issues. A 10-
point difference existed between the age groups for Moral Issues as well, with individuals 
over 30 demonstrating a stronger valence favoring Republicans while the valence for 
young people was just marginally in favor of the Democrats. Both age groups show a strong 
preference for the Democrats in Foreign Policy and Social Welfare, though the valence for 
young people was moderately higher for both domains. 
Issue valence differences were even more stark in 2004. The age groups were 
divided on Moral Issues and General Issue Comments, where the valence for older 
Americans demonstrated a preference for the Republicans and the valence for the young 
favored the Democrats. In fact, there was a 14-point difference in the valences between 
young and older Americans on Moral Issues. Both age groups preferred the Democrats for 
the rest of the issue domains, with rather large gaps (~10 points) in Social Welfare, Energy 
and the Environment, and Other Domestic Issues and a smaller gap (~7 points) in Foreign 
Policy. 
When comparing these valences to the era prior to 2004, it is worth noting again 
that Republicans had a valence advantage for both age groups in Foreign Policy for all 
elections dating back to 1972, with the exception of 1984 when the valence for the young 
favored the Democrats. However, the shift in Foreign Policy valences favoring the 
Democrats since 2004 reveals that individuals of all ages were dissatisfied with the 
Republican handling of foreign policy issues during George W. Bush’s tenure, which 
centered around terrorism after 9/11 and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, providing the 
Democrats with a “lease” on the issue area. Democrats also held a valence advantage in 
Economic Policy for most years for both age groups, except during the Reagan era (1980-
1988), when Republican were favored by both age groups. This is particularly notable in 
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2008 and 2012, especially among the young those years, suggesting the Bush 
administration and the Republican Party were not seen as being able to handle that issue 
area in the wake of the Great Recession. Social Welfare valences also demonstrated a 
general preference for the Democrats except for 1980 and 1972 when Republicans held a 
slight advantage for both age groups (the age groups were divided in 1976). Democrats 
have fairly consistently held valence advantages for both age groups for Energy and the 
Environment and Other Domestic Issues, with the exception of 1980 when older Americans 
favored the Republicans for the former domain and 1988 when both age groups favored 
the Republicans in the latter. 
On the whole, what these valences demonstrate is that the national context heavily 
favored the Democrats in the period from 2004 to 2012 in terms of national problems and 
perceptions of which party was better equipped to deal with those problems. This is 
particularly true among young people, who held stronger pro-Democratic (or anti-
Republican) attitudes as reflected by the issue domain valences than older adults. We see 
this especially in 2004 on Foreign Policy, Social Welfare, Moral Issues, other Domestic 
Issues, and General Issue Comments. The differences between young and older adults were 
not as stark in 2008 but still existed, particularly on Foreign Policy, Moral Issues, Energy 
and the Environment, other Domestic Issues, and General Issue Comments. Finally, in 
2012, we see the greatest differences in terms of Foreign Policy, Economic Policy, Social 
Welfare, Moral Issues, and Energy and the Environment. 
LINKS TO THE VOTE DECISION 
However, mass valences alone do not tell us which of these issue performance, 
candidate, and party assessments were actually the most salient and important to candidate 
choice each year. It could be that a domain with a large partisan valence is relatively 
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unimportant to candidate choice in an election year depending on the individual qualities 
of the candidates in the running and the salience of a particular issue on the national agenda, 
while small partisan valence advantages may be very important to the vote decision in other 
years. There may also be differences between the age groups in the importance of some 
candidate, party, or issue performance domains to vote choice, even in the same election 
year, due the less-rooted party predispositions of young people when compared to older 
individuals. Therefore, to measure the link between attitudes and candidate choice, 
individual-level valence scores for each domain are created and included as predictors in 
an individual-level model estimating the impact of each of these components on 
Democratic candidate preference.  
Like in Chapter 4, I extend my analysis to include young nonvoters who indicate a 
preference for a candidate had they voted in the election and use candidate preference as 
my dependent variable rather than actual vote choice to maximize the number of cases 
included in the 18-29 year-old age group. It must be noted, however, that the 1972 and 
1976 probit regressions use a different dependent variable than those used for 1980 through 
2012. The dependent variables for 1980 on were created from post-election questions 
asking vote choice for voters and candidate preference for nonvoters. The 1972 and 1976 
ANES do not include a candidate preference question in the post-election questionnaire for 
nonvoters, so the dependent variables for these years were created using vote choice from 
the post-election survey and intended vote choice pulled from the pre-election interview 
for those who said they did not vote in the post-election questionnaire. Because of this 
inconsistency, comparisons of the 1972 and 1976 results to the results for subsequent years 
should be made with caution. 
Because the dependent variable is dichotomous candidate preference (coded 
0=Republican; 1=Democrat), probit analysis estimated using maximum likelihood is 
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appropriate. This is preferable to using a multinomial logit model for two reasons. First, I 
am ultimately only interested in the D-R vote share each year. Second, there are so few 
third party voters in most years under study, particularly young third-party voters, that 
analyses including these individuals would be imprecise and uninformative. The model is 
as follows: 
Pr(yi=1) = Φ(β0 + Σβkxki) 
where x is the value of respondent i’s valence on domain k (k=1…17). The individual-level 
partisan valences used as independent variables in the following probit analyses weight 
each variable (domain) by the number of comments made by each individual as follows: 
(positive Democratic comments+ negative Republican comments) – (positive Republican 
comments + negative Democratic comments).36  
This model is not meant to be a comprehensive model of vote choice.37 The interest 
here is in testing the link between short-term factors like national conditions and context—
particularly retrospective and prospective assessments of party and candidate performance 
on important national problems—and candidate choice, and to determine if those factors 
impact candidate choice differently from older individuals who have more crystallized 
party predispositions. Even though party identification is not included as a distinct 
independent variable in the model, it is proxied into the model through the pro- and anti- 
party comments in the three party domains. In fact, one may even interpret the individual 
valence scores on these party domains as partisanship, with negative values suggesting 
Republican partisanship and positive Democratic partisanship. Lower negative numbers 
                                                 
36 This is also sometimes referred to as an “ambivalence” measure (Albertson, Brehm, and Alvarez 2005) 
37 Demographic variables aside from age are not included in these models, so these models are unweighted 
to maintain consistency since weights were not included in surveys prior to 1992. 
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and higher positive numbers suggest stronger partisan inclinations, while values closer to 
zero indicate more moderate positions. 
 The resulting probit coefficients are then transformed into standardized probit 
coefficients38, indicating the magnitude of the effect of each domain on vote choice. 
Standardized coefficients are useful to compare the relative importance of domains across 
elections, and have been shown to be very effective in predicting people’s votes (Kessel 
2004, 75). A one-standard deviation increase in the independent variable xk is expected to 
change y by the number of standard deviations expressed by the standardized probit 
coefficient, holding all other variables constant. Larger standardized coefficients suggest 
those domains are more important in determining the value of the independent variable, 
candidate choice. For example, if the Democrats’ largest valence advantage among the 
young is in the Social Welfare domain in an election year, but the standardized probit 
coefficient is not statistically significant (as was the case in 1996), the Democratic valence 
advantage is neutralized by having no impact on the vote that election. 
PROBIT RESULTS 
Party Domains 
The seventeen-predictor models provide interesting insight into the nature and 
dynamics of presidential elections since 1972 (Tables 5.4A through 5.4C). First, it should 
be noted that party-related domains do not as frequently impact the vote choice of young 
people as they do older people, confirming H3. Both Party Administration and Conduct 
                                                 
38 These are calculated by multiplying the probit coefficients by the ratio of the standard deviation of the 
independent variable (a particular domain) by the standard deviation of the dependent variable (candidate 
choice) for each age group for each year. With full standardization, both the xk variables and yi* (the latent 
candidate choice variable for respondent i) are transformed to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 
1, allowing for comparison across elections. 
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Table 5.4A: Standardized Probit Coefficients – Effects on Democratic Vote by Age, 1996-2012 
  18-29-year-olds  30 and Over 
Domain 2012 2008 2004 2000 1996 2012 2008 2004 2000 1996 
Candidates            
Record-Performance .151* -- .121* -- -- .125*** .094*** .143*** --  .188*** 
Experience-Mgmt .232*** .198*** -- -- -- .137*** .228*** .073* .089*** .12*** 
Trust .160* -- .251* -- .331** .099** .094*** .224*** .137*** .272*** 
Intelligence -- .167* -- .344* -- -- .106*** .1** .109*** .06* 
Personality -- -- -- -- -- -- .075** .169*** .08** .056* 
General Candidate .192** .201** .162** .315** -- .163*** .177*** .216*** .152*** .155*** 
Parties           
Party Admin-Conduct -- .148* -- -- -- .147*** .075** -- .107*** .096* 
Party Affect -- -- .175** .468** -- .116*** .202*** .1** .221*** .206*** 
People in the Party -- -- -- -- NA -- -- -- -- -- 
Issues           
Foreign Policy .266*** .262*** .417*** -- -- .138*** .132*** .234*** .109*** -- 
Economic Policy .313*** .142* .225* -- .188* .192*** .232*** .199*** .216*** .143*** 
Social Welfare .213** .253** -- -- -- .179*** .108*** -- .111*** .118*** 
Moral Issues .186** .18* -- .358*** .269* .168*** .136*** .094** .142*** .213*** 
Environment-Energy -- -- -- -- -- -- .065** -- .107*** -- 
Other Domestic Issues -- .183* -- -- .272* .065* .055* -- .15*** .062* 
General Issue  -- .141* -- -- -- .176*** .176*** .087* .096*** .21*** 
Group Associations .144* -- .278* -- -- .145*** .128*** .141*** .198*** .089** 
N 359 324 180 185 160 1319 1543 799 1176 1125 
Pseudo R² .601 .527 .69 .442 .607 .607 .574 .65 .595 .63 
Log Likelihood -76.85 -80.51 -36.25 -70.47 -38.45 -323.13 -416 -191.72 -329.83 -276.62 
% correctly predicted 92.48% 91.36% 88.89% 80.54% 91.25% 91.89% 88.08% 90.49% 88.78% 90.31% 
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, -- = not significant at the .05 level, NA=Variable not included/too few cases for analysis 
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Table 5.4B: Standardized Probit Coefficients – Effects on Democratic Vote by Age, 1980-1992 
 18-29-year-olds 30 and Over 
Domain 1992 1988 1984 1980 1992 1988 1984 1980 
Candidates         
Record-Performance .375*** -- .217*** .134* .10*** -- .186*** .176*** 
Experience-Mgmt .168** .175* .121** .268*** .19*** .179*** .116*** .145*** 
Trust -- -- .101* -- .122*** .087** .107*** .092** 
Intelligence -- .125* .164*** -- .098*** -- .083*** -- 
Personality .154* -- -- -- -- -- .058* .139*** 
General Candidate -- .146** .121** -- .112*** .026*** .173*** .102*** 
Parties         
Party Admin-Conduct .152* -- .11* .17* .087*** .1*** .115*** .093** 
Party Affect -- -- -- .18** .118*** .171*** .135*** .101** 
People in the Party -- .227** -- -- -- -- .078** -- 
Issues         
Foreign Policy .112* .328*** .3*** .321*** .173*** .2*** .185*** .299*** 
Economic Policy .202*** .3*** .383*** .28*** .197*** .168*** .308*** .199*** 
Social Welfare --  -- -- -- .12*** .182*** .093*** .121** 
Moral Issues .259*** -- .138* -- .247*** .165*** -- -- 
Environment-Energy .232** -- -- -- .072* .05* -- -- 
Other Domestic Issues -- .205*** .165** -- -- .09** .076** .105** 
General Issue  .19* .131* -- -- .172*** .105*** .096** .109** 
Group Associations .164* .198*** .112** -- .161*** .235*** .154*** .211*** 
N 294 322 413 283 1413 1240 1339 862 
Pseudo R² .591 .456 .572 .428 .6 .534 .609 .523 
Log Likelihood -78.52 -120.57 -120.45 -110.89 -383.67 -399.24 -353.62 -283.58 
% correctly predicted 86.73% 81.06% 85.71% 81.27% 89.38% 86.53% 89.02% 86.43% 
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, -- = not significant at the .05 level, NA=Variable not included/too few cases for analysis 
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Table 5.4C: Standardized Probit Coefficients – Effects on Democratic Vote by Age, 1972-1976 
 18-29-year-olds 30 and Over 
Domain 1976 1972 1976 1972 
Candidates     
Record-Performance -- .134* .204*** .135*** 
Experience-Mgmt .258*** .115* .205*** .093** 
Trust .269*** .142** .181*** .218*** 
Intelligence -- .191*** .101*** .084* 
Personality .17*** .194*** .062** .11** 
General Candidate .182*** .116* .136*** .205*** 
Parties     
Party Admin-Conduct -- -- .103*** -- 
Party Affect .125* .173** .227*** .111*** 
People in the Party -- -- -- .073* 
Issues     
Foreign Policy -- .215*** .081*** .192*** 
Economic Policy .235*** -- .193*** .084** 
Social Welfare .126* -- .071* .082** 
Moral Issues -- NA -- NA 
Environment-Energy -- -- -- -- 
Other Domestic Issues -- .204** .064* -- 
General Issue  -- .242*** .114*** .179*** 
Group Associations .16** .187*** .16*** .216*** 
N 513 670 1493 1779 
Pseudo R² .423 .254 .531 .27 
Log Likelihood -200.75 -342.78 -485.56 -816.15 
Chi-square p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
% correctly predicted 83.24% 83.73% 86.87% 87.70% 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, --= not significant at the .05 level, NA=Variable not included/too few cases for analysis 
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and Party Affect have a statistically significant impact on the vote choice of older 
Americans for every year under study except 2004 and 1972. During those two election 
years, Party Administration and Conduct was not statistically significant. In addition, the 
People in the Party domain had a statistically significant impact on the vote of older 
Americans in 1984 and 1972, while it only had an impact on candidate choice for 18-29-
year-olds in 1988. This lends credence to the idea that the more crystallized partisanship 
of older Americans might temper the effects of short-term forces compared to the latter’s 
impact on younger individuals.  
Despite positive and favorable valences for Democrats from 2004 to 2012, party 
domains only sporadically affected candidate choice for young people. In 2012, no party-
related domains had a statistically significant effect for young people, consistent with the 
idea that young people are less attached to the parties in terms of both identification or 
affect. Party Administration and Conduct was statistically significant in 2008, likely due 
to fewer positive assessments of Republican Party performance during the Bush 
administration (Table 5.7 in Appendix B). Party Affect was statistically significant in 2004 
for 18-29-year-olds as well. Combined with the positive Democratic valences on these 
domains, the statistical significance of these party domains do suggest a considerable 
Democratic advantage in these areas among young people.  
Looking back to the era prior to 2004, Party Affect had a statistically significant 
and quite substantive effect on candidate choice for 18-29-year-olds in 2000, and was the 
first election that Party Affect influenced candidate choice since 1980. The positive valence 
in 2000 also indicates young people were quite positive in affect towards the Democrats. 
Party Affect was also statistically significant in 1976 and 1972. Party Administration and 
Conduct had an impact on candidate choice for a few election years in the pre-2004 era, 
and was statistically significant in 1992, 1984, and 1980. But to reiterate, both of these 
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party-related domains regularly affected the candidate preference of older people in most 
years under study.  
Candidate Domains  
Looking next at candidate domains in the 2004-2012 era, we see that in 2012, 
Record and Performance, Experience and Management, Trust, and General Candidate 
Comments had statistically significant effects on candidate choice for both young and older 
Americans that election year. In 2008, while every single candidate domain had a 
statistically significant impact on candidate choice for individuals over the age of 30, only 
Experience and Management, Intelligence, and General Candidate Comments affected 
candidate preference for young people. Finally, in 2004, every single candidate domain 
impacted candidate preference for older people while only Record and Performance, Trust, 
and General Candidate Comments had a statistically significant effect on the young.  
Issue Domains 
Looking next at issue domains for the period from 2004 to 2012, remember, every 
single issue domain had a positive (and thus pro-Democratic) valence among young people. 
Most of these valences were positive for older Americans as well, with the exception of 
Moral Values in 2004 and 2008 and General Issue Comments in 2004. The probit results 
for 2012 indicate that only Foreign Policy, Economic Policy, Social Welfare, and Moral 
Issues had a statistically significant impact on the candidate choice of young people. 
Unsurprisingly, in the wake of the Great Recession, Economic Policy had the greatest 
impact, followed by Foreign Policy, then Social Welfare Issues, followed by Moral Issues. 
Among older Americans, these four issue domains were also statistically significant along 
with Other Domestic Issues and General Issue Comments.  
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The probit results for 2008 demonstrate that many more issue domains had a 
statistically significant impact on candidate preference among individuals over the age of 
30 relative to younger Americans that year. But for the issue domains that were statistically 
significant among young people, the magnitude of the effects tended to be large. With the 
2008 election occurring in the midst of the Great Recession, Economic Policy was 
statistically significant for both age groups, and had the greatest relative impact on vote 
choice for older Americans that year. Foreign Policy, Social Welfare, Moral Issues, and 
Other Domestic Issues all had statistically-significant effects on vote choice of young 
people that year. Foreign Policy actually had the greatest impact of any domain for young 
people that year, followed by Social Welfare Issues, and then General Candidate 
comments. Given the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with Barack Obama’s campaign 
promises for national health insurance, it is unsurprising these issue domains were salient 
and impactful for the young in that election. 
The effects of salient short-term forces were particularly noticeable in 2004 among 
young people. While Foreign Policy, Economic Policy, Moral Issues, and General Issue 
Comments had a statistically significant impact on the vote of older individuals in 2004, 
only the Foreign Policy and Economic Policy domains had statistically significant effects 
on the young. However, Foreign Policy not only had the single greatest impact on the vote 
of the young that year, with the war in Iraq in full force, that domain had the single greatest 
magnitude of effect on candidate preference among any issue domain for the young across 
all years under study.   
Effects of Short-Term Forces Prior to 2004 
Moving next to my second hypothesis, were issue attitudes and candidate 
assessments among the young a stronger predictor of candidate choice from 2004 to 2012 
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when compared to prior elections (1980 to 2000)? The evidence on this is dubious. First 
looking at candidate domains in Tables 5.4A and 5.4B, a larger number of candidate 
domains appear to influence candidate choice among 18-29-year-olds from 2004 to 2012 
when compared to the immediately-preceding low-salience elections of 1996 and 2000. 
But when looking all the way back to 1980, a number of candidate domains do appear to 
affect the candidate choice of young Americans in many elections and at quite large 
magnitudes. Candidate Experience and Management appears to frequently affect candidate 
preference, and was statistically significant in all years except 2004, 2000, and 1996. The 
magnitude of these effects also varied greatly by election year, with the strongest effects in 
2012, 2008, and 1980. The General Candidate Comments domain also often had a 
statistically significant impact on the candidate preference of young people and was only 
insignificant in 1996, 1992, and 1980. It had an effect of the greatest magnitude in 2000. 
Personality is the candidate domain that least frequently impacts candidate choice among 
young people from 1980 to 2012 and was only statistically significant in 1992. All other 
candidate domains had sporadic effects over this time period, varying by election year. 
This provides evidence to reject H2—candidate assessments do not appear to have a greater 
impact on the vote choice of young people from 2004 to 2012 relative to elections prior to 
2004. 
There is also little evidence to support H2 on the issue domains. Issue assessments 
do not appear to have a greater impact, both in terms of magnitude and number of issue 
areas, on candidate choice in the period from 2004 to 2012 relative to the earlier era. While 
six of the seven issue areas do appear to impact the vote choice of young people in 2008, 
and five of the seven in 2012, there were many issues influencing candidate preference in 
1992 and 1984. And while Foreign Policy in 2004 had the largest impact on candidate 
choice for any issue domain for all years under study, it also had a relatively large impact 
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in the 1980s as well. The same can be said for Economic Policy—while it had a substantial 
effect on candidate choice for young people in 2012, the magnitude of effects on candidate 
choice were quite strong during the Reagan era as well.  
1972 and 1976: A Companion Era 
Because of the methodological issues with creating the dependent variables for 
1976 and 1972, I did not think it prudent to directly include these election years in my over-
time comparisons. But this is an interesting companion era to the 2004-2012 period for a 
few reasons. Older Baby Boomers socialized into politics during an equally turbulent 
period, with the nation facing major issues like the Civil Rights movement and the Vietnam 
War in the 1960s and ‘70s, followed by the Watergate scandal. These issues caught public 
attention, penetrated into the personal lives of citizens, and perhaps fostered a greater use 
of performance issue assessments as criteria for vote choice (Delli Carpini 1986; Zukin et 
al. 2006). In fact, older Boomers who came of age in this era demonstrated a greater 
increase in liberal attitudes than older voting cohorts did in the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War (Davis 2004; Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1979) and were more Independent and less 
partisan than they had been in previous decades (Beck 1975, 14-16). However, it was 
difficult to attribute blame for the Vietnam War to any one party since the initial 
engagement began during a Republican presidency but the draft and high casualty counts 
occurred while a Democrat was in office. Nonetheless, the coming-of-political-age 
experience of older Baby Boomers was similar to the experience of Millennials in many 
ways. This also provides a way to test the generalizability of my theory that national 
conditions and context can raise the salience of performance issues and candidate factors, 
and that these short-term factors should have a stronger impact during periods of political 
turbulence compared to times of relative quiescence. 
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The standardized probit coefficients for 1972 and 1976 are reported in Table 5.4C. 
Looking first at the party domains, we see that Party Affect had a statistically significant 
effect on candidate preference for both young and older Americans in those election cycles. 
But Party Administration and Conduct was also statistically significant for older Americans 
in 1976, as was People in the Party in 1972, demonstrating that party-related factors do 
seem to enter the candidate choice calculus of older people more frequently than for 
younger people, especially in times of turbulence, and once again confirming H3.  
Looking next at the candidate domains, we can see that every single candidate 
domain had a statistically significant effect on the vote for both age groups in 1972, and 
for older Americans in 1976. In 1976, Experience and Management, Trust, Personality, 
and General Candidate Comments significantly impacted the vote choice of young people 
while fewer candidate-related factors entered the vote equation in subsequent election 
years. Therefore, these results mostly support H4—candidate factors do appear to affect 
the vote of young Americans to a greater extent during the turbulent elections of the 1970s. 
There is also evidence to support H4 in the issue domains. While fewer issue 
domains had a statistically significant impact on youth candidate preference in this era than 
for older Americans, every single issue domain that was statistically significant for young 
people had strong effects on their candidate preference. Foreign policy, unsurprisingly, had 
a strongest effect on youth candidate choice than among older American in 1972 in the 
height of the Vietnam War, though Other Domestic Issues and General Issue Comments 
also had effects of similar magnitudes. In 1976, while only Economic Policy and Social 
Welfare Issues were statistically significant for young people, the magnitude of their effects 
were quite large, especially on the Economic Policy domain. Thus, these results not only 
confirm my fourth hypothesis, they also provide some credibility to my theory. Party 
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factors do not appear to affect young voters as frequently as older voters, especially in 
times of turbulence.  
POTENCY—AN ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
The following analysis is not relevant to my hypotheses, but it is interesting to 
explore nonetheless. Both partisan valence forces and domain importance (as demonstrated 
by the size of the standardized coefficients) work together to have combined effects (Kessel 
2004). Kessel suggests using potency as a heuristic to develop an idea of how they work 
together by multiplying the aggregate partisan valence for each domain by its standardized 
probit coefficient since a domain can only swing the vote to a candidate if the valence 
favors that candidate and the coefficient is large. While potency is not a statistical measure, 
it can provide a quick impression of how much and in what direction a domain affects vote 
choice. It also allows for a non-statistical comparison of effects among domains within 
each election year. 
Patterns can logically be ascertained by considering the values of both the valence 
and standardized coefficient of a domain. A domain with an insignificant standardized 
probit coefficient would not exert any influence on the vote, no matter the value of the 
valence of that domain. A domain with a very large coefficient but an aggregate valence 
close to zero would result in equilibrium close to neutral, with neither candidate holding a 
major advantage on that domain. Fairly extreme valences (further from zero), combined 
with small standardized coefficients, would suggest a small relative advantage for the 
candidate favored by the direction of the valence; extreme valences combined with 
moderately sized coefficients result in a larger relative advantage for the favored candidate. 
But relatively extreme valences combined with large standardized coefficients suggest that 
voters were moved by strong forces with considerable advantages for one candidate over 
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the other. As such, potencies are an easy way to summarize these patterns, with values 
close to zero indicating equilibrium close to neutral. Higher positive potency values suggest 
stronger advantages for the Democratic candidate, while lower negative values indicate a 
greater advantage for the Republican. 
By looking at potency values, we can get a relative sense of which domains both 
favored one candidate over the other, and which truly moved vote choice. In addition, the 
absolute difference between the potency values of young and older adults provides a clue 
as to which domains moved one age group more than the other in favor of a candidate. 
Tables 5.5A through 5.5C provide the values of these potencies and absolute differences 
for each election. 
First looking at 2012, we see that Group Associations, Economic Policy, General 
Candidate Comments, Candidate Trust, Social Welfare, and Moral Issues had the highest 
potency rates of all domains for young people, and all of these favored the Democrats. 
When considering the absolute difference in potency rates between young and older 
Americans on these domains, however, Economic Policy, Moral Issues, and Party Affect 
appear to have the greatest differences between young and older individuals. This suggests 
that these domains may best explain any differences in candidate preference between 
young and older voters that year. The absolute differences on the domains of Economic 
Policy, Moral Issues, and Party Affect point to the idea that these domains might have 
differentially impacted young and older Americans in 2012, with Economic Policy and 
Moral Issues having a stronger effect on the vote choice of young people while Party Affect 
had a strong impact on the vote choice of older Americans (and had no statistically 
significant effect on the vote choice of younger Americans) that year. 
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Table 5.5A: Potencies and Absolute Differences, 1996 to 2012 
    2012 2008 2004 2000 1996 
Domain Age Group Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff 
Record and 
Performance 
18-29 3.27  0.00  -0.24  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 2.02 1.25 1.48 1.48 -0.39 0.15 0.00 0.00 3.03 3.03 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29 -2.36  -2.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over -1.36 1.00 -4.08 1.79 -0.13 0.13 0.88 0.88 -1.20 1.20 
Trust 
18-29 3.92  0.00  0.00  0.00  -9.86  
30 and over 2.01 1.92 -0.90 0.90 -2.16 2.16 -2.22 2.22 -10.06 0.20 
Intelligence 
18-29 0.00  4.28  0.00  4.63  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 2.84 1.45 1.77 1.77 1.76 2.87 1.52 1.52 
Personality 
18-29 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 0.49 0.49 -5.07 5.07 0.22 0.22 -0.04 0.04 
Gen. Candidate 
Comments 
18-29 4.40  4.53  2.70  -1.05  0.00  
30 and over 3.10 1.29 2.53 2.01 0.75 1.95 -1.17 0.12 2.09 2.09 
Party Admin. and 
Conduct 
18-29 0.00  1.26  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 1.62 1.62 0.49 0.76 0.00 0.00 -0.30 0.30 -0.42 0.42 
Party Affect 
18-29 0.00  0.00  2.77  5.28  0.00  
30 and over 2.51 2.51 4.15 4.15 0.83 1.94 2.19 3.09 1.88 1.88 
People in the Party 
18-29 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
Foreign Policy 
18-29 1.54  5.12  6.29  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.16 1.38 1.96 3.16 1.95 4.34 -1.70 1.70 0.00 0.00 
Economic Policy 
18-29 4.60  2.42  2.58  0.00  0.59  
30 and over 0.82 3.79 4.26 1.84 1.59 0.99 0.18 0.18 0.98 0.39 
Social Welfare 
18-29 3.26  4.84  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 1.89 1.37 1.63 3.22 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.78 0.78 
Moral Issues 
18-29 3.02  0.07  0.00  0.72  1.89  
30 and over 0.37 2.64 -1.38 1.45 -0.15 0.15 -0.29 1.01 -1.09 2.97 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 1.08 1.08 0.00 0.00 2.02 2.02 0.00 0.00 
Other Domestic 
Issues 
18-29 0.00  3.43  0.00  0.00  3.04  
30 and over 1.26 1.26 0.14 3.29 0.00 0.00 0.47 0.47 0.43 2.61 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29 0.00  2.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 1.02 1.02 1.67 0.38 -0.82 0.82 -1.30 1.30 -0.43 0.43 
Group 
Associations 
18-29 5.77  0.00  9.86  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 5.35 0.42 4.77 4.77 4.66 5.20 5.67 5.67 2.75 2.75 
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Table 5.5B: Potencies and Absolute Differences, 1980 to 1992 
  1992 1988 1984 1980 
Domain Age Group Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff 
Record and 
Performance 
18-29 4.85  0.00  -5.38  1.02  
30 and over 1.14 3.71 0.00 0.00 -3.40 1.98 1.51 0.48 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29 -2.66  -1.94  -1.29  -0.90  
30 and over -2.95 0.29 -2.88 0.94 -1.29 0.00 -1.25 0.34 
Trust 
18-29 0.00  0.00  0.30  0.00  
30 and over -1.31 1.31 0.81 0.81 -0.09 0.39 1.14 1.14 
Intelligence 
18-29 0.00  1.50  -0.64  0.00  
30 and over 1.54 1.54 0.00 1.50 0.01 0.66 0.00 0.00 
Personality 
18-29 -1.98  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 1.98 0.00 0.00 -1.47 1.47 -1.26 1.26 
Gen. Candidate 
Comments 
18-29 0.00  0.21  0.84  0.00  
30 and over 0.88 0.88 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.83 1.20 1.20 
Party Admin. and 
Conduct 
18-29 0.42  0.00  0.19  -0.18  
30 and over -0.19 0.62 -0.80 0.80 -0.66 0.85 -0.50 0.32 
Party Affect 
18-29 0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.31  
30 and over 1.48 1.48 1.80 1.80 2.64 2.64 1.55 1.86 
People in the Party 
18-29 0.00  -0.83  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 -1.03 1.03 0.00 0.00 
Foreign Policy 
18-29 -0.69  -1.48  2.04  -1.39  
30 and over -0.43 0.27 -0.71 0.77 -0.14 2.18 -3.77 2.38 
Economic Policy 
18-29 4.19  -2.81  -3.54  -8.55  
30 and over 4.11 0.08 -1.00 1.80 -2.66 0.89 -3.78 4.77 
Social Welfare 
18-29 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 1.66 1.66 1.38 1.38 0.44 0.44 -0.51 0.51 
Moral Issues 
18-29 2.56  0.00  -1.10  0.00  
30 and over -0.58 3.14 -3.70 3.70 0.00 1.10 0.00 0.00 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29 8.84  0.00  0.00  0.00  
30 and over 2.31 6.53 0.54 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Domestic 
Issues 
18-29 0.00  -3.73  2.38  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 -1.13 2.60 0.85 1.53 0.07 0.07 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29 0.60  -2.25  0.00  0.00  
30 and over -0.50 1.10 -1.55 0.71 -2.06 2.06 -1.24 1.24 
Group 
Associations 
18-29 4.90  5.79  3.60  0.00  




Table 5.5C: Potencies and Absolute Differences, 1972 and 1976 
  1976 1972 
Domain Age Group Potency Abs Diff Potency Abs Diff 
Record and 
Performance 
18-29 0.00  -2.65  
30 and over 1.14 1.14 -3.72 1.07 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29 -2.36  -3.61  
30 and over -2.99 0.62 -2.78 0.83 
Trust 
18-29 -1.02  2.13  
30 and over -1.87 0.85 1.34 0.79 
Intelligence 
18-29 0.00  -5.34  
30 and over -0.27 0.27 -2.94 2.39 
Personality 
18-29 -2.05  -5.54  
30 and over -0.47 1.58 -3.70 1.84 
Gen. Candidate 
Comments 
18-29 1.61  -0.89  
30 and over 0.31 1.30 -4.10 3.20 
Party Admin. and 
Conduct 
18-29 0.00  0.00  
30 and over -0.78 0.78 0.00 0.00 
Party Affect 
18-29 3.39  3.84  
30 and over 3.98 0.59 1.45 2.40 
People in the 
Party 
18-29 0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 -1.62 1.62 
Foreign Policy 
18-29 0.00  -2.28  
30 and over -1.04 1.04 -2.93 0.65 
Economic Policy 
18-29 2.54  0.00  
30 and over 2.58 0.03 0.81 0.81 
Social Welfare 
18-29 1.41  0.00  
30 and over -0.05 1.46 -0.75 0.75 
Moral Issues 
18-29 0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29 0.00  0.00  
30 and over 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Domestic 
Issues 
18-29 0.00  1.59  
30 and over 0.19 0.19 0.00 1.59 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29 0.00  -1.95  
30 and over -0.97 0.97 -3.83 1.88 
Group 
Associations 
18-29 5.75  6.87  
30 and over 5.26 0.49 5.99 0.88 





Looking next at 2008, we see that Foreign Policy, Social Welfare, General 
Candidate Comments, Candidate Intelligence, and Other Domestic Issues had the highest 
potency rates of all the domains among young people, and all favored the Democrats. But 
a glance at the absolute differences shows that the factors that may best explain vote choice 
differences between young and older Americans are Party Affect, Group Associations, 
Foreign Policy, Social Welfare, and other Domestic Issues. But it is apparent from the 
potency rates that the differences in the first two domains, Party Affect and Group 
Associations, stem solely from the potency rates of those over 30 as these two domains had 
no effect on the vote choice of the young that year.  
In 2004, the strongest Democratic potency rates for the young were in Foreign 
Policy and Group Associations. These two domains also had the largest difference scores 
that year, along with candidate Personality. But looking once more at potency for 
Personality, it seems that Personality had no effect on the vote choice of the young, and 
only factored highly in the candidate choice of older individuals. In all, the potency and 
difference rates between young and older Americans do support the idea that divergences 
in Foreign Policy, Economic Policy, and to a lesser extent Moral Issue assessments 
between young and older Americans may have had differential effects on the vote between 
the two age groups in the years that the age gap in vote choice was apparent. 
DISCUSSION 
I use open-ended party and candidate likes/dislikes data in the above analyses, 
which allow me to consider a range of contextual factors and assess their impact on the 
voting behavior of younger versus older individuals. These open-ended responses reflect 




problems that are salient to voters and illustrating differences in assessments of candidate- 
and party-competence in handling those issues.  
The results presented above indicate that Foreign Policy and Economic Policy were 
among the most important factors influencing the candidate preference of young people in 
elections between 2004 and 2012. With the exception of candidate Experience and 
Management, the pro-Democratic valences for all other candidate and issue domains that 
had a statistically significant impact on candidate choice among the young demonstrate 
that the national context and circumstances were incredibly pro-Democratic those years, 
signifying that Democrats either owned or had a temporary lease on these issue areas as 
perceived by young people. In addition, disagreement with the Republican Party on Moral 
Issues provides another potential reason for estrangement from the GOP among 18-29-
year-olds in recent elections. 
The magnitude of the standardized coefficients on candidate and issue domains 
suggest that performance issue assessments, along with candidate factors, may account for 
the age gap in vote choice in the elections from 2004 and 2012 as young both young and 
older people retrospectively assessed Republican performance on these issues and thought 
Democrats could better handle the job. While older Americans have stronger party 
predispositions and party affect that help temper these short-term forces impacting 
candidate choice, young people from 2004 through 2012 lacked the same stabilizing forces 
and were thus more susceptible to the short-term factors. Very salient, critical issues like 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the economic recession moved 18-29-year-olds strongly 
in the direction of the Democrats as they were repelled by Republican Party and its 




which suggests that critical period events like wars and recession shape the attitudes and 
party attachments of cohorts of young voters coming into political age, while the more 
crystallized predispositions of older voters inhibit such strong movement. The elections 
from 2004 to 2012 were prime examples of the behavioral consequences of such attitude 
shifts. However, once these large national problems are resolved, young people once again 





Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The goal of this dissertation was to explain the cause for the age gap in vote choice 
we observed between 2004 and 2012—an unusual phenomenon that had not been present 
in prior decades—to determine when we may see such differences in behavior occur again. 
I posited that young people are more susceptible to the short-term forces affecting 
campaigns and elections—namely national context, issues, and candidates—due to their 
malleable partisan preferences, particularly in times of political turbulence. Older 
Americans, with more crystallized partisan attachments and better-defined political 
predispositions, are not as easily moved by national conditions and the short-term forces 
impacting politics.  
In times of relative political quiescence, young people usually do not pay much 
attention to nor engage much with politics and instead simply exaggerate the tendencies of 
the rest of the electorate, receiving only the “loudest shouts” from the political world. 
However, the prevailing national conditions from 2004 to 2012 made politics salient to 
young people as the problems facing the nation—like the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and 
the economic recession—were problems that directly touched the lives of young people, 
leading to a performance issue-driven shift in attitudes and opinions about candidate and 
party competency in handling the major problems facing the country. The attitudes and 
behavior of older Americans were not as moved by these winds of change due to their more 
deeply-rooted predispositions including party identification. In the future, I expect we 
might see another age gap in vote choice when one party’s competency is questioned on 
the large salient problems facing the nation that directly affect young people, particularly 




that another major war with a large commitment of troop would be a catalyst for young 
people to engage with politics to a greater degree than usual, and that perceptions of party 
competency would influence the voting behavior of young people to a greater degree than 
older Americans. 
REVIEW OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
This dissertation started with an introduction to the puzzling age gap in vote choice 
we observed from 2004 to 2012. I included a literature review in Chapter 2 that discussed 
the theoretical and empirical framework that underpins this research. It first reviewed what 
we know about young people—that they are generally uninterested and uninvolved with 
politics, how they develop their initial political beliefs, and how those processes of 
socialization may be disrupted by large national events in times of political turbulence. I 
then discussed some of the existing theories of vote choice and how they inform our 
understanding of youth voting behavior. I note how most of these theories do include the 
effects of political context on the vote, allowing me to develop my own theory 
incorporating political context to explain the voting behavior of young people from 2004 
to 2012 and why it might differ from that of older adults. 
In Chapter 3, I first examined the conventional wisdom political pundits and 
journalists used to explain the age gap in vote choice—that young people simply liked the 
Democratic Party and its candidates than older people, were identifying more as 
Democrats, and were simply voting based on their party identification. I found that this is 
not the case. Instead, using measures of affective polarization and performing a series of 
difference-of-means tests, I found that affective polarization is more prevalent among older 




parties than their over-30 counterparts both in terms of identification and affect. This is 
consistent with my theory that older people, in the aggregate, have deeper-rooted partisan 
attachments that would render them less susceptible to the short-term forces affecting 
campaigns like the national context, performance issue assessments, and candidate 
qualities than younger Americans.  
These findings provided support for my proposition that long-term factors like party 
identification may factor into the candidate preference decisions of young people as 
frequently as they do for older people, and that short-term forces may matter more in times 
of political turbulence—periods during which we might expect young people to actually 
pay attention to politics. This led me to examine the effects of prospective issue proximities 
on the vote choice of young people relative to older Americans in Chapter 4.  
Given the debate as to whether citizens have polarized on substantive policy issues 
(e.g. Abramowitz 2010, Fiorina et al. 2005), in Chapter 4 I first examine the aggregate 
means for self-placement and candidate placement on a series of 7-point issue scales—
measuring attitudes about government spending and services, defense spending, national 
health insurance, government job guarantees, government aid to blacks, and environmental 
policy vs. jobs—for both 18-29-year-olds and individuals over 30 for every year from 1996 
to 2016. I find that, in the aggregate, 18-29-year-olds are consistently more liberal than 
older adults on all issues for all years under study; however, there not much evidence to 
suggest young people have grown more liberal over time. Both young and older Americans 
do recognize a difference in the candidates’ stands, and these perceptions of where 




I also find that while young people were proximally closer to Democratic 
candidates on most issues in recent elections, it was only on the issue of defense spending 
in 2004 that these issue proximities had a very strong impact on the vote. While other 
prospective issue proximities may have had an effect on candidate choice as well, like 
government job guarantees in 2012, it is unclear whether this was due to projection or if 
young people truly knew where the candidates stood on these issues. Surprisingly, it 
appears that older Americans may be more prone to projection, particularly on low 
salience-issues in low-salience election years. 
Chapter 5 was my capstone chapter, looking at the substantive liberalism of young 
adults rooted in salience. It utilized ANES open-ended party- and candidate likes-dislikes 
data from 1972 to 2012 to identify references to extant circumstances and candidate-and 
party-performance on salient national problems. It incorporated long-term party factors, 
short-term candidate factors, and both prospective and retrospective assessments of 
candidate and party performance on salient issues into a single model of vote choice. While 
these data were pre-coded by the ANES for 1972-2004, I took on the massive task of hand 
coding these open-ended data for 2008 and 2012.  
Using these data had a twofold purpose. First, open-ended responses allow a 
researcher to gain a better understanding as to the relative salience of party, candidate, and 
issue factors in any given election year. Second, these data allow for comparison across 
election years to determine whether salient short-term factors have a greater effect in more 
politically turbulent periods in politics among young people. I measured partisan valences 
on a number of party, candidate, and issue domains and find that from 2004 to 2012, 




areas, particularly on foreign policy and economic issues. Young people held opinions that 
were much more favorable to the Democrats on these issue areas compared to older 
Americans, along with moral issue attitudes. Probit models using individual-level valences 
on these candidate, party, and issue domains demonstrated that among the candidate and 
issue domains were salient to young people from 2004 to 2012, and that party domains 
factored into the vote much more often for older Americans in all years under study, 
lending credence to my theory that their more crystallized partisan ties are a stronger anchor 
when it comes to candidate preference. 
The ANES open-ended responses also allowed me to test the generalizability of my 
theory using the 1972 and 1976 election year data. This period of politics was similarly 
turbulent to the period from 2004 to 2012, with large salient national events like the 
Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal making politics relevant to even the most 
indifferent of young people. I find that, like we see in the Aughts, the short-term factors 
and salient national problems factored into the candidate preference of young people more 
often and at greater magnitudes compared to more quiescent election years, particularly in 
the issue area of foreign policy. 
This dissertation, while furthering our understanding of the conditions under which 
the “normal” pattern of partisan behavior does not hold, provides greater insight into the 
social and psychological processes that produce patterns of generational opinion 
divergence. I offer a theory suggesting that young people are more susceptible to the short-
term forces affecting campaigns and elections—namely national context, issues, and 
candidates—due to their malleable partisan preferences. Older Americans, with more 




easily swayed by national conditions and the short-term forces impacting politics. In fact, 
the affective polarization that has emerged among the masses in recent decades has likely 
further calcified the ability of older voters to react to the news of the day. This is less true 
of younger voters, and is likely a major reason for the age gap in vote choice. While young 
people usually do not pay much attention to nor engage much with politics, prevailing 
national conditions and a turbulent political environment can render politics more salient, 
leading to an issue-driven shift in attitudes and opinions about candidate and party 
competency on handling major problems facing the country. But when the particular issue 
agenda changes, it is not clear how long those behavioral differences will last. 
As Andrew Gelman (2014) and others have noted, where someone ends up on the 
political spectrum depends on where they start, and older Millennials started during a 
period where the political forces of the day were strongly pro-Democratic. Does this mean 
they will always vote for Democrats? Maybe not, because politics can always intervene—
especially when partisanship is rather ephemeral, as it may indeed be with Millennials. But 
is likely that the pro-Democratic flavor that stamped the political proclivities of older 
Millennials will remain with them by affecting their preferences on current issues as they 
grow older. The post-Millennial generation has not experienced the same level of political 
turmoil as they come of political age, and the 2016 results are indicative of a return to the 
equilibrium where young people look like everyone else. It is unlikely that young people, 
even with more liberal attitudes, will burn the party system down in the future because in 
the case of quiescent political times, we should expect them to act on their political 
preferences as they usually do. And that expectation is for them to not to engage with 




AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research along this line will investigate other contextual factors in a 
campaign and their effects on vote choice. Journalists provided plenty of anecdotal 
evidence that Barack Obama won the presidency in 2008 because of his grassroots 
campaigning and contact by the parties and campaign. Young voters are cynical about 
politics, and many feel as if politicians do not pay attention to their needs and desires. 
Direct contact by a party or campaign may do more than mobilize young people to the 
polls—it may also motivate them to pay attention to the candidate whose campaign reached 
out to them. While most research on the effects of campaign contact look at its effects on 
turnout, it is possible that outreach by the parties may also have a persuasive effect on 
young voters due to their relatively malleable partisan attachments. I have panel data with 
subjective party contact questions from the 2008 election as well as objective contact data 
from Republican campaigns in 2012. Future iterations of this project will use these data to 
determine whether campaign contact does indeed impact the vote choice of young voters. 
I also intend to leverage the ANES open-ended questions further by taking a closer 
look at the specific issues within each issue domain, and determine whether specific issue 
assessments have a differential impact on the vote choice of young people compared to 
older individuals. It is possible that within the Economic Policy domain, for example, that 
the tax policies preferred by the parties affect older people to a greater extent given their 
higher tax brackets, while gut-level assessments of economic performance or cost of living 
(e.g. Popkin 1991) might affect individuals with less experience with politics to a greater 
degree. As such, political sophistication may play a role in vote choice and could be 
incorporated into these models. In addition, the current models in Chapter 5 are not set up 




Future iterations of this chapter will include tests to determine whether a domain has 
differential effects for young and older voters within an election year.  
Finally, given the prevalence of election information and “fake news” shared 
through social media in 2016, I would like to perform a social network analysis in the 2020 
election cycle to determine the relevance of the sociological model of voting to young 
people. A number of Pew Reports show that the internet and social media are among the 
primary ways young people receive political news. These new online social networks may 
be replacing water-cooler conversations, and it is likely that most young people have a 
handful of opinion leaders in these social networks. Thus, I would like to investigate the 
impact of social media on the attitude formation of young people, and whether it impacts 









APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 4 
Wording and Coding of Questions 
 
Government Spending and Services 
 
2016, 2012, 2008 (old), 2004, 2000 (ftf), 1996 
 
Some people think the government should provide fewer services even in areas such as 
health and education in order to reduce spending.  Suppose these people are at one end of 
a scale, at point 1.  Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many 
more services even if it means an increase in spending.   Suppose these people are at the 
other end, at point 7.  And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in 
between, at points 2,3,4,5 or 6. 
 
Where would you place yourself (Democratic presidential candidate/Republican 
presidential candidate) on this scale/issue? 
 
1 Government Should Provide Many Fewer Services 
7 Government should provide many more services 
 
 2008 New 
 
Do you think the government should provide more services than it does now, fewer services 
than it does now, or about the same number of services as it does now? 
1= more services, 3= fewer services, 5= about the same services 
 
(If 1 or 3 above) Do you think that the government should provide a lot more/fewer 
services, somewhat more/fewer services, or slightly more/fewer services than it does now? 
1= a lot more, 3= somewhat, 5=slightly 
 
What about Barack Obama/John McCain? 
(Does Barack Obama/John McCain think the government should provide more services 
than it does now, fewer services than it does now, or about the same number of services as 
it does now?) 





(If 1 or 3 above) Does he (Barack Obama/John McCain) think that the government should 
provide a lot more/fewer, somewhat more/fewer services, or slightly more/fewer services 
than it does now? 
1= a lot more, 3= somewhat, 5=slightly 
 
2000 (phone) *Note there is a variable that combines the phone and ftf scales, coding values 
3 4 and 5 on the 7 point ftf scale as 3 on the 5 point phone scale, for all 2000 variables 
 
Should the government reduce/increase services and spending a great deal or 
(reduce/increase services and spending) only some? (1 Reduce spending and services a 
great deal 2 Reduce spending and services only some 3 Stay same as now 4 Increase 




2016, 2012, 2008 (old), 2004, 2000 (ftf), 1996 
 
Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these 
people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that defense spending should be 
greatly increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, 
some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6. 
 
Where would you place yourself (Democratic presidential candidate/Republican 
presidential candidate) on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
1 Govt should decrease defense spending 




Do you think that the government should spend more on national defense, less on national 
defense, or about the same on national defense as it does now? 
1=more, 3=less, 5=about the same 
 
(If 1 or 3 above) Do you think that the government should spend a lot more/less, somewhat 
more/less, or slightly more/less than it does now? 
1= a lot more, 3= somewhat, 5=slightly 
 
What about Barack Obama/John McCain? 
(Does Barack Obama/John McCain think that the government should spend more on 
national defense, less on national defense, or about the same on national defense?) 





(If 1 or 3 above) Does (Barack Obama/John McCain) think that the government spend a 
lot more/less, somewhat more/less, or slightly more/less than it does now? 




5 point-- Do you feel the government should decrease defense spending, increase defense 
spending, or is the government spending on defense about the right amount now? Should 
the government decrease/increase defense spending a lot or a little?  
(1 Decrease defense spending a lot 2 Decrease defense spending a little  3 About the right 
amount 4 Increase defense spending a little 5 Increase defense spending a lot 7 Haven't 
thought much) 
 
Healthcare/Medical Insurance Plan 
 
2016, 2012, 2008 (old), 1996 
 
There is much concern about the rapid rise in medical and hospital costs. Some people feel 
there should be a government insurance plan which would cover all medical and hospital 
expenses for everyone. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others 
feel that all medical expenses should be paid by individuals through private insurance plans 
like Blue Cross or other company paid plans. Suppose these people are at the other end, at 
point 7.  
 
Where would you place yourself (Democratic presidential candidate/Republican 
presidential candidate) on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this? 
 
1 Government Insurance Plan 




Do you Favor, Oppose, or Neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government paying for all 
necessary medical care for all Americans? 
1= Favor, 2= Oppose, 3= Neither favor nor oppose 
 
(If 1 or 2 above) Do you favor/oppose that a great deal, moderately, or a little? 
1= a great deal, 2= moderately, 3= A little 
 




(Does Barack Obama/John McCain favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. 
government paying for all necessary medical care for all Americans?) 
1= Favor, 2= Oppose, 3= Neither favor nor oppose 
 
(If 1 or 2 above) Does (Barack Obama/John McCain) favor/oppose that a great deal, 
moderately, or a little? 
1= A great deal, 2= Moderately, 3= A little 
 
Summary: 
1 Favor a great deal 
7 Oppose a great deal 
 
Government Job Guarantees 
 
 
2016, 2012, 2008 (old), 2004, 2000 (ftf), 1996 
Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a 
job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 
1. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose 
these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other people have 
opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself 
on this scale? 
 
1 Government should see to a job and good standard of living 




Citizens of other countries who have come to live in the United States without the 
permission of the U.S. government are called "illegal immigrants." Do you Favor, Oppose, 
or Neither favor nor oppose allowing illegal immigrants to work in the United States for 
up to three years, after which they would have to go back to their home country? 
 
1= Favor, 2= Oppose, 3= Neither favor nor oppose 
 
(If 1 or 2 above) Do you favor/oppose that a great deal, moderately, or a little? 
1= a great deal, 2= moderately, 3= A little 
 




(Does Barack Obama/John McCain favor, allowing illegal immigrants to work in the 
United States for up to three years, after which they would have to go back to their home 
country?) 
1= Favor, 2= Oppose, 3= Neither favor nor oppose 
 
(If 1 or 2 above) Does (Barack Obama/John McCain) favor/oppose that a great deal, 
moderately, or a little? 
1= A great deal, 2= Moderately, 3= A little 
 
Summary: 
1 Favor a great deal 




Do you feel strongly that the government should see to it that every person has a job and a 
good standard of living, or not so strongly? Do you feel strongly that the government 
should just let        each person get ahead on their own, or not so strongly?  
(1  Strongly - govt see to jobs & std living 2 Not strongly - govt see to jobs & std living 3 
Other/depends/neither 4 Not strongly - govt leave people on own 5 Strongly - govt leave 
people on own) 
 
Aid to Blacks 
 
2016, 2012, 2008, 2004, 2000(ftf), 1996 
 
Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve 
the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, 
at point 1.)  Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help 
blacks because they should help themselves.  
 
Where would you place yourself (Democratic presidential candidate/Republican 
presidential candidate) on this scale? 
 
1 Government should help blacks 




Should the government help blacks to a great extent or only to some extent? Should blacks 




(1. Govt help blacks to great extent 2 Govt help blacks to some extent 3. 
Other/neither/depends 4. Should help themselves to some extent 5. Should help themselves 






Some people think the federal government needs to regulate business to protect the 
environment. They think that efforts to protect the environment will also create jobs. Let 
us say this is point 1 on a 1-7 scale. Others think that the federal government should not 
regulate business to protect the environment. They think this regulation will not do much 
to help the environment and will cost us jobs. Let us say this is point 7 on a 1-7 scale.  And 
of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6. 
 
Where would you place yourself (Democratic presidential candidate/Republican 
presidential candidate) on this scale? 
 
1 Regulate business to protect the environment and create jobs  
7 No regulation because it will not work and will cost jobs 
 
2008 (old), 2004, 2000 (ftf), 1996 
 
Some people think it is important to protect the environment even if it costs some jobs or 
otherwise reduces our standard of living.  (Suppose these people are at one end of the scale,  
at point number 1). Other people think that protecting the environment is not as important 
as maintaining jobs and our standard of living. (Suppose these people are at the other end 
of the scale, at point number 7. And of course, some other people have opinions somewhere 
in  
between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6). 
 
Where would you place yourself (Democratic presidential candidate/Republican 
presidential candidate) on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?    
 
1 Protect environment, even if it costs jobs & standard of living 




Do you FAVOR, OPPOSE, or NEITHER FAVOR NOR OPPOSE the federal government 




plants are allowed to put into the air? Do you favor that A GREAT DEAL, 
MODERATELY, or A LITTLE? / Do you oppose that A GREAT DEAL, 
MODERATELY, or A LITTLE? / 
 
(1 Favor a great deal 2 Favor moderately 3 Favor a little 4 Neither favor nor oppose 5 




Is protecting the environment much more important (than maintaining jobs and standard of 
living) or only somewhat more important? Are maintaining jobs and standard of living 
much more important (than protecting the environment) or only somewhat more important?  
 
(1. Environment much more important 2. Environment somewhat more important 3. 




The 2004 ANES did not ask respondents if they identified as a Born-Again Christian. As 
a proxy, respondents answering 1 to the following question were coded as 
Evangelical/Born-Again Christians, all else coded as 0. 
 
Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible? You 
can just give me the number of your choice. 
 
1. The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word.   
2. The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for 
word.   
3. The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God.   
7. Other (SPECIFY) {VOL}   
8. Don't know   






Table 4.1A: Average 7-point Scale placement, by Issue and by Year (combined results) 
    2016   2012  2008   2004  2000  1996  
    Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep Self Dem Rep 
Spending & 
Services 
Young  3.87 2.99 4.9 3.92 2.98 4.8 3.48 2.95 4.02 3.25 3.24 4.4 2.61 2.55 3.15 4.01 3.35 4.72 
(s.e.) (.15) (.14) (.16) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.1) (.09) (.11) (.1) (.13) (.07) (.07) (.07) (.11) (.11) (.1) 
 Older 3.9 2.65 4.94 4.19 2.61 5.09 3.69 2.82 4.35 3.66 3.02 4.52 2.77 2.3 3.24 4.12 3.09 4.76 
  (s.e.) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.06) (.06 (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) 
Defense 
Spending 
Young 4.01 3.8 5.36 4.05 3.94 4.7 3.69 3.5 5.12 4.22 3.93 5.61 3.06 3.05 3.41 3.84 3.96 4.39 
(s.e.) (.15) (.15) (.13) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.1) (.09) (.08) (.11) (.11) (.1) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.1) (.11) (.08) 
 Older 4.64 3.77 5.23 4.28 3.63 4.7 4.09 3.3 5.21 4.61 3.54 5.66 3.4 2.99 3.57 4.12 3.98 4.53 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.05) (.04) 
Health 
Insurance 
Young 3.78 3 5.67 3.68 2.6 5.28 3.18 2.68 5.01     --      --      --      --      --      --  3.77 2.99 4.98 
(s.e.) (.18) (.14) (.13) (.13) (.12) (.10) (.13) (.09) (.09)     --      --      --      --      --      --  (.13) (.12) (.09) 
 Older 4 2.75 5.42 4.11 2.44 5.31 3.73 2.7 5.02     --      --      --      --      --      --  4.0 2.94 4.89 
  (s.e.) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.05)     --      --      --      --      --      --  (.05) (.05) (.04) 
Job 
Guarantees 
Young 3.91 3.28 5.52 3.88 3.06 5.19 3.67 3.31 4.63 3.71 3.42 4.88 3.29 2.75 3.24 4.18 3.46 4.89 
(s.e.) (.15) (.15) (.15) (.1) (.11) (.09) (.11) (.09) (.1) (.13) (.10) (.11) (.09) (.08) (.09) (.13) (.1) (.09) 
 Older 4.34 3.03 5.62 4.47 2.94 5.49 4.14 3.18 4.55 4.34 3.28 5.11 3.43 2.65 3.59 4.48 3.32 4.93 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.05) (.05) (.04) 
Aid to 
Blacks 
Young 3.89 3.33 5.56 4.29 3 5.03 4.41 2.91 4.69 4.13 3.54 4.71 3.23 2.77 3.36 4.66 3.44 4.76 
(s.e.) (.17) (.13) (.16) (.11) (.07) (.09) (.10) (.08) (.09) (.14) (.08) (.1) (.09) (.07) (.07) (.13) (.1) (.09) 
 Older 4.38 2.94 5.5 4.89 3.16 5.2 4.78 3.17 4.82 4.65 3.48 4.78 3.44 2.59 3.33 4.82 3.41 4.82 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.04) 
Enviro/ 
Jobs 
Young 3.16 3.12 5.06 2.93 2.85 4.77 3.07 3.21 4.12 3.47 4.33 4.36 2.74 2.76 3.16 3.33 3.63 4.49 
(s.e.) (.16) (.14) (.17) (.1) (.1) (.09) (.11) (.09) (.08) (.12) (.1) (.11) (.08) (.07) (.08) (.1) (.1) (.09) 
 Older 3.24 2.71 5.18 3.33 2.76 4.76 3.42 3.33 3.99 3.75 4.11 4.17 2.61 2.43 3.21 3.67 3.52 4.39 
  (s.e.) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.05) (.04) (.04) 
Note: Standard errors are reported below the means. “Dem”= Democratic candidate placement, “Rep”= Republican candidate placement, and “Self”= self-





Table 4.1B: 2008 and 2000 Average 7-point scale placement, by version 
   2008 Old Version 2008 New Version 2000 Face to Face 2000 Phone 
    Self Dem  Rep  Self Dem  Rep  Self Dem  Rep  Self Dem  Rep  
Spend 
Services 
Young  3.6 2.92 4.13 3.37 2.98 3.92 3.33 3.46 4.18 2.46 2.31 3.24 
(s.e.) (.13) (.11) (.14) (.16) (.17) (.11) (.13) (.13) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.13) 
 Older 3.72 2.75 4.42 3.66 2.9 4.27 3.68 2.93 4.32 2.7 2.1 3.41 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) 
Defense 
Spending 
Young 3.77 3.74 5.34 3.61 3.26 4.91 4.18 4.05 4.6 3.14 3.18 3.71 
(s.e.) (.12) (.12) (.11) (.14) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.09) (.1) (.13) (.11) (.11) 
 Older 4.31 3.43 5.36 3.86 3.17 5.07 4.66 4.07 4.89 3.53 2.96 3.77 
  (s.e.) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.04) (.05) 
Health 
Insurance 
Young 3.34 2.98 5.11 3.02 2.38 4.92     --      --      --      --      --      --  
(s.e.) (.15) (.12) (.13) (.21) (.12) (.13)     --      --      --      --      --      --  
 Older 3.76 2.93 5.01 3.71 2.47 5.02     --      --      --      --      --      --  
  (s.e.) (.08) (.07) (.06) (.11) (.07) (.07)     --      --      --      --      --      --  
Job 
Guarantees 
Young 3.86 3.26 4.87 3.49 3.36 4.4 4.21 3.78 4.31 3.55 2.52 3.36 
(s.e.) (.13) (.11) (.11) (.18) (.13) (.14) (.15) (.12) (.13) (.18) (.17) (.18) 
 Older 4.39 3.1 5.1 3.88 3.25 4 4.58 3.69 4.75 3.62 2.37 3.87 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.1) (.06) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06) 
Aid to Blacks 
Young 4.22 2.77 4.75 4.6 3.04 4.63 4.38 3.79 4.46 3.28 2.53 3.52 
(s.e.) (.15) (.116 (.12) (.14) (.12) (.13) (.17) (.12) (.11) (.14) (.13) (.13) 
 Older 4.77 3.03 4.94 4.79 3.3 4.71 4.81 3.49 4.6 3.43 2.39 3.41 
  (s.e.) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.07) (.08) (.06) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.05) 
Environment 
Young 3.68 3.72 4.51 2.48 2.72 3.73 3.74 3.61 4.23 2.62 2.68 3.32 
(s.e.) (.12) (.107 (.11) (.15) (.13) (.11) (.14) (.12) (.11) (.15) (.13) (.16) 
 Older 4.09 3.74 4.41 2.74 2.92 3.54 3.66 3.36 4.54 2.4 2.16 3.21 
  (s.e.) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.08) (.07) (.07) (.06) (.06) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06) 
Note: Standard errors are reported below the means. “Dem”= Democratic candidate placement, “Rep”= Republican candidate placement, and  





Table 4.2A: Model 1- Determinants of Candidate Preference (Probit) Combined Results 
  2016 2012 2008 (Combined) 2004 2000 (Combined) 1996 
Independent Variables Young Older Young Older Young Older Young Older Young  Older Young Older 
Party Identification .49** .34*** .56*** .321*** .5*** .38*** .58*** .43*** .47*** .45*** .67**  .41*** 
  (.17) (.06) (.21) (.05) (.08) (-.04) (.12) (.05) (.10) (.04) (.22) (.04)  
Female .82 .21 -.3 .07 -.06 .04 -.39 -.11 .56* .08 .05  .13 
  (.55) (.21) (.27) (.16) (.26) (.13) (.36) (.15) (.28) (.13) (.44)  (.14) 
Black 1.52* .81 .43 1.03* (omitted) 1.68*** 3.1*** .29 .6 1.6*** 2.9**  1.4*** 
  (.67) (.48) (.44) (.47)  (.35) (.68) (.23) (.44) (.27) (1.1) (.37)  
Latino -.4 .51 .10 .65*** .11 .49*** -.22 .01 -.1 .32 1.6*  .1 
  (.58) (.32) (.37) (.18) (.28) (.14) (.63) (.46) (.38) (.3) (.76) (.24)  
Union Household -.9 -.06 .49 -.24 -1.08* -.12 .73* .6** .23 .09 1.7*  .11 
 (1.04) (.25) (.47) (.22) (.44) (.2) (.35) (.19) (.45) (.18) (.74) (.19) 
 Evangelical -.78 -.12 -.48 -.33* -.68* -.44*** -.43 -.13 -.55 -.3* -.84  -.03 
 (.66) (.25) (-.48) (.17) (.31) (.13) (.41) (.16) (.29) (.13) (.46) (.15) 
Spending -- .13*  .09  .08  .09  .08  .18  .17***  .34**  .23***  .27  .18*** 
  -- (.06) (.1) (.05) (.07) (.04) (.11) (.05) (.13) (.06) (.23) (.05)  
Job Guarantees .48*** .19** .21* .07 -0.07 .03 .12 .17*** .18 .17*** .11  .19*** 
  (.14) (.07) (.09) (.05) (.07) (.03) (.11) (.05) (.11) (.05) (.15) (.05)  
Environment .33* .24***  .20*  .14*  .29*  .11*  .18*  .03  .11  .18** .3  .16** 
 (.13) (.06) (.1) (.05) (.12) (.05) (.09) (.04) (.12) (.06) (.17) (.06)  
Healthcare/Insurance .03 .12** .11 .11** .09 .11*** -- -- -- -- .22  .17*** 
  (.08) (.05) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.03) -- -- -- -- (.14) (.04) 
Aid to Blacks .36* .08 .06 .08 .18* .19*** .13 .10 .13 .12 .69**  .22*** 
  (.16) (.06) (.11) (.04) (.07) (.03) (.17) (.06) (.12) (.07) (.26) (.06)  
Defense .14 .27*** -.07 .23*** .13 .14*** .45*** .19*** -.07 .28*** .16  .12* 
  (.13) (.08) (.11) (.06) (.12) (.04) (.11) (.05) (.14) (.07) (.19) (.05)  
Constant -2.6*** -1.8*** -1.6** -1.1*** -.62* -.86*** -1.6*** -1.5*** -1.7*** -1.4*** -.88  -.67*** 
  (.76) (.32) (.51) (.26) (.29) (.18) (.36) (.19) (.4) (.15) (.64) (.17)  
Pseudo R2 .73 .76 0.63 0.66 .61 .62 .68 .62 .39 .57 .76  .68 
N 116 688 350  1308  251  1539  180  799  184  1159  160  1125 
Note:*p<= .05; **p<= .01; ***p<= .001; the “black” variable was omitted from the 2008 young analysis due to perfect separation. 
The healthcare/insurance question was not asked at all in 2000, and candidate placement was not asked in 2004. Spending and services for the young was omitted 




Table 4.2B: Model 1 - Determinants of Candidate Preference for 2008 and 2000, by Version Type 
   2008     2000   
 18-29-year-olds 30 Years and Older 18-29-year-olds 30 Years and Older 
Independent 
Variables 
Old New  Both Old New  Both FTF Phone Both FTF Phone Both 
Party Identification .63*** .82*** .59*** .46*** .53*** .48*** .59*** .50*** .48*** .51*** .56*** .53*** 
  (.16) (.13) (.09) (.05) (.05) (.03) (.16) (.14) (.10) (.05) (.05) (.03) 
Female .03 .1 -.07 -.09 -.14 -.11 .23 .46 .32 .22 -.19 .08 
  (.37) (.38) (.25) (.18) (.17) (.12) (.34) (.45) (.27) (.16) (.19) (.12) 
Black omitted omitted omitted 2.87*** 1.57*** 1.95*** omitted .52 .83 1.38*** 1.23*** 1.32*** 
  -- -- -- (.58) (.42) (.37) -- (.74) (.46) (.3) (.31) (.23) 
Latino .35 -.69 -.10 .44* .32 .41** -.22 -.1 -.22 .26 -.03 .19 
  (.49) (.43) (.31) (.2) (.2) (.14) (.51) (.58) (.42) (.3) (.48) (.26) 
Union Household -1.76** -.62 -.95* .02 -.27 -.13 .21 .10 .02 .1 -.08 .01 
 (.61) (.55) (.44) (.22) (.28) (.19) (.58) (.78) (.42) (.22) (.27) (.17) 
 Evangelical -.67 -.94** -.75** -.72*** -.19 -.49*** -.45 -.98 -.62* -.35* -.27 -.33* 
 (.39) (.36) (.29) (.17) (.17) (.12) (.35) (.55) (.29) (.17) (.2) (.13) 
Spending  0  .37  .03 .15* .05  .08  .15  .19  .16 .03 .22*  .14 
  (.14) (.21) (.12) (.07) (.08) (.05) (.17) (.19) (.19) (.08) (.09) (.09) 
Job Guarantees -.08 .05 -0.03 -.06 .08* .05 -.01 .1 .03 .06 .11 .12 
  (.18) (.1) (.12) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.25) (.16) (.21) (.11) (.09) (.10) 
Environment  .66*  -.05  .26 .24 .09*  .22**  .33  -.34  -.13 .22* -.03  .15 
 (.25) (.12) (.17) (.16) (.04) (.08) (.28) (.24) (.24) (.1) (.12) (.11) 
Healthcare/Insurance .33* -.04 .14* .06 .09** .08* -- -- -- -- -- -- 
  (.15) (.07) (.07) (.05) (.03) (.03) -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Aid to Blacks .16 .33* .31** .16* .09 .14** -.25 .26 .21 -.02 .26 .22 
  (.15) (.13) (.11) (.07) (.06) (.05) (.27) (.27) (.28) (.12) (.13) (.14) 
Defense .23 .59* .22* .12 .17 .10* -.3 .03 .07 .3** .22 .24* 
  (.15) (.31) (.11) (.06) (.11) (.04) (.23) (.32) (.3) (.1) (.12) (.12) 
Constant -1.08* -1.17** -.8* -1.11*** -1.5*** -1.15*** -2.06*** -1.6* -1.56*** -1.8*** -1.51*** -1.69*** 
  (.53) (.43) (.32) (.25) (.2) (.16) (.65) (.69) (.4) (.21) (.05) (.14) 
Pseudo R2 .56 .67 .57 .53 .57 .54 .32 .33 .33 .48 .55 .5 
N  116  135  251 761 778  1539  87  78  184 635 523  1159 




APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 5 
Domain Recoding Scheme  
(based on the 2004 ANES Codebook) 
 
People in the Party 
 
1 through 97 
 
Party Administration and Conduct 
 
121 122 131 132 133 134 135 141 151 161 162 163 164 165 166 169 170 171 172 173 174 
191 197 502 503 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 
618 619 620 621 622 623 625 626 627 697 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 718 719 720 
721 722 729 730 731 732 734 735 739 740 741 742 744 796 797 802 803 804 807 808 811 




101 102 111 112 167 168 500 501 701 702 711 723 728 
 
Record and Performance 
 
213 214 222 223 224 225 321 322 329 330 331 332 407 408 409 410 439 440 456 465 469 
498 505 553 554 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 621 622 623 625 705 706 709 710 730 
740 744 804  
 
Experience and Management 
 
203 211 212 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 305 306 311 312 313 314 315 316 323 324 327 








309 310 319 320 325 326 333 334 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 441 442 447 








301 302 303 304 307 308 317 318 405 406 411 412 423 424 433 434 435 436 437 438 453 
454 457 459 460 470 490 491 495 496 497 807 808 829 830 831 832 837 838 
 
General Candidate Comments  
 
201 297 425 426 427 428 429 430 443 444 445 446 448 449 450 451 452 455 458 461 462 
463 466 467 468 471 472 506 507 508 531 532 533 534 543 555 556 597 615 616 619 620 
626 627 701 702 703 704 711 718 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 732 739 743 796 797 802 




513 514 519 520 871 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 
1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 
1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 
1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 
1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 
1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 




901 902 903 904 911 912 913 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 




805 806 809 810 905 906 907 908 909 910 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 
925 926 927 928 965 966 967 991 992 993 994 995 996 998 1001 1002 1003 1038 1039 




847 848 849 979 980 981 985 986 987 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1065 1066 1067 






Energy and the Environment 
 
959 960 961 962 963 964 1004 1005 1006 1062 1063 1064 
 
 
Other Domestic Issues 
 
511 512 517 518 827 828 870 900 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 
968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 982 983 984 988 989 990 997 1013 1014 
1015 1016 1017 1018 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1047 
1048 1049 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058  1302 1303 1304 
 
General Issue Comments 
 
509 510 515 516 544 801 815 816 817 818 1010 1011 1012 1031 1032 1033 1050 1051 




819 820 821 822 823 824 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 
1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 
1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 




















18-29  11 21 80 29 141 21.63 
30 and over   60 102 330 161 653 16.16 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  43 32 17 31 123 -10.16 
30 and over   227 173 83 156 639 -9.94 
Trust 
18-29  0 30 8 13 51 24.51 
30 and over   50 193 107 77 427 20.26 
Intelligence 
18-29  6 26 27 4 63 34.13 
30 and over   28 99 140 20 287 33.28 
Personality 
18-29  9 36 21 10 76 25.00 
30 and over   64 162 135 50 411 22.26 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  26 40 81 19 166 22.89 
30 and over   120 207 321 117 765 19.02 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  95 185 234 106 620 17.58 
30 and over   549 936 1116 581 3182 14.49 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  40 83 95 65 283 12.90 
30 and over   234 453 467 353 1507 11.05 
Party Affect 
18-29  11 35 19 10 75 22.00 
30 and over   52 133 107 43 335 21.64 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  5 9 12 8 34 11.76 
30 and over   36 61 69 44 210 11.90 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  56 127 126 83 392 14.54 
30 and over   322 647 643 440 2052 12.87 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  25 24 51 32 132 6.82 
30 and over   103 113 155 153 524 1.15 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  59 105 93 49 306 14.71 
30 and over   291 285 302 204 1082 4.25 
Social Welfare 
18-29  39 70 152 79 340 15.29 
30 and over   174 289 452 309 1224 10.54 
Moral Issues 
18-29  36 80 65 38 219 16.21 
30 and over   130 179 128 151 588 2.21 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  2 4 9 3 18 22.22 
30 and over   9 13 32 15 69 15.22 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  11 47 32 10 100 29.00 
30 and over   50 119 113 52 334 19.46 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  48 57 45 27 177 7.63 
30 and over   183 235 168 136 722 5.82 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  220 387 447 238 1292 14.55 
30 and over   940 1233 1350 1020 4543 6.86 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  14 102 116 10 242 40.08 
30 and over   77 476 448 62 1063 36.92 




















18-29  12 24 45 9 90 26.67 
30 and over   98 119 200 68 485 15.77 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  57 37 26 44 164 -11.59 
30 and over   444 211 133 284 1072 -17.91 
Trust 
18-29  5 8 10 11 34 2.94 
30 and over   73 61 68 117 319 -9.56 
Intelligence 
18-29  8 7 52 11 78 25.64 
30 and over   67 100 273 46 486 26.75 
Personality 
18-29  7 6 17 17 47 -1.06 
30 and over   55 66 115 84 320 6.56 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  18 43 97 35 193 22.54 
30 and over   139 275 466 273 1153 14.27 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  73 101 179 92 445 12.92 
30 and over   599 628 834 614 2675 4.65 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  33 67 64 60 224 8.48 
30 and over   225 422 456 446 1549 6.68 
Party Affect 
18-29  20 40 33 11 104 20.19 
30 and over   128 211 218 51 608 20.56 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  11 44 12 5 72 27.78 
30 and over   72 234 79 70 455 18.79 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  55 122 96 69 342 13.74 
30 and over   374 715 641 525 2255 10.13 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  30 68 53 23 174 19.54 
30 and over   155 263 165 77 660 14.85 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  35 56 72 28 191 17.02 
30 and over   143 311 296 138 888 18.36 
Social Welfare 
18-29  21 30 82 29 162 19.14 
30 and over   108 134 348 151 741 15.05 
Moral Issues 
18-29  28 40 25 36 129 0.39 
30 and over   141 131 52 135 459 -10.13 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  6 16 30 3 55 33.64 
30 and over   38 60 70 27 195 16.67 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  11 15 29 9 64 18.75 
30 and over   51 37 73 48 209 2.63 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  35 51 60 26 172 14.53 
30 and over   199 263 277 169 908 9.47 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  166 276 351 154 947 16.21 
30 and over   835 1199 1281 745 4060 11.08 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  10 50 71 9 140 36.43 
30 and over   73 376 456 48 953 37.30 




















18-29  24 31 17 28 100 -2.00 
30 and over   103 97 83 98 381 -2.76 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  9 19 16 36 80 -6.25 
30 and over   64 96 100 147 407 -1.84 
Trust 
18-29  17 9 3 24 53 -27.36 
30 and over   126 100 53 100 379 -9.63 
Intelligence 
18-29  8 24 13 12 57 14.91 
30 and over   32 77 72 39 220 17.73 
Personality 
18-29  26 9 3 41 79 -34.81 
30 and over   169 59 34 203 465 -30.00 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  18 25 49 19 111 16.67 
30 and over   111 98 156 110 475 3.47 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  70 85 70 91 316 -0.95 
30 and over   401 340 314 421 1476 -5.69 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  32 34 37 61 164 -6.71 
30 and over   199 227 195 271 892 -2.69 
Party Affect 
18-29  9 10 17 5 41 15.85 
30 and over   60 43 108 48 259 8.30 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  5 9 13 5 32 18.75 
30 and over   42 18 35 46 141 -12.41 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  39 50 62 66 217 1.61 
30 and over   265 262 281 316 1124 -1.69 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  49 109 42 32 232 15.09 
30 and over   239 365 128 113 845 8.34 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  29 39 36 18 122 11.48 
30 and over   137 174 124 79 514 7.98 
Social Welfare 
18-29  13 23 33 14 83 17.47 
30 and over   78 87 134 104 403 4.84 
Moral Issues 
18-29  18 36 24 17 95 13.16 
30 and over   85 93 57 75 310 -1.61 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  2 16 16 3 37 36.49 
30 and over   2 27 30 2 61 43.44 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  10 27 31 7 75 27.33 
30 and over   36 87 103 51 277 18.59 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  16 22 26 23 87 5.17 
30 and over   109 72 97 139 417 -9.47 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  87 146 113 78 424 11.08 
30 and over   438 533 375 337 1683 3.95 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  7 44 50 9 110 35.45 
30 and over   59 270 278 53 660 33.03 




















18-29  13 19 19 23 74 1.35 
30 and over   85 115 116 130 446 1.79 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  12 22 30 18 82 13.41 
30 and over   134 200 223 149 706 9.92 
Trust 
18-29  14 20 3 27 64 -14.06 
30 and over   166 117 101 261 645 -16.20 
Intelligence 
18-29  11 19 14 8 52 13.46 
30 and over   66 140 104 59 369 16.12 
Personality 
18-29  21 7 15 20 63 -15.08 
30 and over   86 79 117 90 372 2.69 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  32 25 38 40 135 -3.33 
30 and over   256 173 197 249 875 -7.71 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  71 71 81 92 315 -1.75 
30 and over   495 523 511 574 2103 -0.83 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  32 37 49 42 160 3.75 
30 and over   289 326 274 382 1271 -2.79 
Party Affect 
18-29  17 16 22 7 62 11.29 
30 and over   126 128 162 68 484 9.92 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  7 2 9 11 29 -12.07 
30 and over   56 55 63 77 251 -2.99 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  48 52 71 52 223 5.16 
30 and over   405 439 433 470 1747 -0.09 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  13 7 6 15 41 -18.29 
30 and over   109 57 39 74 279 -15.59 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  30 27 29 12 98 7.14 
30 and over   240 180 183 111 714 0.84 
Social Welfare 
18-29  33 34 68 26 161 13.35 
30 and over   317 179 399 242 1137 0.84 
Moral Issues 
18-29  29 27 25 19 100 2.00 
30 and over   144 143 112 133 532 -2.07 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  3 14 20 8 45 25.56 
30 and over   20 56 132 65 273 18.86 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  33 43 34 28 138 5.80 
30 and over   196 196 194 148 734 3.13 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  24 34 30 24 112 7.14 
30 and over   222 95 116 146 579 -13.56 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  97 117 122 87 423 6.50 
30 and over   661 550 700 550 2461 0.79 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  12 63 64 12 151 34.11 
30 and over   128 404 449 104 1085 28.62 






Table 5.10: Object and Domain Frequencies and Valences, 1996 
Object or 
Domain 










18-29  9 19 43 27 98 13.27 
30 and over   97 182 298 149 726 16.12 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  24 18 20 21 83 -4.22 
30 and over   306 172 148 174 800 -10.00 
Trust 
18-29  19 13 7 60 99 -29.80 
30 and over   234 57 50 481 822 -36.98 
Intelligence 
18-29  3 24 12 3 42 35.71 
30 and over   45 112 95 23 275 25.27 
Personality 
18-29  5 18 14 15 52 11.54 
30 and over   57 97 87 133 374 -0.80 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  18 47 38 16 119 21.43 
30 and over   177 378 227 171 953 13.48 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  54 89 91 90 324 5.56 
30 and over   527 657 596 694 2474 0.65 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  15 19 14 14 62 3.23 
30 and over   145 159 119 186 609 -4.35 
Party Affect 
18-29  15 13 13 2 43 10.47 
30 and over   91 77 95 28 291 9.11 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  1 5 3 2 11 22.73 
30 and over   18 28 20 20 86 5.81 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  29 33 25 17 104 5.77 
30 and over   219 237 212 214 882 0.91 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  8 5 11 18 42 -11.90 
30 and over   49 26 94 98 267 -5.06 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  30 21 30 15 96 3.13 
30 and over   167 169 196 110 642 6.85 
Social Welfare 
18-29  14 32 64 21 131 23.28 
30 and over   171 155 303 180 809 6.61 
Moral Issues 
18-29  17 30 31 29 107 7.01 
30 and over   104 126 89 160 479 -5.11 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  0 5 8 3 16 31.25 
30 and over   3 28 61 10 102 37.25 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  10 18 34 23 85 11.18 
30 and over   68 82 164 118 432 6.94 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  17 24 17 12 70 8.57 
30 and over   180 158 125 127 590 -2.03 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  61 85 115 83 344 8.14 
30 and over   450 463 593 493 1999 2.83 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  6 36 40 9 91 33.52 
30 and over   60 264 277 68 669 30.87 





Table 5.11: Object and Domain Frequencies and Valences, 1992 
Object or 
Domain 










18-29  45 111 35 41 232 12.93 
30 and over   229 469 155 164 1017 11.36 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  70 43 52 113 278 -15.83 
30 and over   352 224 222 495 1293 -15.51 
Trust 
18-29  11 24 13 44 92 -9.78 
30 and over   131 166 67 229 593 -10.71 
Intelligence 
18-29  11 29 44 10 94 27.66 
30 and over   86 111 230 92 519 15.70 
Personality 
18-29  25 14 22 36 97 -12.89 
30 and over   155 95 105 150 505 -10.40 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  34 28 85 34 181 12.43 
30 and over   273 145 526 215 1159 7.89 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  134 188 166 190 678 2.21 
30 and over   759 850 837 877 3323 0.77 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  44 73 69 83 269 2.79 
30 and over   293 424 341 543 1601 -2.22 
Party Affect 
18-29  13 7 22 14 56 1.79 
30 and over   105 88 182 57 432 12.50 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  20 16 9 14 59 -7.63 
30 and over   57 72 65 66 260 2.69 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  71 92 93 102 358 1.68 
30 and over   407 530 505 612 2054 0.39 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  120 89 24 25 258 -6.20 
30 and over   457 412 69 74 1012 -2.47 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  46 168 103 66 383 20.76 
30 and over   218 741 452 272 1683 20.89 
Social Welfare 
18-29  28 63 102 39 232 21.12 
30 and over   151 286 408 242 1087 13.85 
Moral Issues 
18-29  43 60 49 30 182 9.89 
30 and over   215 213 131 163 722 -2.35 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  2 17 20 3 42 38.10 
30 and over   13 73 60 16 162 32.10 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  21 47 37 17 122 18.85 
30 and over   65 221 143 58 487 24.74 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  28 28 39 31 126 3.17 
30 and over   158 99 186 162 605 -2.89 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  185 273 209 135 802 10.10 
30 and over   820 1146 862 625 3453 8.15 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  23 111 99 30 263 29.85 
30 and over   122 619 635 119 1495 33.88 




















18-29  16 28 19 20 83 6.63 
30 and over   80 148 94 105 427 6.67 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  92 57 38 57 244 -11.07 
30 and over   456 229 166 313 1164 -16.07 
Trust 
18-29  13 26 8 16 63 3.97 
30 and over   60 87 79 54 280 9.29 
Intelligence 
18-29  15 29 20 15 79 12.03 
30 and over   71 82 102 57 312 8.97 
Personality 
18-29  16 19 27 21 83 5.42 
30 and over   105 123 94 105 427 0.82 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  36 21 52 33 142 1.41 
30 and over   148 155 181 156 640 2.50 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  142 121 120 113 496 -1.41 
30 and over   623 559 464 572 2218 -3.88 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  52 42 55 58 207 -3.14 
30 and over   275 249 215 365 1104 -7.97 
Party Affect 
18-29  27 21 45 16 109 10.55 
30 and over   140 100 213 64 517 10.54 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  12 9 10 10 41 -3.66 
30 and over   75 44 46 54 219 -8.90 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  83 69 94 77 323 0.46 
30 and over   412 357 417 439 1625 -2.37 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  98 90 36 53 277 -4.51 
30 and over   303 311 102 173 889 -3.54 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  86 47 55 63 251 -9.36 
30 and over   321 200 205 194 920 -5.98 
Social Welfare 
18-29  30 47 74 46 197 11.42 
30 and over   153 173 366 244 936 7.59 
Moral Issues 
18-29  29 20 14 40 103 -16.99 
30 and over   134 60 44 139 377 -22.41 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  1 16 16 16 49 15.31 
30 and over   9 34 39 38 120 10.83 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  29 19 30 76 154 -18.18 
30 and over   117 106 129 276 628 -12.58 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  53 16 25 31 125 -17.20 
30 and over   248 117 118 183 666 -14.71 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  191 158 140 185 674 -5.79 
30 and over   675 616 596 684 2571 -2.86 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  21 77 106 27 231 29.22 
30 and over   90 412 557 112 1171 32.75 




















18-29  110 29 26 53 218 -24.77 
30 and over   340 129 115 185 769 -18.27 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  59 43 49 83 234 -10.68 
30 and over   182 145 159 296 782 -11.13 
Trust 
18-29  21 25 29 27 102 2.94 
30 and over   120 81 113 81 395 -0.89 
Intelligence 
18-29  20 17 24 28 89 -3.93 
30 and over   69 76 70 76 291 0.17 
Personality 
18-29  62 16 20 44 142 -24.65 
30 and over   180 52 55 148 435 -25.40 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  44 68 92 77 281 6.94 
30 and over   185 234 250 298 967 0.05 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  217 148 168 213 746 -7.64 
30 and over   672 529 513 724 2438 -7.26 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  80 71 108 87 346 1.73 
30 and over   286 196 296 334 1112 -5.76 
Party Affect 
18-29  13 7 51 11 82 20.73 
30 and over   74 59 195 37 365 19.59 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  30 16 13 23 82 -14.63 
30 and over   105 41 78 99 323 -13.16 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  107 92 148 110 457 2.52 
30 and over   415 269 485 426 1595 -2.73 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  125 171 80 66 442 6.79 
30 and over   378 386 183 209 1156 -0.78 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  166 103 71 87 427 -9.25 
30 and over   474 302 204 243 1223 -8.63 
Social Welfare 
18-29  57 95 54 38 244 11.07 
30 and over   238 364 205 232 1039 4.76 
Moral Issues 
18-29  37 32 21 36 126 -7.94 
30 and over   90 106 38 72 306 -2.94 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  1 10 11 1 23 41.30 
30 and over   4 39 22 1 66 42.42 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  22 30 37 15 104 14.42 
30 and over   63 93 74 43 273 11.17 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  38 19 31 34 122 -9.02 
30 and over   221 59 92 158 530 -21.51 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  246 285 190 174 895 3.07 
30 and over   784 832 527 575 2718 0.00 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  24 124 133 32 313 32.11 
30 and over   103 524 543 103 1273 33.82 




















18-29  19 67 80 89 255 7.65 
30 and over   73 188 236 227 724 8.56 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  66 38 59 45 208 -3.37 
30 and over   241 142 128 141 652 -8.59 
Trust 
18-29  6 21 38 12 77 26.62 
30 and over   57 47 155 65 324 12.35 
Intelligence 
18-29  9 40 21 12 82 24.39 
30 and over   40 133 65 45 283 19.96 
Personality 
18-29  22 18 25 45 110 -10.91 
30 and over   71 55 98 150 374 -9.09 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  38 68 57 39 202 11.88 
30 and over   145 247 198 130 720 11.81 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  123 181 193 184 681 4.92 
30 and over   440 548 554 513 2055 3.63 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  31 51 42 66 190 -1.05 
30 and over   121 145 156 253 675 -5.41 
Party Affect 
18-29  22 7 21 8 58 -1.72 
30 and over   68 56 114 22 260 15.38 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  6 18 10 15 49 7.14 
30 and over   43 47 61 56 207 2.17 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  54 71 61 85 271 -1.29 
30 and over   219 226 283 301 1029 -0.53 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  70 120 80 168 438 -4.34 
30 and over   159 157 156 365 837 -12.60 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  86 33 17 121 257 -30.54 
30 and over   191 93 111 263 658 -19.00 
Social Welfare 
18-29  24 22 28 29 103 -1.46 
30 and over   72 71 96 126 365 -4.25 
Moral Issues 
18-29  11 20 5 7 43 8.14 
30 and over   25 29 3 17 74 -6.76 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  6 14 8 10 38 7.89 
30 and over   7 11 12 32 62 -12.90 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  16 36 25 27 104 8.65 
30 and over   32 63 50 78 223 0.67 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  42 24 27 29 122 -8.20 
30 and over   131 74 63 87 355 -11.41 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  167 179 137 251 734 -6.95 
30 and over   395 350 353 579 1677 -8.08 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  22 71 71 22 186 26.34 
30 and over   58 286 367 79 790 32.66 




















18-29  49 103 75 57 284 12.68 
30 and over   199 260 187 158 804 5.60 
Experience and 
Management 
18-29  177 123 51 75 426 -9.15 
30 and over   506 283 149 281 1219 -14.56 
Trust 
18-29  72 50 90 91 303 -3.80 
30 and over   337 144 254 269 1004 -10.36 
Intelligence 
18-29  30 28 71 30 159 12.26 
30 and over   108 74 130 119 431 -2.67 
Personality 
18-29  30 39 54 122 245 -12.04 
30 and over   123 110 220 325 778 -7.58 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  70 69 121 63 323 8.82 
30 and over   248 165 334 208 955 2.25 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  279 285 276 294 1134 -0.53 
30 and over   873 694 776 829 3172 -3.66 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  53 85 59 95 292 -0.68 
30 and over   235 336 143 415 1129 -7.57 
Party Affect 
18-29  10 28 26 6 70 27.14 
30 and over   87 117 145 39 388 17.53 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  19 63 28 28 138 15.94 
30 and over   81 193 90 91 455 12.20 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  77 150 101 121 449 5.90 
30 and over   351 524 344 495 1714 0.64 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  67 73 24 48 212 -4.25 
30 and over   180 155 60 184 579 -12.87 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  69 72 122 56 319 10.82 
30 and over   196 217 343 128 884 13.35 
Social Welfare 
18-29  24 34 59 35 152 11.18 
30 and over   86 106 124 151 467 -0.75 
Moral Issues 
18-29  6 8 11 17 42 -4.76 
30 and over   6 18 10 46 80 -15.00 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  2 8 3 1 14 28.57 
30 and over   7 22 13 7 49 21.43 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  14 18 23 15 70 8.57 
30 and over   52 54 61 50 217 3.00 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  38 59 91 45 233 14.38 
30 and over   220 104 163 157 644 -8.54 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  148 181 227 150 706 7.79 
30 and over   524 493 548 510 2075 0.17 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  19 120 186 31 356 35.96 
30 and over   87 424 553 115 1179 32.87 




















18-29  39 18 11 28 96 -19.79 




18-29  87 22 7 40 156 -31.41 
30 and over   266 76 21 120 483 -29.92 
Trust 
18-29  18 49 29 24 120 15.00 
30 and over   71 143 72 97 383 6.14 
Intelligence 
18-29  19 5 10 34 68 -27.94 
30 and over   43 11 18 122 194 -35.05 
Personality 
18-29  7 5 13 59 84 -28.57 
30 and over   63 24 23 177 287 -33.62 
Gen Candidate 
Comments 
18-29  37 18 26 23 104 -7.69 
30 and over   160 61 63 129 413 -19.98 
Total Cand 
Comments 
18-29  148 93 73 164 478 -15.27 
30 and over   501 268 174 519 1462 -19.77 
Party Admin 
and Conduct 
18-29  36 50 30 60 176 -4.55 
30 and over   136 154 81 230 601 -10.90 
Party Affect 
18-29  3 13 13 7 36 22.22 
30 and over   56 43 107 32 238 13.03 
People in the 
Party 
18-29  22 19 14 35 90 -13.33 
30 and over   76 34 34 101 245 -22.24 
Total Party 
Comments 
18-29  56 76 51 91 274 -3.65 
30 and over   228 208 197 322 955 -7.59 
Foreign Policy 
18-29  146 74 69 74 363 -10.61 
30 and over   325 178 106 209 818 -15.28 
Economic 
Policy 
18-29  45 53 37 18 153 8.82 
30 and over   104 148 115 74 441 9.64 
Social Welfare 
18-29  20 24 29 59 132 -9.85 
30 and over   84 77 78 140 379 -9.10 
Moral Issues 
18-29  1 0 0 1 2 -50.00 
30 and over   2 0 0 5 7 -50.00 
Energy and the 
Environment 
18-29  1 2 1 0 4 25.00 
30 and over   1 1 2 0 4 25.00 
Other Dom. 
Issues 
18-29  9 13 13 10 45 7.78 
30 and over   52 44 39 31 166 0.00 
General Issue 
Comments 
18-29  29 13 39 43 124 -8.06 
30 and over   107 37 66 150 360 -21.39 
Total Issue 
Comments 
18-29  180 127 135 131 573 -4.28 
30 and over   451 348 276 399 1474 -7.67 
Group 
Associations 
18-29  17 86 110 13 226 36.73 
30 and over   63 263 295 97 718 27.72 
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